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Abstract:
Project management in the shipbuilding industry is a complex and misunderstood
field. Ship programs are often delivered behind schedule and over budget. Many
external factors can cause a relatively well run program to experience problems. These
include material shortages, labor problems or customer generated design changes. Even
harder for a manager to understand are internally generated problems from sources like
overtime use, hiring and firing policy, and cost estimating.
Project managers do not understand or have the tools to measure many of the
dynamic features of a construction process. These features include feedback, time delays
and nonlinear cause and effect relationships among project components. In general,
people have a hard time dealing with nonlinear relationships in their mental models of the
world. When three or four of these relationships are operating at the same time, the
resulting complexity becomes very hard to unravel intuitively. Experienced program
managers can describe dynamics and understand they are operating on the system. They
cannot quantify the strength or impact of these features on their project.
The purpose of this paper is to use System Dynamics modeling to examine the
Navy Ship Acquisition and Construction process and to increase the knowledge and
understanding concerning the management of large Navy shipbuilding projects. System
Dynamics captures the many complex facets of ship construction simultaneously and
examines their behavior over time. Using simulation, project managers in the Navy and
in the private sector can make better, more quantitative decisions.
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Chapter 1
1.1 - Introduction:
The Naval shipbuilding industry is a complex and misunderstood field. Projects
are typically behind schedule and over budget. Many external factors can cause a
relatively well run program to experience problems. These include material shortages,
labor problems or customer generated design changes. Even harder for a manager to
understand are internally generated problems from sources like overtime use, hiring and
firing policy, and cost estimating. Project managers do not understand or have the tools
to measure many of the dynamic features of a construction process. These features
include feedback, time delays and nonlinear cause and effect relationships among project
components.' In general, people have a hard time dealing with nonlinear relationships in
their mental models of the world. When three or four of these relationships are operating
at the same time, the resulting complexity becomes very hard to unravel intuitively.
Experienced program managers can describe dynamics and understand they are operating
on the system. They cannot quantify the strength or impact of these features on their
project.
The nature of the product also adds to the project's complexity. A ship is built
from a multitude of small manufactured parts that are assembled into larger parts and
finally fit together as construction blocks. If the small assemblies are not built to proper
'Ford, D. N., (1995), The Dynamics of Project Management: An Investigation of the Impacts of Project
Process and Coordination on Performance. Ph.D. Thesis. Sloan School of Management. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. Cambridge, MA.
tolerances, errors compound downstream to cause rework or out of sequence work. The
precedence relationships of one phase of the project on another can lead to large delay
and disruption penalties. If an error occurs in the design of the ship, it may not be
discovered until many of the small assembles have been manufactured. If the required
design change is large enough, many of the smaller assemblies may be rendered obsolete.
The results of such behavior include huge cost over runs, schedule slippage and poor
customer relations.
Much work is ongoing to better define the product with 3-D product models. All
new Navy ship programs require an electronic version of the ship that can be transferred
from the government to the shipyard and back. Not much has been done in modeling and
simulating the process by which ships are built. The real improvements that can be made
in reducing the costs of Navy ships will come through proces improvement, not through
product optimization. By taking into account necessary process changes in product
design, significant improvements in productivity can be realized.
The market for America's shipbuilders has gone from bad to worse in the last few
years. Foreign competition has eroded the commercial industrial base. The US Navy is in
a period of consolidation, limiting the amount of available government shipbuilding
contracts. The lack of new work has made project management even more critical to ship
builders. Problems with an existing project could cause the loss of future work with a
valuable customer. Many major shipbuilders are experimenting to find new ways to
improve the process in order to compete at home and abroad. The ship construction cycle
can take five to fifteen years. The process starts with initial concept design and ends with
delivery to the customer. Cycle time reductions are critical in order to deliver a ship that
meets an existing market or threat.
Much time and effort has been expended trying to revitalize the ship building
industry in this country. A strong ship building industry allows the Navy to take
advantage of state of the art commercial practices. The best practices of a market leader
will result in reduced costs for Navy ships. Without a strong commercial base, the Navy
must shoulder the cost and risk of developing any new technology. This is an expensive
proposition. Perhaps the time has come to take a fresh look at the shipbuilding process.
Business as usual clearly is not working.
The purpose of this paper is to use System Dynamics modeling to examine the
Navy Ship Acquisition and Construction process and to increase the knowledge and
understanding concerning the performance of large Navy shipbuilding projects. A
glossary of terms is included in Appendix C to decipher the acronyms and unique
terminology of shipbuilding. Likewise, System Dynamics is used to capture the many
complex inter-relationships of ship construction simultaneously and examines their
behavior over time. Jay Forrester developed the field in the early sixties to study
complex social systems. System Dynamics has expanded in recent years to study product
development processes in the software and automobile industries. Shipbuilding consists
of large, complex, capital intense projects. Shipbuilders consider prototyping too
expensive. Because of this, shipbuilding is a natural field for use of simulation.
Any large scale construction project demonstrates the following characteristics:
* Extremely complex, consisting of multiple interdependent components
* Highly dynamic
* Involve multiple feedback processes
* Involve nonlinear relationships
* Utilize "hard" and "soft" data2
All of these factors complicate the management of these projects. Shipbuilding has been
the focus of several earlier System Dynamics studies. The most widely known cases
involve litigation against the government. Potential exists for wider use of simulation in
this field. Some proposed uses include:
* Contract Bid Analysis
* Productivity Improvements
* Optimal Manning Analysis
* Build vs. Buy Studies
* Policy Assessment
* Design Change Assessment and Management
* Cost Estimation
In this paper, computer simulation is used to investigate some of the management
policies and constraints found in a shipyard. By combining these management policies,
2 Sterman, J.D., (1992), "System Dynamics Modeling for Project Management," unpublished working
paper, Systems Dynamics Group. Sloan School of Management. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
shipyard constraints and the products characteristics in one model, the cumulative effect
of all decisions a shipbuilder makes concerning a ship program can be examined. A
computer model requires the user to define boundaries and make assumptions concerning
the level of aggregation. The definition of boundaries narrows the scope of the model
and makes clear to the user the purpose and limits of the model.
1.2 Motivation
The US Navy manages some of the most complex and expensive projects
in the country. The weapon systems, ships and aircraft produced in these projects
are the most capable in the world. Problems inevitably arise in managing these
high risk programs that produce cutting edge, state of the art hardware. Operating
with risk is better understood in the commercial sector. Investing in new
technology is a risky proposition and must be managed accordingly. Many
innovators never take their product to market.3 The inventor who introduces a
new technology is often overtaken and forced out of business by a later entry
competitor. Sometimes it is easier to let the competition develop a new risky
technology. Once a dominant design is established the risks involved decrease.
Small improvements in the product and the manufacturing process provide a
competitive advantage. In this way, one could develop a competitive product
without being exposed to large risks.
3 Utterback, J.M., (1994), Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation, Harvard Business School Press, Boston,
MA.
This is not an option for the US Navy. The United States has long relied
on a commitment to using the latest technology in our military hardware as a
tactical advantage. Allowing the enemy to take the lead in developing new
weapon systems could have dire consequences for the Navy. Experiences in the
Gulf War indicate that technology can be effectively used as a force multiplier.
The Department of Defense has had significant problems integrating new
technology into existing product lines in an expeditious and affordable manner.
Technology integration has become even more critical in the last few years with
the rapid development of information systems, computational capability, and
global inter-connectivity. To maintain our technological advantage we must do
things smarter, cheaper, and faster than the enemy.
Computer hardware frequently becomes obsolete in less than 5 years. This
forces a similar reduction in military product development times. Current cycle
times for Navy ships from concept design to final delivery may take as long as
fifteen years. During this period of time the entire world may have changed. Just
such a scenario occurred with the Seawolf class submarine. The Seawolf was
designed at the height of the Cold War to be the most capable attack submarine in
the world. Its primary mission was to attack Russian submarines. In the time it
took to design and build the Seawolf, the Russian Navy virtually collapsed. The
threat the Seawolf was built to meet no longer exists. This left the Navy with a
very capable, and expensive, ship with no legitimate adversary. Most of the class
was canceled as a result. Cycle time reductions are a critical improvement the
Navy must make in order to match hardware with current requirements.
For the military, failing to utilize a critical technology could mean the
difference between winning the next battle and not coming home! For the private
sector, the situation is very similar. Missing a jump in technology could mean
loss of market share and could drive the company to bankruptcy. The stakes in
both cases are very high. A recent study conducted to benchmark product
development projects around the world indicates that less than fifty percent meet
their targets for cost and schedule. 4 Clearly something is acting to mislead
planners and managers as to the real cost and schedule needed to develop new
products.
The latest and most expensive case of mismanagement of a military
program is the new attack aircraft designated the A-12. Although many people
involved with this program were aware of serious problems with weight and
schedule, the project was allowed to continue. The performance for cost and
schedule demonstrates exponential behavior as can be see in Figure 1-1.
4 Roberts, E.B., (1992) "Strategic Management of Technology: Global Benchmarking," Cambridge MA
A-12 Cost and Schedule Performance
Figure 1-1 A-12 Cost and Schedule Performance
The managers of this program chose to quibble about specific ceilings and
scheduled dates instead of looking at the behavior of the project. Clearly, the
project was out of control early in 1989 when overruns reached $100 million
dollars. By March of 1990, it was estimated to be more than $1 billion dollars
over budget and 1 year behind schedule. The contractor team of General
Dynamics and MacDonald Douglas, the Navy management team, and the
Congressional Oversight Group all were using different models to predict
program performance. The program was eventually canceled resulting in a huge
loss of taxpayer's dollars, new capability for the Navy's attack aircraft component
and million of dollars in revenues for the contractor team. The law suit as to who
is responsible for the brunt of the losses is still in litigation.
5 Beach, C.B., (1990) "A-12 Administrative Inquiry", Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.
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Why, with the stakes so high and the talent available, do these problems
occur? What are the underlying causes for the cost and schedule overruns
experienced in large military development projects? Why are cost and schedule
estimating tools so bad at predicting what would really happen given a set of
conditions? Are there policies that can be used to address dynamic sets of
circumstances which result in better project performance? These are all questions
that will be addressed in this work.
1.3 Outline
A literature search is conducted to determine the current state of the Navy
ship acquisition process. The affordability crisis the Navy is currently
experiencing in acquiring the new ships it needs is examined. Hypotheses on how
to improve the process will be generated and discussed for applicability.
Several current acquisition reform measures instituted by the Department
of Defense aimed at improving the process including Affordability Through
Commonality (ATC) and Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) will be reviewed for
their impact on the crisis.
The National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP) is one of several
projects which study ways to improve the competitiveness of US shipyards. Part
of the NSRP approach is to encourage the development of a Build Strategy for
each yard. A Build Strategy consists of all of the important decisions a builder
and a customer must make in order to build a ship. If the Build Strategy is well
thought out, the program has a better chance of success. Build Strategy
development is discussed and a plan is formulated for a high performance
commercial ship. Key events are identified. Block breaks and construction
sequence are discussed. The different stages through which the parts that make up
the ship are discussed.
A series of shipyard visits is conducted to observe US Navy ship building
in commercial yards. The different sequences used for building ships and the
critical features of managing these projects are discussed. Several hard to
quantify variables like quality, productivity, and rework are discussed with
shipbuilders. The shipyards include:
* Avondale Industries, New Orleans, LA
* Bath Iron Works, Bath, ME
* Ingalls Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, MI
* NASSCO, San Diego, CA
In many cases the perspective of a program manager is formed by the tools
used to measure performance. Without robust tools that can capture the important
factors of a project, a manager will be operating with an incomplete picture.
Current tools used to manage Navy projects and develop cost estimates are
discussed. The advantages and disadvantages of the current tools are reviewed.
One management field that has received little attention from the Navy is System
Dynamics. Dynamic models have been used in the past by contractors to describe
the shipbuilding process in support of delay and disruption claims against the
government. Although System Dynamics was used successfully by shipbuilders
to demonstrate their case, the Navy chose not to develop any of their own models.
A dynamic model, the Ship Production Model, is developed and examined
in detail to determine it's applicability to Navy ship construction. The
observations and data collected during the shipyard visits are used to develop the
structure and policies found in the model. The model's purpose and boundaries
are discussed. The structure of the dynamic sectors of the model are examined in
detail.
The Ship Production Model is used to determine the best way to build a
new ship in a virtual shipyard. Several policies are examined including: quality,
use of overtime, and required manning levels. Analysis is conducted to determine
the choke point in the process. Infrastructure is added to determine its impact on
the performance of the project.
The model is tuned to exhibit the features of existing shipyards. A
comparisons of two shipyards is conducted on a high performance commercial
ship program. Schedule and cost performance are evaluated. Several ways to
improve the productivity of each yard are discussed.
Finally, the implications for future use of Systems Dynamics in Navy
program management are discussed. Dynamic models become the reservoir of
much information about the system. The real value of the model is the chance to
examine policies in detail rapidly and without risk to the program. The models
become valuable communications tools that can be used to find common ground
between the government and the contractor on difficult issues. Models could be
used as early as the concept design stage to make clear the goals and objectives of
all interested parties. By providing a tool to practice the management of a large
project, problems like those experienced on the A-12 can be avoided.
Chapter 2 - Literature Search
In this chapter, a review of the literature is conducted to determine the current
state of the Navy ship construction process. The cost of buying Navy ships has increased
steadily in the past 20 years. The dynamics behind this increase will be investigated
using causal loops. Several initiatives that attempt to remediate this problem will be
investigated including acquisition reform, revitalizing the commercial industrial base, and
build strategy development. Possible solutions to this Affordability Crisis are discussed.
These include Lean Shipbuilding. Finally, the use of System Dynamics modeling is
discussed as a way to better understand the complexities of shipbuilding and to examine
the true impact of some of the reform measures.
2.1 The Affordability Crisis
The Navy is currently experiencing a crisis in which it can no longer afford the
ships it requires. Several acquisition reform programs including Affordability Through
Commonality (ATC), Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS), and Standards and
Specification Reform have been developed to address this crisis. These are described in
detail in the next section. Some of these programs may have a real impact on the cost of
future ships. Others are merely first aid to correct a small but visible problem.
Several programs have also been instituted to try to revitalize commercial
shipbuilding in this country. These include the MARITECH Program, National
Shipbuilding and Research Program (NSRP), and Mid-Term Sealift Ship Technology
Development Program (MTSSTDP). These efforts study why the commercial
shipbuilding industrial base has eroded since 1980 and attempt to find corrective
measures. They also try to show US shipbuilders how they can become world class
manufacturers. Foreign shipbuilders can produce ships faster and cheaper than their
American counterparts. Without throughput to improve shipbuilding methods and
productivity, American yards will continue to lag behind foreign yards when competing
for commercial contracts. Either more Navy work needs to be generated or commercial
work needs to be stimulated in some way.
It is critical to understand the true nature of the Affordability Crisis before
attempting to repair it. In some cases, two acquisition reform programs are in conflict
with each other. Although each measure sounds like a good idea on paper, each must be
tested for applicability in real life amidst the complexities of the process. The dynamic,
non-linear nature of the ship construction and acquisition process is difficult to grasp.
Because of this, some solutions address one part of the crisis while ignoring the big
picture. Applying solutions that do not take into account the entire problem may have a
detrimental effect instead of the desired positive effect. Causal loop diagrams are used to
try to capture some of the dynamic behavior that is described but not explicitly defined by
other authors. Many articles discuss pieces of the crisis but few capture the whole
picture. Without a broader perspective, true acquisition reform is not possible.
2.11 Reference Modes
The process used to develop a System Dynamics model involves:
* Reference Mode Identification
* Dynamic Hypothesis
* Modeling
* Analysis
These steps force the modeler to fully examine the system of interest. In many cases,
valuable insight can be gained during each step in the process. 6 For the Affordability
Crisis, the first two steps in the modeling effort will be conducted. To fully model and
analyze the Affordability Crisis is beyond the scope of this work.
The first way to examine this problem is to look at historical data on a set of axes.
From these plots, trends can be observed concerning the nature of the problem. These
trends describe behavior of the important variables in the problem. The behavior will
indicate whether a variable represents a problem or not. Is the variable exhibiting linear
behavior or does it exhibit exponential behavior? Does the growth decay slowly to an
upper limit or does it continue to infinity? Is the behavior cyclical? Much insight can be
gained by examining the reference modes of a problem in this fashion. The first
reference mode for the Affordability Crisis is demonstrated in Figure 2-2.
6 Hines, J.H. and Johnson, D.W., (1994), Launching System Dynamics, International System Dynamics
Conference.
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Figure 2-2 - Cost of Surface Combatant Ships in $K (FY 90)/TON
The total acquisition cost in constant dollars of Navy surface combatant ships per
ton is steadily increasing with time. The behavior associated with this trend is linearly
increasing. These costs are the result of several inter-related dynamics.
First, more military capability is required to counter the threat of faster, deadlier,
and more widely distributed advanced weapons systems. The military tends to
incorporate new technology to a greater extent and is willing to assume more risk than
commercial product development groups. To remain the technological leader of military
hardware in the world, the Navy must pay "innovator" costs. In the commercial world,
this role is called an industry leader. This position has its advantages and disadvantages.
Being first to market allows you to grab market share from the competition if the new
product is superior. However, once a product has been brought to market, the
competition has the luxury of reverse engineering to determine what went into the
development effort. Sometimes it may be more cost efficient to follow the market leader
with a similar product if the development effort is risky. Thus far the US military has
committed itself to remaining an industry leader. The costs associated with this strategy
must be understood and dealt with accordingly. This behavior will be described as the
Arms Race dynamic.
Second, the decrease in Navy ship end strength numbers reduces new ship
construction contracts. After a peak in 1990, the trend has been sharply downward.
Several projections have been made concerning the future size of the Navy including the
Surface Combatant Force Level Study and the Bottoms Up Review. Based on these
studies, current national directives call for a force of between 325 and 350 ships for the
foreseeable future. The current defense budget spending does not even support this level.
As the worldwide threat changes, these levels will be adjusted accordingly.
The portion of the defense budget allocated to ship construction is around $5
billion dollars per year. To support the current force levels at current costs, the required
expenditures to maintain a 325 ship Navy is $7.4 billion dollars as indicated in Table 2-1.
Ship Type #/year Service Life Force Level $B/year
CG/DD 3 30 90 2.7
CV 0.2 50 10 0.9
A 1 30 30 0.5
SSN 1 30 30 1.5
SSBN 0.5 30 15 1
AMPHIBS 2 25 50 0.8
Totals 225 7.4
Table 2-1 - Force Levels and Expenditures
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Figure 2-3 - Size of the US Navy
Third, the Navy's support infrastructure is harder to downsize than number of
ships. This results in higher cost of support infrastructure until adjustments can be made
through the Base Realignment and Closure program (BRAC). This dynamic will also be
discussed in Military Industrial Base.
2000
With fewer ships being built, volume discounts associated with long production runs are
not achieved. The unit cost of doing business increases since there is less business over
which to spread overhead costs. This behavior will be further discussed in the Military
Industrial Base diagram. Figure 2-3shows the trend for the number of ships on active
duty in the Navy.
The commercial shipbuilding industry in the United States has been in decline for
some time. The reference mode for this is demonstrated in Figure 2-4.
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Figure 2-4 - Domestic Shipbuilding Market
This trend was obscured during the push for a 600 ship Navy in the military
buildup of the 1980's. The Japanese and the Koreans continue to capture most of the
market share of new construction commercial shipping. If the Navy is to ever realize
lower costs for their ships, the domestic shipbuilders will need to update their
shipbuilding methods to the level of the competition. If US yards could capture a
reasonable portion of the commercial market, valuable experience could be gained in
modem production methods. The modern techniques used by world class shipyards
would result in decreasing the cost of producing Navy ships.
With the paltry share of the market enjoyed by American Shipyards, currently 1.2
%, the required improvements in shipbuilding technology will not occur without
government subsidies. No commercial base exists to provide the economies of scale
necessary to stimulate improvement. In the automotive and aerospace industries, great
strides have been made to improve American competitiveness on a global basis. Without
a healthy commercial industrial base, shipbuilding in this country will never become
world class. It is quite apparent by examining the order book of American shipyards
today in Figure 2-5 that we are not competetive. 7
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Figure 2-5 - Shipbuilding Trends
If the commercial base continues in its present state of decline, the Navy will be
faced with a monopsony in which only one customer exists in a given market. DOD
acquisition regulations require competitively bid contracts. With the few number of new
ships currently being built and more importantly, the meager amount of ships planned for
the next 20 years, private shipyards may not have the work to stay in business. In order
to maintain the industrial base, the Navy has been forced to pay an exorbitant amount for
each new ship. This behavior is defined further in the Commercial Industrial Base
diagram.
Finally, the level of uncertainty in the basic national objectives adds to cost of
doing business. The proliferation of advanced technologies make staying ahead of the
game a very expensive proposition. During the Cold War, the huge expenditures needed
to maintain our technological edge were justified as a national priority. In the post Cold
War era, the threats to our interests are not as well defined. Without a clear threat, the
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justification for new expenditures is not as apparent. For this reason, specialized ships
that are built to counter specific threats look less attractive. "Future uncertainties
establish an increased value and need for flexibility on operational usage."8 This changes
the emphasis for ship designers. To deal with uncertainty, they need to design in
flexibility or margin for future upgrades. Instead of optimizing the ship for a specific
mission, the design margin allows for growth or new weapons packages in the future.
2.12 Definition of Terms
The next step in examining the problem is to define the important variables
associated with Navy ship construction and acquisition. Once the variables are identified,
they can be grouped by their relation to each other. A brief description of how they
change over time is included. These variables involved with the Affordability Crisis were
gleaned from literature and interviews with shipbuilders and Navy program managers.
Arms Race Dynamic
Advanced Weapons Proliferation - The rate at which high tech weapons spread to other
nations. Today's world is characterized by little if no real threat to US Interests. For this
reason, the leading arms exporter in the world has become the United States. The rate at
which advanced weapons proliferates to the Third World is faster than ever before.
Actual Threat - Advanced weapons in the hands of countries or individuals at political or
economic odds with the objective of the United States.
8Bosworth, M. L.and Hough, J. J. (1993). Improvements in Ship Affordability. The Society of Naval
Architects and Marine Engineers Centennial Meeting.
Perceived Threat - Based on intelligence sources. Currently perceived to be low. The
perceived threat drives the commitment of funds to the military. If the perceived threat is
low, fewer dollars allocated to the military. The problem with the Perceived Threat is
that it takes time to formulate. It is also subject to the biases of the analyst. Several times
in recent history, the United States has found itself caught looking the other way because
the Perceived Threat was wrong.
Required Military Capability of US Ships - The number of ships, aircraft and missiles
needed to carry out the missions tasked by higher authority. Current tasking calls for the
ability to fight two Major Regional Conflicts simultaneously. As force levels drop, this
requirement may need to be revised.
Cost of Navy Ships - The acquisition cost of Navy ships. The material, labor, and
shipyard overhead costs that make up the purchase price of a Navy ship.
Pressure for Reciprocating Capability - The pressure for countries at odds with US
objectives to match the technology and weapons of the US
Military Industrial Base
Navy Order Book - The amount of work the shipyards have on order generated by the
Navy. Consists of new construction, conversion or maintenance. In the eighties the total
Navy Order Book came close to twenty billion dollars a year. 9 In the leaner times of the
nineties, the Order Book is more like six or seven billion dollars.
9 On the Rebound? Navy Business, Marine Reporter and Engineering News, February 1997.
Need for New Ships - There are several things that drive the need for new ships. First,
older ships need to be replaced as they reach the end of their service lives. New ships
may also be needed to meet a new threat. This was the case of the Mine Hunters built in
the early nineties. Finally, in time of war, ships need to be built to replace damaged or
lost ships. The current need for new ships is low. More ships will leave the Navy this
year than will be commissioned.
Defense Budget - The amount of money committed each year to supporting the military.
Part of this is committed to Ship Construction, Navy (SCN), the portion that goes to
building new ships. Current defense spending is lower than it has been since the
seventies.
Required Military Capability - The ability to carry out the objectives of higher authority
against a given threat. As the enemy capability rises, the Required Military Capability
Rises as well.
Capability Gap - The gap between the existing capability of the Navy and the capability
required to achieve the objectives outlined by higher authority.
US Shipyard Overhead Rate - The rate charged to a ship contract that covers the
infrastructure and management costs of the shipyard. If the yard has very little work,
these charges have to be absorbed over a smaller revenue base. This drives the overhead
charges up for any one contract.
Commercial Industrial Base
Foreign Productivity - The ability of foreign yards to produce ships measured in
tons/person/year. The productivity of foreign shipbuilders, in particular the Japanese, is
considerably higher than typical US workers on similar projects. The reasons for this
difference will be discussed in a later section.
US Productivity - The ability of American shipbuilders to produce ships measured in
tons/person/year.
Foreign Order Book - The amount of work, measured in dollars, that a shipyard has
under contract. A large order book means the future will remain stable. It allows
investments in personnel, infrastructure and process improvements.
US Commercial Order Book - The amount of work American yards have under contract.
Foreign Construction Costs - The total acquisition cost to the ship buyer in a foreign
yard.
US Construction Costs - The total acquisition cost to the ship buyer in a domestic yard.
The cost of buying ships in this country has grown to almost double what a similar ship
would cost overseas.
Foreign Subsidies - Many foreign countries offer construction subsidies to shipyards.
This acts to reduce the cost to the shipowner of buying a ship in that country. Stimulating
heavy industry in these countries is a national priority.
US Subsidies - In 1980, the United States government eliminated the Construction
Differential Subsidy (CDS) which was designed to keep American shipyards competitive
in the world shipbuilding market. The commercial shipbuilding base has been in decline
since this time. Under the Clinton Administrations National Shipbuilding Initiative
(NSI), other forms of subsidies have been explored. These include NSRP studies,
MARITECH funding for new ship designs, and Title XI financing and guaranteed loans
for new ships and for investments in infrastructure to try to make the US shipyards more
competitive.
2.13 Causal Loops
The final step is to build causal loops that link the variables. In this way the
relationships between the variables can be shown. A polarity is assigned to the arrows
that connect the variables. If the polarity is positive, the two variables behave in the same
way. If the polarity is negative, the two variables act reciprocally. If one increases, the
other decreases. The loops created can be either balancing or reinforcing loops. These
are designated by either a balancing scale or a snow ball rolling down hill respectively.
Three separate dynamic relationships act to increase the cost of Navy ships. Determining
the strength of these loops will require more research. Understanding that more than one
force is acting at any time is critical to solving the problem.
The first loop modeled is the Arms Race Dynamic depicted in Figure 2-6. The
Actual Threat of armed conflict in the world positively affects the Perceived Threat with
a time delay. The Perceived Threat is a combination of intelligence and strategic national
objectives. Based on this Perceived Threat, the Required Military Capability of US
Ships to meet the threat is developed. This capability consists of a combination of
platforms which can carry out various missions. The actual capabilities required are
better defined if the perceived threat is well understood. If the perceived threat is not as
well defined, the platforms that are used to meet this threat need to have multi-mission
capabilities or be reconfigurable. As the Perceived Threat increases, the Required
Military Capability of US Ships also increases. As more capability is required, the level
of technology needed to respond tends to increase with a subsequent increase in cost.
Figure 2-6 - Arms Race Dynamic
The dynamic part of the arms race is that as the current capability of US Ships
increases, the level of technology needed to match this capability increases. Pressure for
Reciprocating Capability is placed on other world powers to match this new capability
with a time delay. This pressure tends to increase the rate of Advanced Weapons
Proliferation. In turn, weapons proliferation increases the Actual Threat to US objectives.
This completes a reinforcing feedback loop that has been the topic of much discussion
since the beginning of warfare. The Arms Race Dynamic has been the cause of many
wars including World War I and has resulted in the expenditure of countless dollars.
Defusing this reinforcing feedback loop has proven to be a huge challenge.
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The next loop, the Military Industrial Base Dynamic shown in Figure 2-7, deals
with the decreasing level of the US fleet and the subsequent loss of business for US
Shipbuilders. The Perceived Threat directly affects the amount of money allotted to the
Defense Budget. It also affects the Required Military Capability of US Ships. As was
seen directly after the Persian Gulf War, without a legitimate threat, the Congress looks to
reduce the money expended on the military. The funding for additional defense spending
usually evaporates long before the Required Military Capability of US Ships is adjusted.
The problem is that these Defense Budget cuts are based on the Perceived Threat, not the
Actual Threat. If deep cuts in capability are made too rapidly, it is impossible to
regenerate this capability in a timely fashion should the Perceived Threat change. In
some cases, contractors who make products exclusively for the military are forced out of
business.
As the Perceived Threat decreases, the amount of money dedicated to the Defense
Budget decreases. The Navy Order Book for new construction and for service life
extensions is correspondingly reduced. As the amount of work the Navy orders from the
shipyards decreases, the US Shipyard Overhead increases. Overhead is the amount of
money that is charged to a contract to cover the costs of shipyard infrastructure. As the
work decreases, the overhead is spread out over fewer projects thus increasing the cost of
each contract. As the US Shipyard Overhead increases, the Cost of Navy Ships also
increases. As the Cost of Navy Ships increases, the number of ships the Navy can buy
for the allocated money decreases. This, in turn reduces the Navy Order Book resulting
in another reinforcing feedback loop.
Military Industrial Base
Figure 2-7 - Military Industrial Base
The final loop, shown in Figure 2-8 deals with a problem that has been developing
in this country since 1980, the Commercial Shipbuilding Industrial Base. When the US
government decided to cut the Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS), US Shipbuilders
could no longer compete with their overseas competition for commercial ship contracts.
Looking at the diagram, as US Subsidies decrease, US Construction Costs increase. This
tends to increase the cost differential between US and Foreign Construction Costs. As
the cost differential increases, the US Commercial Order Book decreases and the Foreign
Order Book increases. As the Commercial Order Book decreases, the US Shipyard
Overhead rate increases resulting in higher costs for Navy ships. The distressing part of
this diagram is that as the US Commercial Order Book decreases, US Productivity also
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decreases. The ability to keep up with state of the art shipbuilding practices requires
work on which to learn these skills.
A quick look at the reference modes indicates the US Commercial Order Book
has been practically non existent for the last 15 years. As US Productivity decreases, US
Construction Costs continue to increase resulting in a reinforcing loop. Contrarily, the
Foreign Order Book has benefited from the cost differential. As more work has gone
overseas to the Japanese and the Koreans, their productivity has greatly improved. The
ability to practice modern shipbuilding techniques on commercial ships has provided the
foreign yards with a huge advantage. Having more work in the yard allows the Foreign
Overhead Rate to be spread over several contracts. As Foreign Productivity increases,
Foreign Construction Costs continue to decrease resulting in another reinforcing feedback
loop.
Figure 2-8 - Commercial Industrial Base
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US shipbuilders are in a very difficult situation. As the military order book
decreases, they have less business for which to compete. Without a significant order
book, the future remains risky for many yards. Investments in yard improvements are put
off until new contracts are signed. The productivity of American yards lags far behind
the foreign yards. We employ more shipyard workers than any other nation in the world.
Why then do we produce so few ships?
The improvements will come to US Productivity only if work can be generated on
which to learn modern practices. The US government has chosen to provide assistance to
the airline industry and the automotive industry at different times during the past twenty
years. These decisions were made because these industries represent vital national
interest. Similarly, the shipbuilding industry represents a vital national interest. The
shipyards are now looking to the Japanese to help improve shipbuilding processes. An
NSRP study identified several items as weaknesses in the way American yards build
ships when compared to foreign yards. Technology transfers have been attempted with
foreign yards to attempt to make up the shortfalls in new designs and technology.
Instituting a change in the management of the construction process will take an even
greater effort.
If the Affordability Crisis is allowed to continue, the Navy will not be able to buy
the necessary hardware to meet its commitments or adequately protect its personnel. US
Shipbuilders will not be competitive in the world market to win commercial ship
contracts. If they are forced to rely on the Navy as their sole customer several of the US
yards may be forced to close by the year 2000.
Looking at all of the loops of the Affordability Crisis simultaneously, we see that
there are many ways to reduce the cost of Navy ships. Not all of the of the variables
involved in this problem have bee discussed or even thought about. Some of these
suggestions may not be realistic in today's political environment. We could, for instance,
force the under utilized shipyards out of business by denying them Navy contracts. The
yards that have work should be fully loaded with work to increase learning on the
contracts available. The representatives to Congress from the states these yards are
located may have a difficult time letting a major industry, like shipbuilding, with many
well paying jobs leave their state. Congressmen have terms of 2 years. The real benefit
of reducing under utilized shipbuilding capacity will not be realized on a national for
several years after the closing. It may never be felt on the local level.
Another suggestion could be to re-assess Navy commitments around the world. If
we did not need to commit naval forces around the world, the required Military
Capability of Navy Ships could be reduced. This would immediately reduce the amount
of money we spend on ships. It would also act on the Arms Race Dynamic by reducing
the Pressure for Reciprocating Capability. In the long term it may have the desired result
of reducing the Actual Threat. The problem is that higher authority sets the commitments
for the Navy. Reducing the international profile of our Navy may have the desired effect
of reducing the amount of money we spend on ships. It may also indicate to leaders of
countries not so friendly to the US that the time has come to push their own national
agenda.
The strength of each of the loops needs to be determined using historical data. It
may be impossible for improvements in the Commercial Industrial Base loop to come
anywhere near reducing the cost of combatant ships to a significant degree. The push for
new technology may make this loop inconsequential. Is it more cost effective to
subsidize the construction of commercial ships in this country hoping to reap some
productivity gains or to directly invest in new technology for Navy ships? Many experts
say building a warship is an entirely different process from building a commercial ship.
By modeling the Affordability Crisis in greater detail, the insights needed to make good
decisions about investments in Navy shipbuilding could be made. Without the tools to
properly address all the aspects of shipbuilding, we may wastefully invest in the wrong
loop.
Another suggestion that will be further pursued further in this paper is to fund the
construction of high performance commercial ships directly. These ships are more
similar to combatant ships in their construction than typical break bulk, container or
product carriers. The government would fund the construction and then lease them to
commercial shippers at market rates. The government will need to replace the aging
Ready Reserve Fleet in the next ten years anyway. Why not make these ships
commercially viable? The Department of Defense could use these commercial ships as
Sealift assets in time of war. Commercial ship operators could use the superior capability
of these ships in peacetime. The increased Commercial Order Book would stimulate
increases in US Shipyard Productivity. It would also act to reduce US Shipyard
Overhead. Both of these would act to eventually reduce the cost of building Navy ships.
The time has come to make smarter use of government assets concerning US
Shipbuilding. Several initiatives are underway in the Navy to improve the acquisition
process. More must be done than merely putting band aids on the problem. An entirely
new way of doing business must be pursued if US Shipbuilders are to reclaim a market in
which they once dominated. In the next section, several acquisition reform programs will
be discussed. The initiatives aimed at stimulating commercial shipbuilding in this
country including MARITECH, NSRP and the Mid Term Sealift Technology
Development Program will also be reviewed in the context of the Affordability Crisis.
Questions that should be asked include what loops do these programs effect and what is
the magnitude of the contribution they will make? By taking a more systematic
approach, we can look at these programs from a different perspective.
2.2 Acquisition Reform
The goal of Acquisition Reform is cost reduction through adoption of best
commercial practices and streamlining advanced technology insertion. The process of
building a ship for the Navy is vastly different from building a commercial ship.
Additionally, the product development cycle time of a Navy ship (10-15 years) can be
two to three times the period required to develop a new commercial ship design.
Determining what technology will go into a ship 15 years in the future is an incredibly
risky task. The product development process and the cycle time must change if the Navy
wants to reduce the cost of buying ships. In order for the US Navy to take advantage of
best commercial practices, a viable commercial industrial base needs to exist.
This section examines several of the acquisition reform programs, COTS and
Standards and Specifications Reform, and the ATC program. These programs will then
be viewed in the context of the Affordability Crisis to determine which dynamic loop
they affect.
2.21 - Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS)
The Cold War forced the military to push for better and better technology at any
expense. Huge amounts of money were expended to develop the technology that would
allow the US military to maintain a tactical advantage. To address specific military
requirements for products a system of Military Specifications and Standards (MILSPEC
and MILSTD) were developed. The standards ensured the product met all requirements
of the military. Many commercial applications grew out of this Defense initiated research
program. In many cases, the commercial applications became more capable and less
expensive as they went through several generations of product development in the private
sector.
In the past few years, the technology trend has reversed itself for many products.
For example, the military no longer drives the push for smaller electronic components or
faster microprocessors. Commercial products are demanding faster data transfer rates
and more computing power than most military applications. The Navy, however, has
been stuck with the requirements of a MILSPEC product that may be less capable and
cost much more than the commercial product. The COTS program calls for increased use
of commercially available equipment. This allows the Navy to take advantage of the cost
savings from new technologies developed in the private sector. Clearly all the needs of
the Navy can not be met by the commercial sector. Commercial products in general are
not designed to go to war. However, as much of the common architecture as is feasibly
possible should be bought "off the shelf."
COTS will help to improve the Affordability Crisis. It reduces the cost of adding
Required Military Capability. By choosing a commercially viable product, the cost of
research and development associated with putting that piece of technology on a ship is
greatly reduced. When upgrades are required, a standard commercial interface will
usually allow a quick transition to the next version. For a military upgrade, the old
system more times than not will need to be torn out and replaced with a new unit. By
using more commercially available equipment, the development and acquisition costs of
Navy ships will be reduced.
2.22 Standards and Specifications
The Department of Defense has relied in the past on MILSPEC and MILSTD to
describe exactly what it needs for a certain applications. Standards have been used to
ensure the equipment meets all the rigors of a military environment. Many of the
Standards and Specifications have been "written in blood" of sailors who relied on
substandard equipment. Every time an accident occurred, another specification was
written to ensure it didn't happen again. Over the years, the number of different
specifications has grown to a staggering level.
In the past few years, many of these specifications have become obsolete. The
military industrial base to supply many of these parts has undergone significant
downsizing as well. In many cases the Navy is faced with products that have a single or
no supplier. The lack of competition for these products has allowed an increase in costs.
Without a wider commercial base for these products, they become custom made for the
military. One example is steel plate. Bath Iron Works is forced to buy MILSPEC DH-36
steel plate to use in the DDG-51. The steel suppliers will only produce this particular
plate in large lots. This requires Bath to purchase all of its steel plate in one lot during
the summer. The inventory then sits for up to a year before it is used. The cost of
maintaining excess inventory has become a hot topic among shipbuilders as they move to
Just In Time (JIT) manufacturing. Bath has been able to work out arrangements with
many of its sub-contractors to provide parts on a 72 hour basis. The plate manufacturers
could support this if the plate required was not MILSPEC.
Another aspect of the problem is that a commercial product may be available that
offers superior performance at reduced prices. Standards and Specifications reform is
aimed at being smart about procurement. The barriers to making smart decisions need to
be eliminated. In June of 1994, Secretary of Defense Perry called for the use of
"performance standards or non government standards to define new systems and system
modifications. Military specifications are only to be used as a "last resort", with an
appropriate waiver.""'
Looking at the Affordability Crisis, the Standards and Specification program
should also act to reduce the cost of providing Required Level of Capability to the Navy.
By removing the barriers to less expensive alternatives, the Navy promotes competition
among suppliers that should result in less expensive components.
COTS and Standards and Specification reform played a large role in the LPD-17
acquisition program. This ship was just recently awarded to the Avondale/Bath team.
Most of the ship had been designed by the time Secretary Perry discussed his vision for
reforms. Much effort was expended to sanitize the contract of government specifications
after the fact. More of an impact will be felt if these reform measures are implemented
during preliminary design. Despite its late start, COTS and Standards and Specifications
will have a significant impact on the end cost of the LPD-17. Quantifying this impact
will be critical for proponents who want to continue the movement away from
MILSPECs. Without a way to measure the long term benefit of these programs, the
process may revert to the better known MILSPEC methods. If future programs are as
attentive to what they ask of the contractor, the cost of building Navy ships could be
reduced.
10 Perry, W.J., (1994), Specifications and Standards - A New Way of Doing Business, SECDEF
Memorandum, 29 June 1994.
2.23 - The Affordability Through Commonality (ATC) Program
The goal of the ATC program is to improve the process by which the Navy,
designs, acquires, and provides lifetime support for ships used in national defense. By
standardizing equipment and designs across the fleet, economies of scale could be
generated. Reducing the number of different parts in the fleet improves the ability to
maintain or replace these parts. By building standard modules, the designs would
become more mature.
The increased use of commonality in naval ship design and acquisition will:
* Reduce design requirements and construction time
* Maintain reasonable procurement quantities at the equipment/subassembly
levels
* Improve shipbuilding quality control
* Permit ease of maintainability and upgradibility.
The ATC program receives its funding through the National Shipbuilding
Initiative established by President Clinton in 1994 to stimulate commercial shipbuilding
in the United States. The approach used to achieve this goal is a combination of
modularity, equipment standardization, and process simplification. The ATC office was
established to develop necessary strategies, standards, designs, specifications, and
procedures to lower costs of fleet ownership with commonality.
"1 Cable, C. W. and Rivers, T.M. (1992). Affordability Through Commonality. ASNE DDG-51 Technical
Symposium.
The current Navy order book does not support long production lines on which
productivity improvements could be made. Instead of building many of the same ship,
the ATC program promotes the use of common modules across ship classes. In this way,
economies of scale could be achieved. Prototype modules have been developed for
habitability, machinery/auxiliary systems and combat systems. Reducing the number of
different parts supported throughout the Navy would allow great reductions in the cost of
the maintenance system as well.
Another tenet of ATC is process simplification of production, logistics and
requirements. Process simplification includes the following: 12
* Standard designs for Hull, Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) systems
* Elimination of unnecessary military specifications and standards
* Procurement of equipment in large lots to support fleet levels
* Generic build strategies at the fleet level
* Efficient standard assembly of major systems and equipment
* More production oriented distributed systems architecture
* Increased concurrent assembly and testing of equipment and systems during
construction
* Fewer different types of systems to support
* Replaceable components and subassemblies to ease upgrade
12 Bosworth, M. L.and Hough, J. J. (1993). Improvements in Ship Affordability. The Society of Naval
Architects and Marine Engineers Centennial Meeting.
Several other industries have promoted commonality across product lines as a
way to reduce costs including the automobile industry. When Ford is set to develop its
next pickup truck the product development engineers make a conscious effort to use as
many successful components from existing vehicles as is practically possible. This
reduces the total product development cycle while providing mature systems intact
around which to build the new design. As in the car industry, the use of increased
commonality in naval ship design and acquisition can lead to shorter design and
construction times.
If cycle times can be reduced, the program costs and risk will also be reduced.
Additionally, the use of common components allows economies of scale to be realized
despite the decreasing number of ships being built. Commonality fosters improved
quality control and facilitates ease of maintenance and upgrade. Examining the
Affordability Crisis, ATC should contribute in several ways. First, by making ships more
common, the database of products offered can be reduced. This allows the use of more
mature designs that reduces the risk associated with new product development and the
total acquisition cost.
By producing many of the same module, the commercial industrial base could be
increased. Perhaps some of these modules could be used in commercial ships or off shore
platforms. This would reduce the cost of building commercial ships that could become a
competitive advantage for the shipyards. Standard propulsion packages like the LM-2500
have been successfully used fleetwide for the last twenty years. Similar gains in
commonality would act to reduce the cost of Navy ships.
While ATC promotes commonality across Navy designs, the problem is that the
program still uses Navy designers to develop the ATC modules. Forcing a shipbuilder to
use a Level III drawing prescribed by NAVSEA removes his initiative to improve the
process. Assuming that these modules could be built the same way for the same cost in
any shipyard is not realistic. Real standardization must come from the shipbuilders and
must be suited to their individual capabilities. They must be allowed to provide their
knowledge to the process. In order for ATC to reach its full potential, the different
program managers of the major ship programs need to choose standard components. Is
the SC-21 program manager going to accept the same combat systems architecture as
LPD-17? How much of the fleet can really be common? How difficult is the integration
of an entire module into a ship design? Is ATC really worth the trouble?
The ATC program also needs to find ways to quantify the savings that increased
commonality can produce. These savings come in many forms including design,
construction, maintenance and upgrade costs. Without a Life Cycle Cost (LCC)
estimating method, the true benefits of ATC can not be balanced against the costs.
Current program managers tend to look only at the savings the program can provide to
construction costs. A wider view over the life of the ship must be used in measuring the
ATC benefits. Tools must be developed to provide this big picture perspective to the
program managers and the Navy. "Actual, detailed real life costs to produce a ship are
not known. To realize the full cost savings benefit of modularization, supportive ship
architectures need to be incorporated in Navy ship designs and must be designed from
the ground up. "is
2.3 Commercial Shipbuilding Initiatives
The commercial shipbuilding market has been described as a "dog fight where
nobody makes any money. 14" Indeed the profit margins in an industry that faces huge
over capacity are low. Many countries, including Japan and Korea, have propped up their
national shipbuilders to gain a dominant portion of the market. With a large order book,
the market leaders have been able to upgrade their practices and implement new
technology into production lines. The rest of the participants in the commercial
shipbuilding world, U.S. yards in particular, have been left behind in terms of cycle times
and productivity. Without proper market forces to correct for these government
subsidies, the glut of excess tonnage will continue.
The National Defense Authorization Act of 1993 lay the groundwork for a
comprehensive plan to ensure that U.S. shipyards could eventually compete in the
international shipbuilding market. From this act comes a plan that attempts to:
* Ensure fair international competition
13 Bosworth, M. L.and Hough, J. J. (1993). Improvements in Ship Affordability. The Society of Naval
Architects and Marine Engineers Centennial Meeting.
14 Buttner, S., (1997) Interview conducted at MIT.
* Improve domestic competitiveness
* Eliminate unnecessary government regulations
* Finance ship sales through Title XI loan guarantees
* Assist International Marketing
The benefits of this legislation are starting to materialize. Some commercial work
has been stimulated although the jury is still out over whether this has improved
productivity in warship construction. It may be time to revisit this initiative and to
redirect its efforts to more productive areas. Some suggest a return to the Construction
Differential Subsidy of the seventies . Others call for tax benefits for shipbuilders.
Finally a call has gone out for increased funds for education. All of these are good ideas.
Some will have a more immediate effect than others. Again the problem is quantifying
the true impact of any of these programs individually or comprehensively.
2.31 MARITECH
Several foreign shipyards have established themselves as market leaders in
international shipbuilding. The Marine Systems Technology (MARITECH) program has
been designed to promote technology transfer, process improvements, product
development, and productivity and quality enhancement in US shipyards. Ishikawajima-
Harima Heavy Industries (IHI) Marine Technology in particular has been tapped for its
expertise as a world class shipbuilder by several U.S. yards. Focus areas include
shipbuilding standards, producibility, productivity, and shipyard management.
5 O'Neil, D.A., (1997) Is Our Military Unwittingly Helping to Scuttle the US Merchant Marine?, Sea
History 80, Winter 1996-1997.
MARITECH is a government cost-sharing program established by President
Clinton in 1994 to assist defense department shipyards in the research and development
of new designs for commercial ships. The program has generated several interesting ship
designs in this country. It remains to be seen if the domestic ship owners are willing to
invest in American built ships when they can buy less expensive ships overseas.
Looking at the Affordability Crisis, the MARITECH program attempts to increase
U.S. Productivity using best practices from foreign yards. If the positive feedback loop
that drives the costs of U.S. Ships can be properly stimulated, the commercial industrial
base may see an increase in Order Book as the Cost Differential swings more in favor of
US yards. The increased commercial work will lead to further improvements in
productivity and eventually additional cost savings. The initial stimulation of this
feedback loop is the critical component that is currently missing.
The differences between building conventional commercial ships like tankers and
bulk carriers and combatants may not facilitate increased productivity across product
lines. Perhaps high performance commercial ships may be the answer to improving the
construction of combatants. Several designs are currently available that attempt to
capture a high end container market. These designs use high performance hull forms and
advanced propulsion systems. If a commercial market for these type vessels could be
established, real savings on combatant ships may be realized while regaining a substantial
share of the commercial market.
2.32 National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP)
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 as amended in 1970 established the NSRP for
the purpose of providing a forum for productivity and technology improvements for the
U.S. shipbuilding industry. The mission of the NSRP is to "collaborate with shipbuilders
in developing plans for the economic construction of ships." Nine panels have been
established to allow interaction between industry, the Navy, and academia. These panels
include:
* SP-1 Facilities and Environmental Concerns
* SP-3 Surface Preparation and Coatings
* SP-4 Design/Production Integration
* SP-5 Human Resources Innovation
* SP-6 Marine Industry Standards
* SP-7 Welding
* SP-8 Industrial Engineering
* SP-9 Education
"The NSRP is a nationally recognized model for government/industry research program.
It has made a significant effort to maintain the industrial base needed for national
security."'" If this is the case, then why can't any U.S. shipbuilders produce a commercial
16 Rivers, T.M., Schiller, T.R., (1995) Naval Affordability: Right Heading, Wrong Course, Annual Meeting
of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineer.
ship as fast or as inexpensively as Japanese yards? The NSRP may provide the forum for
discussion but it seems obvious that the time has come for action and not words. To get
real improvements in productivity, revolutionary change is needed in the domestic
shipbuilding industry. Years of surviving on government contracts has ended. The
shipyards that cannot adapt and become more efficient need to be allowed to be driven
out of business regardless of the political ramifications. Shipbuilding is an industry
subject to market conditions. If the US government does not allow the market to weed
out the dead weight, real productivity gains will never occur. The only true competitive
advantage is the ability to innovate faster than your competitors. If US shipyards are not
forced to innovate based on market forces, they will never become competitive on a
world level.
The NSRP hosts a Ship Production Symposium annually. The major shipbuilders
come together to discuss the industries problems and to try to find ways to solve them.
Although some progress has been made, it seems the shipyards are not yet hungry enough
to make radical improvements to the way they build ships. Many of the papers presented
were interesting and generated discussion. They included modularity and product model
development. These were the same topics presented at the symposium back in 1993!
When will these ideas finally begin to catch on in the industry?
When viewed in the context of the Affordability Crisis, the NSRP acts to increase
US Productivity by stimulating change in the industry and introducing best practices from
world class shipyards. The NSRP carries out an important function although the benefits
are hard to quantify.
2.33 Mid-Term Sealift Ship Technology Development Program (MTSSTDP)
The MTSSTDP is a program that uses the shipyards, university personnel,
vendors, design consultants and the NAVSEA Shipbuilding Support Office
(NAVSHPSSO). The major objectives of this program include:
* Construction Contract Cycle Reductions
* Initial Acquisition Cost Reduction
* Replacement of MILSPEC Equipment with commercially acceptable versions
* Development of Enhanced 3-D Design Tools with access to Expert Systems
for Lessons Learned
* Identify and recommend change within the NAVSEA acquisition process
One significant contribution of the MTSSTDP has been the evaluation of dual use
ship designs. The main objective of this effort is to stimulate commercial shipbuilding
while producing valid assets that can meet the U.S. surge and follow on Sealift
requirements in the future. The program attempts to produce designs for a container ship
that can compete in commercial markets. This ship would also have installed National
Defense Features (NDF) allowing it to be rapidly converted to a military useful ship in
time of national emergency.
When viewed in the context of the Affordability Crisis, this program makes
perfect sense. To meet our transportation needs, the United States has relied on
commercial shipping to provide Sealift capacity in time of war. In the eighties, the
government chose to purchase excess commercial ships and maintain them in a reduced
state of readiness in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). Experience during Desert
Shield/Desert Storm indicates this may not be the most effective way of acquiring
capability. The "mothball fleet" was much harder to activate than originally anticipated.
Many ships on a five day alert status required several weeks to get underway. Foreign
container and break bulk ships were chartered to make up the shortfall in RRF assets. In
the next national crisis, foreign assets may not be available to pick up the slack for the
RRF.
The cost of maintaining the RRF at the pier in a degraded state of readiness
should be traded off against subsidizing the construction of new commercially viable
container or RO/RO ships. With the proper NDF features, these ships could be
immediately used in time of war. In peacetime, they could be used to deliver cargo in
Jone's Act trade or in the international markets. The Future Technology Variant (FTV) is
the design proposed by the MTSSTDP. A commercial operator, Crowley, evaluated this
ship and determined it to be not commercially viable when compared to a similar ship
currently in operation. The subsidy to make up the difference in operating costs would be
over $2 million dollars/year."
17 Crowley Report Assessment of FTV, March, 1997.
A better suggestion would be to start with a commercially viable high
performance container ship like FASTSHIP Atlantic or BATHMAX 1500. The only
subsidy required from the government may be a construction subsidy for installation of
NDF items and perhaps some guaranteed military cargo for the first few years until high
value markets can be stimulated. If this high speed container ship concept gains market
share, the US may be able to capture the high value container market while providing a
superior asset to military planners in time of war.
2.34 Lean Shipbuilding Initiative
Another program that is in the very early stages of development is the Lean Ship
Initiative (LSI). This program is in the formative stages at NAVSEA. It attempts to
combine industry, the Navy, and academia to study the way ships are manufactured in
this country and to find ways to improve the process. Womack, Jones and Roos define
the basic Lean principles in their work, "The Machine That Changed the World," that
examined the automotive industry. The Toyota management, design and production
methods were investigated and determined to be superior to the mass production
techniques used in this country. Several large domestic automotive firms including Ford
and GM have chosen to make themselves more Lean as a result. Roos updates this work
with the current diffusion of Lean principles into other industries."
18 Womack and Jones, (1996), Lean Thinking, Simon and Schuster, New York, NY
Lean approaches have had great impact in the domestic automotive, aerospace and
other complex manufacturing industries. In some cases, these industries were in grave
danger of being forced out of the market in which they operate. Japanese firms could
produce similar products at higher levels of quality for less money. Adapting Lean
principles calls for a revolutionary change to the way a company deals with its customers,
suppliers and employees. This change will result in the breaking of established
paradigms. It can be a very hard transition to make. It has also become necessary in the
international, inter-connected world of today.
The key Lean principles include:
* Perfect first time quality through a quest for zero defects, revealing and
solving problems at their ultimate source, achieving higher quality and
productivity simultaneously, teamwork, and worker empowerment
* Waste Minimization by removing all non-value added activities making the
most efficient use of scarce resources (capital, people, space) just-in-time
inventory, eliminating any safety nets
* Continuous improvement (reducing costs, improving quality, increasing
productivity) through a dynamic process of change, simultaneous and
integrated product/process development, rapid cycle time and time to market,
openness and information sharing
* Flexibility in producing different mixes or greater diversity of products
quickly, without sacrificing efficiency at lower volumes of production,
through rapid set-up and manufacturing at small lot sizes
* Long term relationships between suppliers and primary producers (assemblers,
system integrators) through collaborative risk-sharing, cost sharing and
information sharing agreements built upon a sense of mutual obligation,
openness and trust.19
The domestic shipbuilding industry is ripe for revolutionary change. If ever an
industry was the opposite of Lean, shipbuilding in this country fits the bill. After touring
five of the six major shipyards in the past year, it is my observation that none of the key
precepts of a Lean organization are being used. The relationship between the government
and the shipbuilders is adversarial. Because protracted disputes with the government
often lead to financial duress, the prime contractor usually squeezes its sub-contractors
for every last penny as well. Piles of inventory and work in progress (WIP) were the
norm instead of the exception. Some of the smaller shapes produced at Bath Iron Works,
for example, were stored in an open field under snow after being manufactured.
Employee relationships were strained as the shipyards constantly look for ways to cut
costs. The easiest way to reduce overhead is to layoff workers. This problem was
observed at every shipyard visited. It will be discussed later in Chapter 5.
Lean manufacturing holds great promise for shipbuilding. Shipbuilding can be
considered a cross between a craft trade and a mass production trade. The products are
very complex and built in small numbers. Many of the sub-assemblies that are used to
19 Lean Sustainment Initiative - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
build ships have very similar characteristics. If we consider these sub-assemblies the
products and make them as common as possible, an agile manufacturing process could be
developed to produce the different components in the same way on the same machines.
Japanese shipbuilders are able to produce military and commercial ships similar to
those built in the U.S. using shorter cycle times and with fewer man hours. A
comparative study of US and foreign shipbuilders, outlined in Table, quantifies the
differences between the foreign and domestic yards.20 The product of interest is the
construction of 54,000 dwt tankers.
Productivity Japan Korea Germany US
Employee-Days/Ship 45,000 99,000 65,000 100,000
Hourly Compensation (1990 US Dollars) 16.00 7.8 26.5 15.6
Total Labor Charges ($ million) 5.76 6.17 13.78 12.48
Table 2-2 - US vs Foreign Productivity
As U.S. shipbuilders try to get back into the commercial ship building market,
they will need to compete with the Koreans and the Japanese. The wages for US workers
have dropped below the level of much of the foreign competition. The real area in which
improvements need to be made is worker productivity.
20 Simmons, L.D., (1996) Assessment of Options for Enhancing Surface Ship Acquisition, Institute for
Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA.
Instead of competing directly on standard container ships and tankers, several
yards have announced plans to investigate the high performance shipbuilding market.
Cruise liners, high speed ferries and fast container ships are more complex than product
carriers or tankers. They have more in common with the warships U.S. yards are
accustomed to building. Either way, adjusting their operations to becoming more Lean
can only help US yards. With a leaner industrial base that can compete internationally,
the Navy may be able to realize cost savings as the processes used in U.S. yards
improves.
The principles associated with Lean manufacturing have been discussed in the
industry individually as improvements to the process. Many yards have used foreign
technology transfer programs under NSRP during the 1980's. These yards tended to pick
one or two good ideas to on which to concentrate their time and money. Bath is trying to
cut its working inventory from 9-12 months down to 2 weeks. Ingalls is moving to
Integrated Product Teams internally to get cross trade improvements at the design level.
NASSCO is trying to choose standard component parts that can be aggregated into all of
the complex units needed to build a ship. If the parts at the lowest level of manufacturing
are common, economies of scale can be realized. It then becomes a process management
problem to put these pieces together in an economical way. If implemented individually,
these measures will have some impact but not realize their true potential.
To really make a difference in the industry, more needs to be done. The
government needs to rethink the way that contracts are let. The government acquisition
strategy needs to take into account the long term needs of the shipbuilder. Long term
relationship with sub-contractors needs to be cultivated which contributes to Just In Time
delivery of components. The entire Lean package must be put in place. This will cause
great angst in the industry. By taking a broader systems view of the industry, we can find
the true leverage points on which to concentrate. It may require closing some of the
privately owned yards that survive on defense work and starting with a clean sheet of
paper. The reopening of the Quincy Shipyard offers a unique opportunity to view the
retooling of a shipyard from the beginning. Clearly, the status quo is not satisfactory.
Real change, initiated by the only real customer, the government, is required. Hard
decisions need to be made. The sooner they can be implemented, the sooner the domestic
shipbuilding industry can become world class again. The first step to improving the
process is understanding the complexities involved. One method for identifying and
dealing with complexity is a Build Strategy which will be discussed in the next section.
2.4 Build Strategy Development
New product development has been the topic of studies in many industries over
the last few years from software development to the automotive industry. The
technicians at Toyota, with their Lean production methods, seem to have mastered the
product development process by bringing all the critical personnel together early in the
project. All the difficult decisions concerning the design and production of the new
product are discussed and formalized. In this way, the design does not need to go through
generation after generation of change as the development process matures. 2 1 Similarly,
Japanese shipbuilders have shown that by investing critical time before the start of
construction to plan and integrate all the processes involved in the design and
construction of a ship, great improvements in performance can be achieved.
For U.S. shipyards to compete with the Japanese for commercial ship contracts, a
thorough understanding of the product and process is required. A Build Strategy goes a
long way towards identifying exactly what the product consists of and the process that
will be used to manufacture it. Three critical components of any project are coordination,
cooperation and communication. The Build Strategy acts as a facilitator for each of these
components.
2.41 Description
Any complex project requires an in depth plan of action and milestones for proper
execution. Shipbuilding is no different. All shipbuilders plan how they will take the
customers' requirements and coordinate their assets to satisfy them. The plan may be the
result of a detailed analysis conducted by many people or it may be one experienced
manager's vision of how things should be done. This plan, in shipbuilding, is defined as
21 Womack, J.P, Jones, D.T., and Roos, D., (1990), "The Machine That Changed the World," Rawson
Associates, New York, NY.
the Build Strategy. "A Build Strategy is an agreed design, engineering, material
management, production and testing plan prepared before work starts, to identify and
integrate all necessary processes. ,,"22 It represents the culmination of many decisions that
must be made by the company to remain competitive yet produce a quality ship.
A Build Strategy does the following things for a company:
* Applies a company's overall shipbuilding policy to a specific contract
* Provides a process for feedback between design and production to introduce
production engineering principles that can reduce ship work content and cycle
time
* Determines resource and skill requirements and overall facility loading
* Identifies shortfalls in capacity in terms of facilities, manpower, and skills
* Provides baseline schedule for production planning and ordering of long lead
time material
* Identifies and resolves problems before work on the contract begins
* Ensures communication, cooperation, collaboration, and consistency between
the various technical and production functions
The problem with a Build Strategy is that it once it is completed it becomes a
static document. Once the project starts, the Build Strategy goes on the shelf as "...the
22 Lamb, T., (February 1994), Build Strategy Development, The National Shipbuilding Research Program,
Carderock Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Bethesda, Maryland
perfect plan that never was." All the work and decisions that went into the development
of the strategy are filed away until the next ship project. This is why many shipyards
know what a Build Strategy is but do not find the value added in producing a new plan
for each ship.23 If the Build Strategy could be made interactive where the production
planners could actually revisit their decisions as the project progresses, they may get
more use out of the effort. In this section the components for a Build Strategy are
described. These components will be described in more detail in the Build Strategy
Document found in Appendix A and then converted into structure and policies in the Ship
Production Model.
2.42 Components
The Build Strategy should make all assumptions and objectives about a project
clear to the project management team, the workers executing the plan, and the customer.
The Build Strategy represents the culmination of all the shipyard's experience, resources
and capabilities. It is critical for each yard to know its strengths and weaknesses and to
know when it is reaching a constraint in the system. If a constraint needs to be
eliminated, it is critical to know what the next constraint may be. Proper planning can
avoid many of the difficulties associated with the constraints of a yard. Equally critical is
for the customer to know and understand these constraints. If a certain change order will
result in a disruption of the core business or delay delivery of the ship, it is imperative
that the customer know this. A lack of understanding for the true cost of change made
23 Lamb, T., (February 1994), Build Strategy Development, The National Shipbuilding Research Program,
Carderock Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Bethesda, Maryland
late in a project has resulted in many disputes between the shipyards and the government.
If the shipyards had the tools to demonstrate the true cost, many changes may have been
reserved until the next ship in the series.
The components of a Build Strategy include:
* Ship Description
* Applicable Regulations
* Quality
* Contract Requirements
* Product Work Breakdown Structure
* Master Equipment List
* Design and Engineering Plan
* Material Plan
* Build Plan
All of these will be described in greater detail in the Build Strategy for a specific
ship, Sealift Option, Commercial Viability (SOCV. Many of the inputs and the outputs
will be used in the Ship Production Model. The Ship Production Model is a System
Dynamic model of the construction process. The model makes the Build Strategy
interactive and dynamic. It can be used in the initial stages to try out different hypotheses
concerning staffing, schedule, infrastructure and shop loading. As the process matures it
could be updated using real performance data concerning productivity and quality. It
could be used for evaluating different scenarios concerning the project. It takes many of
the management decisions needed to create a Build Strategy and creates a dynamic tool.
By using a well-defined Build Strategy with an interactive model, US shipbuilders
could gain insight that would have taken years of commercial work to achieve. The use
of simulation could become a competitive advantage for US shipbuilders. By being able
to "test drive" a project from start to finish without expending significant capital, many
different courses of action could investigated. In this way, the "best" plan for how to
build a ship could be determined before one piece of steel is cut.
An interactive model requires that all assumptions and boundaries must be made
explicit. The model could be used as a communication tool between the customer and the
shipbuilder. Instead of hiding the true objectives from each other, an open and
cooperative environment could be created.
The current state of shipbuilding in the U.S. is far from an open and cooperative
environment. The U.S. Navy is the only real customer in the market. For this reason,
shipbuilding contracts are fiercely competitive. The low bidder usually has difficulty
producing a ship for the promised price. Contractor/customer relations suffer as the
shipyard tries to recoup some of its losses. The use of a Ship Production Model could
improve these relationships by making the assumptions of both sides clear. If a dispute
over the cost of certain changes occurs, the model could be used as a mediation tool,
avoiding costly litigation.
2.5 Dynamic Project Modeling
Dynamic models, like the Ship Production Model mentioned in the previous
section, have been used for years to settle many different disputes. Several of these
disputes have involved shipbuilding. The purpose of this paper is to introduce Dynamic
Project Modeling in the early stages of a project as a proactive means of: production
planning, hypothesis investigation and communication. Modeling can have a much larger
impact on the performance of the project instead of just as a retroactive tool to assess
blame.
As previously mentioned, the process of building Navy ships may be one of the
most complex processes undertaken in this country. Many groups have a vested interest
in Navy ship building programs. The huge amounts of money expended and the nature of
the construction process contribute to this complexity. The political ramifications of a
large ship contract further complicates the situation as Members of Congress try to
protect the jobs of their constituents. The Navy chooses to competitively bid its contracts
adding competitive dynamics to the process. Because of this complexity, some Navy
programs result in huge cost over runs and experience schedule delays in delivering the
product.
Even the most experienced program manager has difficulty mentally accounting
for all the critical factors involved in a program at one time. People are more comfortable
dealing with ideas that are linear and easily quantified. Many factors involved in
shipbuilding are dynamic in nature, meaning they change over time. Most of the factors
described in the Affordability Crisis are out of the program manager's control. Many of
the problems he/she must deal with are exogenous to the shipyard. The dynamic
variables, like quality and productivity, associated with shipbuilding are not so easily
measured. Even when they can be measured, they do not represent the current state of the
system as they are constantly changing. The causal nature of product development
projects has been well documented in other System Dynamics.24 Managers understand
and can describe feedback acting in the process. From experience they can say that
changing this will have an impact on that. Assessing the strength of several causal loops
or quantifying the relationship one variable has on another is not easy in the abstract. For
this reason, many important decisions are made based on "gut feel."
Systems Dynamics is a field developed in the 1960's by Professor Jay Forrester at
MIT to try to quantify "gut feel." He felt too many decisions were being made for the
wrong reasons. By systematically defining all the variables in a problem using
mathematical relationships, the problem can be reduced to black and white instead of
shades of gray. These mathematical relationships can then be tuned based on real life
data to provide a mathematical representation of the world. This representation is subject
to the assumptions and boundaries used to create the model. In the next section, the
24 Ford, D. N., (August 1995), "The Dynamics of Project Management: An Investigation of the Impacts of
Project Process and Coordination on Performance," PhD Thesis. Sloan School of Management.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Cambridge, MA.
models that deal with the shipbuilding industry will be discussed. These models have
been used effectively by very few people. The time has come to use System Dynamics
models to address many of the questions raised in the previous sections of this chapter.
2.51 History - Ingalls Case Study
Project modeling has become one of the most popular uses of System Dynamics
in the field. Professor Edward B. Roberts, an original student of Jay Forrester, pioneered
this approach at the Sloan School of Management. His doctoral dissertation concerning
"The Dynamics of Research and Development," in 1962 has led to many further studies
at Sloan of Project Dynamics. Professor Roberts founded the consulting firm Pugh-
Roberts with another of Jay Forrester's students, Alexander Pugh. Pugh-Roberts
specializes in building complex System Dynamics models for clients in many fields.
Many firms have found this method very useful to gain insight into the operations and
management of their businesses. These firms include major automobile manufacturers,
semi conductor companies, chemical companies, shipbuilders and a growing number of
others. The System Dynamics approach allows firms to capture the causal relationships
and non-linear behavior of the manufacturing processes. Several firms including, General
Motors and Eastman Kodak, have internalized the process of System Dynamics modeling
and consider this process a major competitive advantage. They have used models to
examine their own company, the competition, and the market in which they operate.
Interestingly, the project model that has gained the most notoriety in the field of
System Dynamics is the Shipbuilding Model built by Pugh-Roberts Associates in support
of a delay and disruption case by Ingalls Shipbuilding against the U.S. Navy. The claim
arose as a result of significant change orders submitted by the Navy on the LHA and DD-
963 contracts of the mid '70s. The hard core costs of these changes were generally
agreed upon. Hard core costs consist of the material and man hours needed to accomplish
a task. What was not agreed upon was the cost of delay and disruption caused by these
changes at an advanced stage in the execution of the contract. It is much more difficult to
quantify delay and disruption than the hard-core costs. The claim amounted to nearly
$500 million dollars, a sum that could have put Ingalls out of business if not recouped.
Both sides agreed some delay and disruption was justified. The difficult part
came in determining what would have happened if the Navy did not order changes.
Many other factors were discussed as possible contributions to the cost over run.
Material delays and a labor problem resulted in some loss of time. Problems with the
new designs led to significant internally generated change. The role of the model in this
case was to "...develop and use a methodology that would (a) correctly quantify Navy
responsible delay and disruption costs in the design, procurement, planning, and
production stages of the programs, and (b) demonstrate the cause and effect relation of
the costs to the items cited in the 'hard-core' segment of the claim. "25 It was able to
simulate the performance of the project to a high degree of accuracy. It was then able to
determine how much of the disruption was caused by Navy generated change orders.
25 Cooper, K. G., Dec 1980, "Naval Ship Production: A Claim Settled and a Framework Built.", Interfaces,
Vol. 10, No. 6.
This model has been credited with significantly contributing to the settlement of the case
in favor of Ingalls for $447 million dollars.
Ingalls has since used this model to improve the management of their shipbuilding
processes. The extent to which Ingalls still uses this model will be discussed in the
Chapter 3 on shipyard visits. That the management was able to take ownership of the
model and use it for purposes other than litigation is very intriguing. A visit to Ingalls
was conducted to investigate the effectiveness of this model and to determine to what
extent it was being used. Perhaps System Dynamics modeling is a valuable tool that the
Navy has thus far overlooked in the management of complex projects. Ken Cooper, a
senior manager at Pugh Roberts infers at the end of his discussion of the model that
perhaps a similar model could be used to the positive benefit of both parties.26 If both the
Navy and the contractor had a systems view of the construction process, perhaps the
inevitable conflicts that arise during the management of any large complex construction
program could be more readily resolved at a local level.
This model is very large in comparison with other project models. It depicts the
entire shipyard in considerable detail, modeling the processes of several shipbuilding
programs. The sectors modeled include:
* Acquisition and Utilization of Manpower
* Scheduling and Performance of Work
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* Rework Generation and Scheduling
* Managerial decisions at different levels within the organization
The model captures the feedback and non-linear way the different sectors interact.
Each shipbuilding program contains multiple phases of design and construction. These
phases include system and detail design, material procurement, production planning and
control, and four stages of ship construction. In each phase, manpower utilization of
several trades, the accomplishment of work, the creation of rework, productivity, and
technical complexity are all represented.
The phases interact with each other. Detailed design has a great impact on the
accomplishment of work phase. If detailed design drawings are incorrect, work done in
the production phase will be done wrong as a result. This creates a management
dilemma. Do we fix the problem with rework, scrap the old and remake this particular
component, or do we go forward with errors intact? The schedules of all phases are
interdependent. Difficulties or delays experienced in upstream activities can result in
future delays or require out of sequence work in later phases. If material ordered for the
On Unit construction phase does not arrive on time, the entire module may be delayed
until a replacement can be found. The entire build strategy may be disrupted as a result.
The model was constructed over a period of two years by a small working group
including shipyard personnel and consultants from Pugh Roberts. Interviews were
conducted with managers from all phases of shipbuilding as well as experts in
government contracts and litigation. A massive amount of data was collected and
analyzed to assemble a preliminary mathematical model of a single phase of construction.
The model was reviewed by the project team and structural changes were made.
Extensive statistical testing of the model was used to tune the model. In the end, the
model was able to replicate most of the major performance measures associated with the
project to a high degree accuracy.
Several key structures were developed in this model that have become standard
for project models in general. These include:
* Rework
* Labor Allocation
* Overtime
* Interaction of Phases
All of these will be incorporated into the Ship Production Model presented in Chapter 4.
The participation by Ingalls management created a tool that has great potential. It
combines the experience of years of shipbuilding in an interactive and dynamic model.
After the settlement of the claim, Ingalls was able to use the model to its benefit. How it
is currently used at Ingalls is the topic of the next section.
2.52 Ingalls Internal Use of the Shipbuilding Model
The Shipbuilding Model was the product of years of work investigating,
analyzing and modeling the way Ingalls build ships in its yard. Many of the critical items
identified for incorporation in a Build Strategy are present in the model. Ingalls makes
use of simulation to improve their internal management practices. The Shipbuilding
Model developed by Pugh Roberts is still in use today. It is maintained and calibrated by
Pugh-Roberts consultants. It is used as a strategic tool by upper level management
although it has had an impact to much lower levels in the yard. Specific uses include:
* Bid/Risk Analysis
* Competitor Bid Analysis
* Program Management Assistance
* Change Management
* Benchmarking/Evaluation of Best Practices
* Evaluation of Process Changes/Transitions
* Dispute Avoidance/Resolution
* Program Manager Development
During the visit to Ingalls, a meeting was conducted with the simulation group
who work directly with the model. They were asked to provide specific cases in which
the model was used. The group pointed to:
Evaluation of infrastructure constraints: Would a new Butt Welder improve
the throughput? What is the real choke point for the manufacturing phase of
construction? The model indicated that the Butt Welder was no the
constraining factor.
* Manning Assessment. How many people does it really take to build a DDG?
Historically the level was set at 1100 people. The Strategic Model indicated
the ship could be built with 850 with no loss in schedule. The production
people claimed there was no way this could be done. Finally senior
management cut production personnel to 850. The model turned out to be
correct. The same work could be done with 250 fewer people in the same
amount of time. The current manning levels on the DDG-51 being built at
Ingalls is 850 people.
* Assess the impact of 3-D CAD on the shipbuilding process. The Navy has
been pushing for 3-D CAD. The shipbuilder wanted to know what the impact
this large investment in software would have on the bottom line cost of
building a ship. The modeling group was able to quantify a savings of only
$200K/ship as a result of the new CAD package
* Shipyard Loading: What is the impact of emergent new work? The USS
Gonzalez runs aground in the Caribbean and needs to be dry docked and
repaired. Will this work package disrupt our core business? The
determination was made that work would negatively impact core business. A
bid on the emerging work was not submitted.
* Hiring Firing Policy Formulation: What does it really cost to cut experienced
labor? Model determined that it is more economical to maintain hull and
mechanical people doing less complex barge work than laying them off. Even
though Ingalls may take a loss on the barge work, they avoid much larger
penalties trying to find qualified labor when needed. This is perhaps the most
valuable insight provided by the model. Every shipyard visited mentioned the
problem of finding good workers when needed. Every shipyard also
mentioned cutting their work force when the order book is low. Only Ingalls
was able to quantify the cost of rehiring these people or training replacements.
This topic will be visited in the analysis section of this paper as a case study.
The simulation group indicated they had some problems with the model. The
group felt the model was not agile enough for everyday use. Much of the large structure
used in the original litigation case is still present in the model. They were frustrated that
it was a legacy system with assumptions which are not documented. Because of this the
simulation group is not able to examine the shipyard on the level that can be used on a
weekly or monthly basis. They would like to be able to disaggregate to the level where
the true impact can be realized. The strategic model is not as flexible a tool as they
would like.
The simulation group would like to make use of a Graphical User Interface (GUI)
that is available for more current System Dynamics modeling packages. The present
model, built in DYNAMO, displays inputs and outputs but not model structure and
equations. The group would like to be able to examine the model equations. They would
also like to be able to modify structure as needed to provide a wider range of simulation
topics.
Ingalls has a great advantage due to its previous use of Dynamic Modeling. The
management team understands the systems approach. They know that carrying additional
people until the next peak in production pays off in the end. After twenty years, it is clear
that the model used at Ingalls needs an overhaul. Current System Dynamics software
packages like ITHINK or VENSIM provide a user friendly interface to investigate the
model equations and make local changes. Pugh-Roberts could go a long way to helping
the Navy define what is needed to help all of the domestic shipyards take advantage of
this type of simulation.
2.53 Halter Marine
Another example of the use of System Dynamics for shipbuilding is the Halter
Marine Case. The model used in this case was also built by Pugh-Roberts. A graduate
student at Sloan School of Business, Kim Reichelt, examined this case for her thesis.
Because most of the models used by Pugh-Roberts are proprietary, examining the
equations and structure they use is impossible. This case study provides an interesting
look at commercial shipbuilding. Many of the conflicts experienced in Naval ship
construction also occur in commercial shipbuilding. This case also provides a model that
uses much of the Pugh-Roberts project model structure.
The dispute in this case was between a shipbuilder, Halter Marine, and a ship
owner, Leon Hess. The conflict concerned who was responsible for cost overruns on a
ship construction project in the mid 80's. It was standard practice in the commercial
shipbuilding industry to continue with a job whether or not disputes could be
immediately settled. Negotiations to sort out the claims of each party were then held after
the project was completed. In this way the customer could put his new vessel to work
generating income and the shipbuilder could get on with other work. In the Halter case,
the customer refused to settle the dispute on terms amenable to both sides. Again, the
shipyard would be forced to go out of business unless it could win a reasonable
settlement.
Competitive Dynamics
Several key insights into the dynamics of shipbuilding come out of this work.
First, the bidding process is critical to the entire system. The competitive dynamics of the
industry drive shipbuilders to come up with the low bid to win a project. This leaves the
customer in an awkward position. If the bids are too low, should the customer hold the
yard to a bid he can not deliver? Low bids usually mean the shipbuilder will need to
make money other ways like growth on the contract. If the bid is too low it may also
mean that the contractor really does not understand the complexity of the project. A fair
bidding price is critical to the success of a project. All aspects of the project need to be
accounted for. Choosing a builder solely based on bid price is foolhardy at best. If there
is not a thorough review of the proposals for completeness, the program manager is sure
to experience a degraded relationship with the builder as nickel and dime dynamics come
into play as the contract progresses. The Navy could learn much from this case. During
the 1980's, the Navy chose to award contracts based almost exclusively on the lowest bid
price. This has led to a very poor working relationship between the government and
industry as many programs have experienced cost over runs and schedule delays.
The natural reaction is to blame the other party for the cost over run or schedule
slippage. The government blames the contractor for trying to squeeze more money out of
the contract. The contractor accuses the government of changing the contract at an
advanced date. Both sides may be justified in their argument. Determining who is
responsible for what part of the costs fairly is critical to a good working relationship. If
projects remain constrained by impossible cost or schedule goals, both sides are setting
themselves up for a difficult time. Hopefully, the acquisition reform measures that are
being investigated will look hard at the way contracts are awarded. A well thought out
shipbuilding plan with margin for error seems much more attractive than a bid generated
to be the lowest no matter what the real cost to the government and the contractor.
Overhead
Shipbuilding is characterized by a relatively small number of large projects.
Fluctuating orders require frequent changes in yard capacity. "The ability to tailor
shipyard overhead to shipyard order book requires special attention. Without this
ability, overhead becomes exorbitant. 27 Halter Marine was structured to deal with this
volatility. The company was easily able to cut back its work force by closing mobile
27 Reichelt, K. S. (June 1990) Halter Marine: A Case Study in the Dangers of Litigation. Master's Thesis.
Sloan School of Management. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Cambridge, MA.
yards and to expand its work force by double shifting or working overtime. Through
double shifting alone it was able to increase productivity in the short term by around
33%. 28 Every shipyard visited discussed the problem of cutting overhead, both labor and
facilities in lean times. This is a key strategic decision that will be discussed in depth
later.
Labor
Because of the desire to cut overhead, labor relationships between the shipbuilders
and their workforce can be strained. Halter Marine is one of relatively few non-union
shipyards in the country. In its 25 years of operations, Halter never had a work stoppage,
strike or even a major labor confrontation. Halter Marine employees were well rewarded
for top performance through the Halter Incentive Program (HIP). It provided cash awards
to employees for achieving quality and productivity improvements. Absenteeism at
Halter was less than 2%.
Management
Most of the management at Halter was promoted from within the company.
Internal promotion acted to increase motivation for Halter employees who saw a career
path to which they could aspire. It also gave them added respect for the management as
they came up through the ranks.
Product
28 IBID
The characteristics of the product can play a large part in the performance of the
project. Vessels that are of a standard design with few new components tend to do better
than innovative designs. The innovative designs the Navy has used in the past may not
be affordable in the future. If a completely new design is determined to be required,
decision makers must be willing to pay the price for the product and process changes that
come with new designs. The Cat Tug, built by Halter can be considered an innovative
design. It consists of a large barge driven by a catamaran tug. Halter had difficulty
producing what the client actually wanted due to design problems.
The Naval Architecture firm constantly made changes to the contract to improve
the design. The increased scope was to be negotiated after the delivery of the first ship.
This is typical of the way the Navy does business as well. Change orders are used to
improve the design after the contract has been awarded. This change throws off the
planning sequence developed in the Build Strategy. It may lead to delays in construction,
out of sequence work or a disruption of the core business. Change orders should be kept
to a minimum once the detailed design is set. If there is concern for the quality of the
design, the changes need to be made up front and not after material is being
manufactured.
Scope
The shipyard likes increase in scope as it provides more work for their order book.
The Navy has used change orders and increased scope to a varying degree on different
projects. It is critical that this increased scope be properly documented, priced and
negotiated as it occurs to get the real cost of change at certain times in the contract. If
change is allowed to be introduced too far into the construction process, the core work
could be interrupted. Even removing items from the project can prove detrimental as
management may have already expended a significant portion of the money allotted to
that item prior to cancellation.
Hiring/Firing
More engineers were needed to deal with the owner directed changes on the Cat
Tug project. Overtime was increased and new people were hired. This action led to
exactly the opposite result intended. Instead of an increase in productivity due to more
people, the productivity dropped significantly. Two dynamics are at work here. First, the
Rookie vs. Veteran dynamic occurred. New people are hired to fill a gap in the project.
They take some time to get up to speed before they can make a positive contribution.
Experienced people need to take the time to indoctrinate the new people. The total effect
is to decrease the overall productivity of the group. This puts the project even farther
behind schedule.
Overtime can work to improve productivity in the short term. It is used
throughout the industry to try to limit the amount of fluctuations in the work force. Top
managers know they will pay a price in productivity if they need to hire new people. To
avoid this, in times of increased workload, management offers overtime to the
experienced workers. Too much overtime leads to fatigue in the workplace. This can
cause additional errors to be made, safety hazards and poor employee morale. All of
these factors combine to further degrade the performance of the project.
While changes were ongoing in the engineering and detailed design phase,
construction at Halter began. Large numbers of revisions were being made to the original
plans by engineering making the planning and execution of construction difficult.
Overtime was already being required in construction, adding to productivity problems.
Additionally, some major equipment was late in its delivery. The delays in this project
started to affect the performance of the yard in general.
Changes continued without Halter being reimbursed. The company began to sink
its own money into the project. The engineering problems got worse further delaying the
project. Almost all of the initial drawing had been issued. Problems with the original
drawings required revisions. All of these problems exacerbated construction problems
leading to out of sequence work and the use of overtime. New workers were hired to pick
up the slack, further eroding productivity. As both budget and schedule pressures arose,
morale began to suffer.
Due to enormous losses on the project the HIP was suspended further eroding the
morale of the workforce at the Chickasaw yard. Chickasaw soon had the highest
absenteeism and turnover in the company which further degraded productivity. Cash
flow problems soon led to Halter losing its position as a market leader. Threats of
bankruptcy continued to erode worker morale.
Halter was forced to sell to Trinity Marine for $23 million, one quarter of the
value of the company only 3 years before. The decline in Halter's value can be attributed
to a general decline in the oil industry at this time. The problems with the Cat Tug
project accelerated Halter's fall as an industry leader by weakening its strategic position
in the market and keeping it from developing new business.
The problems with the Cat Tug program were inevitably felt by management as
well. Under pressure to increase worker output to get the program back on schedule,
managers tend to tinker with their policies. In order for these new policies to have the
desired effect, a period of adjustment is required. This worse before better dynamic
further erodes the efficiency of the workforce. If the project reaches such low
performance levels that the management needs to be replaced, additional problems are the
result. When new management is acquired, labor productivity will suffer until the new
manager is up to speed.29
Summary
Disruption costs are difficult to quantify by either the contractor or the customer.
Neither party is likely to anticipate all of the disruption to the original plan that the
change will cause. In general, the hard core costs of the change are quantifiable based on
some previous job of similar complexity. Difficulty arises in trying to put the change in
the context of the entire project. In some cases the change will be hardly noticed at the
29 Hammon, C, Graham, D.R., (1980), "Disruption Costs in Navy Shipbuilding Programs," CNS 1149-Vol.
1/October 1980, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA.
shop level. In other cases, a ripple effect will occur which impacts every process
downstream. The work required to accomplish the change in scope may be done at lower
productivity rates than normal work. The disruption caused by this change of scope
requires significantly more work than normally would be anticipated.
The causes of delay and disruption or indirect impacts have been well
documented. They include out of sequence work resulting in lower productivity. Lower
productivity means more hours are required to get the same amount of work done. To
compensate for this loss of productivity or poor schedule performance, management may
elect to increase overtime for the current workforce or higher new workers. In the short
term, more overtime will increase the productivity per day. In the long run however, the
use of excess overtime will lead to fatigue, further degrading productivity. 30 Hiring new
people will initially lead to a drop in productivity as the more experienced people are
forced to train the rookies. Adding more people often leads to having your best people
spending their time training new people. This can further dilute the team's productivity.3'
This dynamic is well understood in other industries. Brooke's Law, from software
development, states that adding labor to a late project makes it even later.32
All of these effects may be resolved if the scope and impact of the changes to the
original plan are realized. With the proper tools, a cost vs. schedule analysis could be
30 Homer, J.B., (1985), "Worker Burnout: A Dynamic Model with Implications for Prevention and
Control," System Dynamics Review, Vol.1, Summer 1985
31 Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, (1988)
32 Sterman, J.D., (1992), "System Dynamics Modeling for Project Management," unpublished working
paper, Systems Dynamics Group. Sloan School of Management. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
conducted. If schedule adjustment is feasible, delaying the project long enough to work
through the out of sequence work would be the logical choice. If the client demands
adherence to the original schedule, he must be willing to pay for the disruption. Program
managers have not had the tools to do such comparisons in the past. Perhaps with
Systems Dynamics modeling, they can determine the real costs of change and make
decisions accordingly.
2.54 Other Systems Dynamics Models
Several System Dynamics models are in use or being developed that could
provide insight to shipbuilding managers. The most mature of these is offered by Pugh
Roberts. They continue to advise Ingalls Shipbuilding using the Strategic Model
previously discussed and the Program Management Modeling System (PMMS) which
has been used for a variety of industries. "PMMS can reflect differences in technology,
productivity, labor utilization, management, government regulations, business culture,
and political environments that exist from one industry or one country to another. "33
Other shipbuilding clients have included Newport News Shipbuilding and Electric Boat.
No formal reports or documents have been generated concerning the impact of Systems
Thinking on these yards. It would be in the best interest of the Navy to pursue tools like
System Dynamics to aid in understanding the shipbuilding process.
33 Management Simulation Group of PA Consulting Group Informational Pamphlet
One software package under development that could be used to study the
shipbuilding industry is ShipBuild. This model is being built by Decision Dynamics, a
modeling group out of Washington D.C. ShipBuild has been proposed as a planning,
analysis and cost estimating tool for simulating the dynamics of shipbuilding activity.
The current version is more similar to a static project planner like Microsoft Project or
Computer Associates' Super Project. The next version will include many of the dynamic
features previously discussed. Using ShipBuild, a project could be developed using
traditional CPM or PERT methods. The dynamic portion of the model could then be
utilized for analysis of different scenarios involving policy changes, design changes, or
schedule vs. cost scenarios as the project progresses. One sector of this model is
provided in the Users Manual. It is shown in Figure 2-9. It contains variables like
Rework, Productivity, Work Force and the stocks and flows of a typical System
Dynamics model.
Figure 2-9 - Flow of Work Accomplishment During Production
This model contains many of the structures that the Pugh-Roberts project models use.
ShipBuild is a proprietary product so the equations and structure used are not available
for closer scrutiny at this time. The user first identifies the characteristics of the ship to
be built. This is done by laying out the construction tasks in a similar way to creating a
Build Strategy.
A Product Work Breakdown Structure (PWBS) is used to identify the different
components that feed into units and then into blocks and finally into the ship. ShipBuild
can go to six layers of aggregation. The man hours and material required to produce
these pieces of the ship is associated with the PWBS. Precedence relationships can be
established for the blocks as well. For example, Block I cannot be started until Work
Package I and II are completed.
Different types of tasks using labor pools can also be identified. The schedule for
the ship can be defined or automatically calculated based on the labor productivity and
the amount of work that needs to be accomplished. Finally any special equipment needed
to construct the ship is input. Once the Ship package is identified, the user can create a
shipyard to build the ship.
In the Shipyard Sub-model, the resources available for construction are defined
for the yard of interest. The Facilities section allows you to create a facility map and
provide capabilities for defining management policies, work stations, and associated
equipment. Typical shipbuilding facilities are provided in a Layout Library. These
include items found in every shipyard like:
* Blast and Paint
* Plate Storage
* Surface Prep Area
* Plate Burning
* Plate Shaping
* Sub Assembly Area
* Machine Shop
* Pipe Shop
* Insulation Shop
* Electrical Shop
* Block Assembly Area
* Construction Ways
The capacity of each of these facilities areas can be input defining the constraints in the
system.
The Management function allows the user to select and define management
policies that will be applied to the study during simulation. In the current version, only a
few management functions can be examined. These include policies for management
response to schedule pressure caused by changes or delays as well as productivity loss
from overmanning. In future versions of ShipBuild, rising schedule pressure will trigger
a variety of management actions including hiring additional labor, assigning overtime, or
a combination. If too much labor is assigned to the job, the net productivity eventually
will decrease as interference between workers starts to occur.
These management policy structures and others are still in the developmental
stage. Once they are fully operational and tested, ShipBuild will could be a valuable link
between the static production planners and a fully dynamic model. The output from
ShipBuild can come in several forms. Traditional Gantt Charts of the program can be
displayed. All of the important variables can be viewed over time. Management policies
can be manipulated to evaluate the effect of each policy on schedule and cost.
"ShipBuild gives the model user an unprecedented capability to develop and test
alternative "what if" scenarios for the purpose of improving both the productivity of ship
designs and the efficiency of shipyards. "34
ShipBuild shows great promise for providing a commercial package to
shipbuilders to try their own modeling and simulation. The software package is not yet
available. Because of this fact, I chose to build my own models that could demonstrate
the dynamic behavior of interest.
David Ford, in his dissertation, "The Dynamics of Project Management,"
develops another System Dynamics model which can be used to simulate product
development. His model combines many of the structures from previous work at the
Sloan School of Management with new structure he built as a result of his observations of
the computer industry. Project performance can be measured in time, quality, and cost.
The model consists of a set of inter-related development phases and a set of management
features. Each phase represents a specific stage of the product development process. The
later phases depend on the products of the earlier stages. The structures and
characteristics found in this model are shown in the Figure 2-10 below.
34 ShipBuild Phase II Users Guide (1996) - Dynamic Simulation Model of Shipbuilding Construction
Delays.
Figure 2-10 - Ford Major Sectors
Ford concludes that adding feedback, delays and non-linear relationships to
traditional project models results in a better picture of the real world. "Static features and
impacts of projects have been extensively researched and applied to project management
practice. In contrast, project managers do not effectively understand or utilize the
dynamic features of development project structures. These features combine to cause
projects to behave in complex ways which are difficult to understand, predict and
manage."
The Product Development Project Model simulates a project that can have
multiple development stages. This is a feature that has been observed in shipbuilding.
The key structures in this model are listed below in with the model references if they
exist. All of the references can be found in the bibliography.
35 Ford, D. N., (August 1995), The Dynamics of Project Management: An Investigation of the Impacts of
Project Process and Coordination on Performance. PhD Thesis. Sloan School of Management.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Cambridge, MA.
Model Structure References
Close Loop Flow of tasks Cooper (1980), Richardson and Pugh (1981)
Internal/External Work Constraints Homer et al. (1993)
Recycling of Flawed Work (Rework) Cooper (1980), Kim (1988)
Interaction of Phases Cooper (1980), Reichelt (1990)
Gross Labor Sector Abdel Hamid (1984), Richardson and Pugh (1981)
Labor Allocation Abdel Hamid (1984)
Workweek Kim (1988)
Fatigue Effects Homer (1985), Abdel Hamid (1984)
Learning curve/Productivity Abdel Hamid and Madnick (1991)
Schedule Pressure Roberts (1974)
Perceived vs Actual Progress Roberts (1974), Richardson and Pugh (1981)
Schedule Estimates Abdel Hamid (1984)
Project Quality Fiddeman, Oliva, and Aranda (1993)
Project Cost Abdel Hamid and Madnick (1991)
Table 2-3 - Ford Model Structures
Ford's model requires reconfiguration to depict the shipbuilding process. It was
originally used to examine computer product development. This model has proven very
valuable as an example of how to tie everything together for a multiphase project model.
The complexity of the model and the fact that it is written in Dynamo made refining it for
my purposes too difficult.
None of the models listed above were suitable for the level of analysis of this
paper. The simulation done in this paper is used for proof of concept and to demonstrate
the potential of the tools. To tune a System Dynamics model to real situations requires
much more specific data and calibration.36 For this reason, a simpler model, the Ship
Production Model is created. This model is built using VENSIM developed by Ventanna
Lyneis, J.M., (1980), Corporate Planning and Policy Design., Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press.
Corp. Several of the project structures used are found in the Molecules, a supplemental
package to VENSIM provided by Professor Jim Hines of the Sloan School of
Management. This model is simpler to understand and recreate than the models
previously mentioned. It provides the novice System Dynamics practitioner with a useful
tool to test policies and hypotheses related to building ships. This model will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
2.55 Potential
Simulation in many different forms is becoming increasingly accepted as a
standard engineering and management tool. The primary purpose of simulation is to
reduce technical and commercial risk. Simulation helps designers and managers better
understand the consequences of their actions in advance of the eventual performance of
the project under consideration. The Navy, to this point, has chosen to ignore System
Dynamics. ShipBuild has been mentioned in some circles as a cost estimating tool.
System Dynamics has been used to effectively by several commercial yards as a way to
demonstrate the dynamic nature of ship building and to simulate the process. It has been
used by Ingalls to manage complex ship design and production efforts by determining the
future effect of actions on the project. It can provide the valuable insights that a
knowledgeable customer, namely the Navy, needs to make good choices as well.
Several scenarios can be simulated to determine the best course of action, thus reducing
the risk on the project. System Dynamics provides a way to quantify a good managers
"gut feel". Using historical data, actual behavior can be simulated with a well
constructed model. Once the model operates like the real world, projections can be made
as to the future performance of the program within the limits of the model.
The emerging emphasis on the use of integrated teams in new procurements
accentuates the need for a common framework. Using this framework team members can
agree in advance on a course of action based on the expected outcome of these actions. If
all team members are privy to the assumptions and structure in the model, this tool could
be used proactively to settle disputes, should they arise, thus avoiding costly and
damaging litigation. System Dynamics modeling is well suited to provide this capability.
It forces the users to think about the system in which they are working. It provides
insights into dynamics that are hard to quantify without the use of a model or years of
experience. Thus far, System Dynamics has been a closely held, proprietary management
tool. Hopefully, simulation will play a more extensive role in communicating among
stakeholders in the shipbuilding process to the benefit of all.
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Chapter 3 - Shipyard Visits
In order to learn how ships are built and what factors affect productivity, a series
of shipyard visits was conducted. In this chapter the different yards will be discussed.
The yards visited include:
* Ingalls Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, MI
* Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine
* NASSCO, San Diego,CA
* Avondale Shipbuilding, New Orleans, LA.
A specific shipyard will be chosen to build SOCV. With the constraints of the
shipyard, a Build Strategy will be developed geared for that yard. The timing of source
selection is critical to developing an effective design. An effective design enables the
performance the customer desires yet reflects the "design for producibility" features that
increase shipyard productivity. Source selection depends on many attributes of the
shipyard. The yard must have:
* Technical competency to build this type of ship
* Capacity in the yard to absorb the work
* An adequate pool of skilled labor
* Installed machinery and facilities to fabricate, erect and launch the ship
In the past, source selection has relied heavily on the bid price. Over the last twenty
years, this trend has led to major conflicts between the government and the contractor as
described in Chapter 2. Some shipyards would underbid the competition to win the
contract despite the real costs to build the ship. Once the contract was awarded, the costs
would escalate to a point where the shipyard could make some money. A broader view
of the capabilities of each yard, combined with bid price and Total Ownership Costs
(TOC) should be used in the future to make better decisions.
The purpose of the shipyard visits was to determine:
* Which yards have the capability to build the SOCV
* How ships are built in this country
* What factors affect program performance in the major US shipyards
* What are the constraints to production
* What are the factors that effect quality and productivity
These yards represent a significant portion of the Navy warship building in this country.
Ingalls and Bath build surface combatants. NASSCO builds auxiliaries and Sealift Ships.
Avondale builds amphibious ships, oil tankers and Sealift Ships. Newport News builds
aircraft carriers, submarines, Sealift Ships.
Over the last few years many domestic shipyards have pursued commercial
contracts to supplement their Navy work. NASSCO has delivered the most recent
commercial work with open top container ships for Matson Lines in 1992. Avondale
Shipyards has been working to develop a small commercial niche for product tankers.
Newport News and Avondale may have a distinct competitive advantage over the other
yards in this country with their ability to attract commercial contracts. Many people in
the industry think both yards will lose money on these efforts. The true payoff to
increasing the amount of work flowing through the yard is not easily quantifiable.
Increased throughput allows productivity gains and maintain a steady workforce. The
benefits of these effects will not be realized on one ship. The benefits of increased
throughput will show up in the overall health of the company.
Cost effective commercial shipbuilding may be the future for US Shipyards. The
amount of Navy work currently being contracted is not enough to keep all of the large
shipyards active, let alone profitable." Without throughput, shipbuilding processes do
not evolve. Without continued improvement, US shipyards will fall further behind the
foreign competition. Without another source of work similar to the core competency of
building warships, several of the large yards will be forced to close.
Areas of interest examined at each shipyard include:
* History
* Financial Status
* Current Navy and Commercial work
* Future Strategic Plan
* Shipyard Layout - Key Factors include:
Land Area
Pier Space
Crane Capacity
Blast and Paint Facilities
37 Marine Agility Group, (June 1996), 21st Century Agile Shipbuilding Strategies- Infrastructure and
Business Process Opportunities
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Transfer Equipment
Capital for renovations
* Human Resource Management
* Production Planning
Build Strategy
Constraints to Production
* Material Procurement and Handling
* Phases of Construction
* Performance
* Use of Simulation
Interesting topics specific to each shipyard are also investigated. The differences
between yards and the perceived advantages and disadvantages of each are discussed. A
specific comparison is made between Bath and Ingalls on the DDG-51 contract. The
reasons why Ingalls consistently outperforms Bath in cycle time and cost are investigated
later in Chapter 5.
3.1 - Ingalls Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, Mississippi
Areas of specific interest
* Use of System Dynamics Modeling
* Level of Outfitting
* Quality
* Ability to outperform Bath on DDG-51
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* Capacity
3.11 History
Ingalls started building ships in 1938 with the first all welded ship. They have
made considerable process improvements including modular construction on the FFG-7
guided missile frigates and DD-963 destroyer classes. Ingalls was involved with a large
litigation claim against the Navy over delay and disruption on DD-963 and LHA-1
amphibious transport ship programs. This claim stimulated the use of System Dynamics
at Ingalls as discussed in Chapter 2. It also launched System Dynamics as a major
methodology in project management litigation. Ingalls has improved the process it uses
to build ships as a result of this model. The yard has demonstrated outstanding
performance on the CG-47 guided missile cruiser and DDG-51 guided missile destroyer
contracts. 38  Since 1975 Ingalls has delivered a combination of 72 new destroyers,
cruisers and amphibious assault ships to the US Navy.39
3.12 Financial Status
Ingalls is currently a subsidiary of Litton Industries, one of the world's leading
suppliers of defense electronics and information systems. It has shown steady profits
despite reduction in the number of ships currently being built by the US Navy. Ingalls
continues to look for additional international combatant work with two new surface ship
38 Simmons, L.D., (1996) "Assessment of Options for Enhancing Surface Ship Acquisition," IDA Paper P-
3172, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia.
39 Litton Industries Inc., (1996), Building Toward the Future, 1996 Annual Report.
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designs, a 1300 ton corvette and a 3000 ton frigate. The financial performance of Ingalls
is shown in Table 3-4.40
Ingalls Financials ($ millions) 1996 1995 1994
Marine Engineering and Production Revenues $1294.6 $1396.1 $1484.1
Marine Engineering and Production Operating Profit $142.5 $131.6 141.1
Profit Margin 11.01% 9.43% 9.51%
Revenues/Employee ($000) 117 101.2 101
Table 3-4 - Ingalls Financials
Margins at Ingalls have been steady. A measure of effectiveness of the shipyard
is revenues generated per employee. Over the last few years this number has been
increasing at Ingalls indicating higher levels of productivity. With the current
procurement rate for Navy ships, Ingalls will have a major shortfall in revenues after the
delivery of the last LHD amphibious transport ship. They need to stimulate some new
work in order to maintain current manning levels. The future of Ingalls depends on its
ability to continue to win contracts from the US Navy. Without this base of work on
which to build, the yard will be in serious financial trouble. The recent award of LPD-17,
an amphibious assault ship, to the Bath/Avondale consortium has left Ingalls in a delicate
position. The yard is currently working at around 30% capacity. Further erosion of the
work backlog will force Ingalls to take drastic action.
40 Litton Industries Inc., (1996), Building Toward the Future, 1996 Annual Report.
106
3.13 Current Navy and Commercial Work
Ship Type No. Size Customer Value (Millions) Delivery
DDG-51 8 6600 It US Navy 2,696.4 12/01
LHD-1 3 28,200 It US Navy 2,287.7 7/00
Table 3-5 - Ingalls Order Book
Navy Work
* The core work at Ingalls is the DDG-51 program. Management counts on
maintaining at least 1.5 ships per year through 2010 when the last ship will be
delivered in the class. Management at Ingalls would like to get more of this work.
With recent developments at Bath on the LPD-17 and Arsenal ship programs
additional DDG-51 work may shift to Ingalls.
* Ingalls has recently delivered the last ship in the CG-47 program.
* The Wasp Class LHD-1 represent the largest Amphibious ships in the fleet.
Ingalls has built five of these helicopter carriers and has orders for three more.
* Foreign military sales include the construction of the SA'AR-5 class corvette for
Israel. This class represents a quantum jump in stealthiness of small combatant
ships. Ingalls also offers a 3000 ton frigate for sale overseas.
* Ingalls also does significant repair on CG-47, DD-963, DDG-993 amounting to
$74.2 million in FY 96
* Arsenal Ship - Selected for Phase II. They are teamed with Lockheed Martin and
Newport News Shipbuilding on this innovative design. The small number of
ships projected for this class is less attractive to Ingalls than the LPD-17 contract.
* LPD-17 - Lost bid to Bath/Avondale team. Decision under appeal. Teamed with
NASSCO and Newport News Shipbuilding. The Build Plan for this ship seemed
to be flawed. The front end of the ship was to be built at Ingalls taking advantage
of its combat systems integration skills. The aft portion of the ship was to be built
at Newport News. The two pieces of the ship were to be joined during erection at
Ingalls. Transporting half of a 25,000 ton ship 1500 miles for final erection and
having both pieces fit together is quite a challenge. The problems associated with
this plan may have contributed to the contract being awarded to another team.
Commercial Work
* Ingalls has not built any commercial ships since 1973-1974 when it built 4
container ships for American President Lines. They are currently building some
small barges to keep hull and mechanical labor employed until the next spike in
production. Ingalls is not actively seeking commercial work as they believe their
niche is in high performance combatant ships.
3.14 Future Strategic Plan
Ingalls future is dedicated to building complex combatant ships for the US Navy
and for foreign export. The specific ships Ingalls seems to be concentrating on include:
* Ingalls would like to be the sole yard for all DDG-51 contracts - they feel they
can build these ships more efficiently than BIW.
* Arsenal Ship - Teamed with Lockheed Martin on innovative ship program.
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* SC-21 - The Navy's future surface combatant. Still in concept stage. Ingalls
would like to be a major part of this contract as this is the only surface
combatant program on the horizon
* Trying to stimulate foreign military sales of SA'AR class or slightly larger
frigate design.
* May be able to compete for CVX if the Navy chooses to pursue a smaller,
conventionally powered variant.
* May need to revisit position on commercial work. Ingalls is an ideal
candidate to build SOCV Project. The Build Strategy for SOCV is oriented
for Ingalls.
3.15 Shipyard Layout
* Land Area - 569.2 Acres of developed land, 788.8 total acres
* Pier Space -2.2 miles of dock space
* Crane Capacity - Portal Cranes - 15 heavy lift cranes operate off a fixed track
system in bay areas and on the wharves. Capacity ranges from 39-300 tons.
Lift reach 50-200 ft
* Blast and Paint Facilities - Large building used for surface preparation and
painting of larger blocks. Additional blast and paint area not in use. The
capability exists to blast and paint large blocks. There was little evidence of
extensive use of this facility and it certainly was not a choke point.
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Figure 3-11 - Ingalls Shipyard Layout
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* Transfer Equipment - Launch/Translation Dry-dock - Capacity - 30,000 long
tons. Limitations: 50 tons per foot loading, 175 ft width, 850 ft length. Meets
SOCV constraints. Provides great flexibility to waterfront area.
* Capital for renovations - Ingalls feels it has more than enough capacity and
technology to produce ships for the Navy. They seem to be holding off on
large capital investments until the current order book stabilizes.
Figure 3-11 depicts the layout at Ingalls.
3.16 Human Resource Management
The management at Ingalls realizes that maintaining a stable, experienced
workforce is the key to remaining competitive. They are frustrated with the current order
book they maintain. In order for them to make significant improvements in cycle time
and productivity, there needs to be sufficient work to keep the yard gainfully employed.
Some characteristics of Human Resources Management at Ingalls include:
* Understand the value of maintaining experienced labor
* Working to instill team concept between trades
* Utilizing Covey training (7 Habits of Effective People) to increase
productivity
* Workforce - 11,000 workers down from a max of 25,000 in the late seventies
* 10 years average experience
* Mostly union workers
* Mississippi is a "Right to Work" state, meaning the workers do not have to
join union. This gives management some leverage during labor negotiations.
* Working in Integrated Product Teams (IPT). The IPT manages its own
budget. In this way the people who have the most control are the ones who
have to most understanding of the situation.
* Use multi-functional teams of cross trained personnel. Brings designers, CAD
operators, material procurement and construction people together. Breaks
down institutional barriers between departments.
3.17 Production Planning
Ingalls has used Production Planning as a competitive advantage on the CG-47
class and the DDG-51. The yard is big enough to absorb much more work than they have
on the order books. As will be discussed later, Ingalls has the tools to determine the most
efficient values for key the parameters for building a ship in terms of cycle time and
manpower utilization.
Constraints:
The only constraint to the shipbuilding process at Ingalls with its current order
book is man power. The throughput is around 3.5 blocks per week. Production planners
estimate they could increase throughput to 11.5 blocks per week without any major
investments in new infrastructure. Ingalls is keenly aware of the cost of ramping up
production too quickly. In the 1970's they expanded to 25,000 workers. The loss of
productivity from trying to train all of these new people greatly impacted performance.
The first place a constraint would be felt is in the fabrication area. More burn
tables would need to be purchased to meet a higher demand than 11.5 blocks per week.
The other option would be to purchase more of the shapes used in the early stages
through out-sourcing. All of the yards visited attempt to produce as much of the ship
internally to maximize man hours for their labor force. The Japanese are able to out-
source much of the low margin work on smaller subassemblies. US yards do not have the
sub contractor relationships to allow them to achieve this symbiosis without a major
change in the way they do business.
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A block at Ingalls is larger than other yards. These Grand Blocks consist of a
number of sub-assemblies. They can weigh as much as 250 tons. The flexibility
provided by the land level translator and heavy lift capability is a great strategic
advantage for Ingalls in Production Planning.
3.18 Phases of Construction
Observations were made of the construction process during a walking tour of the
yard. A time line depicting the way Ingalls builds ships will be compared to how Bath
builds the same ship, the DDG-51, at the end of this chapter. The flow of material
through the yard is represented in Figure 3-12.
ction
struction
Istruction
Figure 3-12 - Ingalls Material Flow
Table 3-6 shows the breakdown by phase of standard man-hours for a typical
DDG-51 construction cycle at Ingalls. It also shows the percentage of units of work
broken down by phase of construction.
Work and Cost Categories % of Total Work Percent of Std Man-hours
Shop Fabrication & Mfg 21.9% 13.6%
Pre Outfitting Installations 11.6% 17.7%
Outfitting 23.1% 27.4%
Testing 5.1% 4.2%
Change (ECP) 28.5% 2.4%
Rework 3.3% 1.3%
Backcharge (Material Prob) 2.1% .1%
Construction Services (Ovhd) 4.4% 33.3%
Table 3-6 - Ingalls Work Percentages at Each Phase41
Change represents the amount of Engineering Change Proposals (ECP) the
customer submits to the contractor once the project has started. The amount of change
the Navy imposes on the shipyard is too high. Once the Production Planning and
Detailed Design phases are completed, changes on that particular ship must stop if we are
to realize any effects of learning. Every time a change is made, it causes deviation from
what has already been done. This acts to limit the productivity gains that can be realized.
Although the total man hours associated with change is small, the disruption of base work
can lead to significant additional charges.
The overhead rate is interesting. Typical submarine construction overhead has
been quoted as at least equal to, and more likely higher than, the direct costs. The
percentage advertised at Ingalls is considerably less even though Ingalls is only utilizing
30% of its capacity.
41 Philo, D. (1997) Personal Communication
Detailed Design
The Ingalls design facility is very impressive. 3-D Computer Aided Drafting
(CAD) is being used extensively. Although the transition to 3-D CAD has been painful,
true producibility, quality and productivity improvements may be possible using a 3-D
product model correctly. Ingalls is using Dimension III, a Computervision product. It
has invested over $2 billion to achieve 3-D product modeling. Specific observations
concerning design include:
* 200 designers - making the transition to design build teams
* Ingalls uses line people, industrial engineers on same team as CAD operators
to make sure the design is producible.
* Use of 3-D CAD for most of DDG Flight IIA
* 3-D CAD can be used to find interferences and determine proper sequencing
of work
* 3-D CAD also allows Ingalls to bring the operators into the design site to get
feedback on arrangements at a very early stage. This may reduce the amount
of change the Navy demands on these ships.
Material Procurement and Handling
Material control is able to receive up to 50,000 items /month
* Most material comes by truck
* Not much evidence of piece parts laying around the yard. Could be for lack of
work. Ingalls personnel report they maintain an average of 6-8 weeks
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inventory. They understand that there are internal customers in the shipyard.
These customers must be ready to receive parts before they are shipped.
* Clear areas where pieces are manufactured
* Clear plate line. Plenty of room to cut and bend initial plate
* Moving to 3-D CAD that can be linked to Computer Aided Manufacturing
(CAM).
On Unit Construction
On Unit outfitting is done at several shops around the yard. It takes place between
weeks 28-72 for a typical DDG-51 contract. At Ingalls, On Unit represents 22.5% of all
outfitting. This seemed like a low number. Perhaps the size and weather at Ingalls allow
them to be more efficient than other yards in the On Block and On Board phases. On
Unit assembly takes place in several specialized shops with controlled environments.
Although this stage is thought to be the place with the highest outfitting productivity,
Ingalls chooses to do a larger percentage in later stages. This dynamic will be examined
in greater detail in Chapter 5.
On Block Construction
On Block Construction is conducted in the 600 area of the yard. The structural
steel components and the smaller subsystems come together in this area. The amount of
outfitting done here represents 41.9% of the total. This area is out in the weather. The
blocks are extensively jigged to allow access to the different yard workers. The blocks
are moved along the assembly line with overhead cranes. Specific observations:
* This area seemed congested and not environment controlled.
* Rain, heat must affect productivity and quality
* Access to services must be run via long wires or welding leads
* Level of pre-outfitting low.
* No final blast and paint prior to erection observed. This is the same as state of
the art Japanese yards. The difference is that the Japanese do not have rust
problems during On Block outfitting. Extensive rust could be observed at this
stage which requires surface prep or rework. Touch up work or rework was
being done on third shift to reduce the amount of disruption with base work.
On Board Construction
Ingalls leaves a larger portion to On Board Outfitting than other yards. This part
represents 34.3% of the outfitting that is done after the launch of the ship. This is the
least productive of the outfitting stages.42 The limited access to compartments and
interference among trades makes On Board construction very inefficient. Specific
observations include:
* Much of outfitting left to On Board phase
* May lead to coordination problems. Much of painting and insulation work is
done on third shift
* More difficult environment in which to work than PO-2 at Bath
42 Wilkins, J.R., Kraine, G.L., and Thompson, D.H., (Aug 1993) Evaluating the Producibility of Ship
Design Alternatives, Journal of Ship Production, Vol 9, No 3, pp 188-201.
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* Flexibility of launching methods may lead to inefficient practices.
The percentages of work done at each stage of construction are shown inTable 3-7
% of Unit Starts
Shop Pre-O/F Outfitting Test Change
Phase 1A 12 weeks 5.5%
Phase IB 12 weeks 18.2%
Phase 2 12 weeks 21.8% 23.8% 2.3%
Phase 3 12 weeks 13.8% 32.4% 1.6% 4.1%
Phase 4 12 weeks 11.6% 31.9% 6.3% 1.1% 7.0%
Phase 5 12 Weeks 9.8% 11.9% 12.3% 7.9%
610 w/s 12 weeks 10.9% 21.2% 1.7% 10.8%
620 w/s 12 weeks 5.3% 21.1% 3.1% 9.2%
910 w/s 10 weeks 2.1% 15.3% 6.6% 13.1%
920 w/s 10 weeks 0.9% 8.5% 21.1% 11.2%
930 w/s 11 weeks 0.1% 13.6% 33.4% 10.3%
940 w/s 12 weeks 4.8% 19.2% 11.3%
950 w/s 11 weeks 0.9% 13.3% 12.8%
Table 3-7 - Ingalls Phases and Work Start Percentages
3.19 Performance
Ingalls' performance has been good for the past several years. On the CG-47
project several ships were also under budget.
* Poor schedule and cost performance on DD-963 and LHA programs led to
$500 million delay and disruption claim.
* Ingalls gave money back to Navy on CG-47 program due to process
improvements.
* Ingalls has consistently out performed competition on DDG-51 program in
terms of cost.
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3.110 Use of Simulation
Ingalls was the only yard that was internally using Systems Dynamics modeling
to examine their production processes. It was clear from the beginning that the senior
level management understands that a systems perspective is important. The model they
use will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. The uses for the model include:
* Bid Risk Assessment - the simulation group was able to manipulate the Ingalls
Shipbuilding model to examine the LPD-17 work package. They were able to
change work package variables in the model to simulate the work needed for a
larger, less complex amphibious ship. They were also able to change the shipyard
strategic variables to simulate the competitions bid based on historical data and
the open literature. This allowed Ingalls to produce a competitive bid, and assess
cost and schedule risk.
* Analyze the impact of alternative management initiatives striving for better
program performance with lower costs, improved customer relations and
improved labor relations.
* Analyze cross-program and cross functional impacts
* Forecast the time and cost at completion of on-going programs with much greater
accuracy than traditional approach. This forecast can be updated based on new
information concerning change to the scope of the contract or the schedule as a
result of rework or customer directed Engineering Change Proposals (ECP).
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* Facilities Loading and Planning - The simulation group was able to evaluate if
USS Gonzalez work package would effect core DDG-51 assembly. Obviously if
the yard is only working at 30% capacity, the constraints are labor and
management. Key concerns for strategic planners include:
* How long does it take to hire people and get up to speed?
* Will we see an initial drop in productivity?
* Will this drop in productivity effect the core work in the yard?
* Ingalls is able to project how long it takes for an improvement process like JIT to
take effect. Worse before better dynamics will inevitably take place. The model
used to demonstrate this critical behavior.
* Change Order Negotiation, Dispute Resolution - Model used to quantify change
order impacts. This is done reactively, after the fact. It seems more sensible to
use proactively to give a true value to the decision makers requesting the change.
* The model could be used to test suggestions on how to improve the process. This
is the method the Navy should use for planning change. It captures the true
impact of change to a contract and not just the direct charges. This value may not
be exact but it is a better representation of the real costs that just man hours and
material.
* Cost-Schedule tradeoffs can be done although the Navy has never asked for them.
Only upper level management at Ingalls seem interested in this modeling. They
definitely feel there is need for use of models in resolution of these type of
disagreements.
* Build Strategy - Used to look at loading of different trades and infra-structure to
find optimum levels based on current order book.
* Strategic Planning - used to load yard so as not to affect core business. Would
like to model all ships, only have capital for DDG-51 program
3.111 Summary
My overall impression of Ingalls is the management is frustrated with the Navy
acquisition process. They feel they can produce the ships the Navy desires cheaper and
faster than the competition. A systems view of the shipbuilding process is evident from
the "Welcome Aboard" message from the CEO to the assembly process where
producibility ideas can be found. This systems perspective may have contributed to their
performance improvements since the DD-963 contract. Ingalls is a large shipyard which
is under utilized. It has valuable resources that are not being put to work. Ingalls is the
perfect candidate to build high performance commercial ships.
For these reasons, the SOCV program office has chosen Ingalls Shipbuilding to
produce this ship based on the projected order book, general characteristics of the yard,
and reasonable bid price. Initial estimates place the cost for SOCV around $250 million
dollars. Ingalls has built many innovative combatant ships for the Navy. The SOCV
design fits within the constraints of the yard without a large retooling investment. This
high performance hull requires the skills of a proven shipyard. Ingalls, operating at 30%
capacity, can easily gear up to absorb this work in the yard without disruption to their
core DDG-51 work
3.2 Bath Iron Works, Bath Maine
Areas of Specific Interest
* Material Handling and Procurement
* Level of Outfitting
* Constraints to Construction
* Competition with Ingalls
3.21 History
Bath Iron Works (BIW) was founded in Bath, Maine in 1884. It has delivered
over 400 ships since then to the world's fleets. BIW has been the lead designer and
builder of half of the non-nuclear surface ships procured by the US Navy since World
War II. BIW currently designs and builds the DDG-51 class destroyers. They are direct
competitors with Ingalls shipbuilding. BIW utilizes modular construction techniques
combined with extensive pre-outfitting of construction blocks.
BIW was purchased for $292 million by General Dynamics on 15 September
1995. General Dynamics management initiated a program requiring its major businesses
to be market leaders and have "critical mass." This is defined as "...the appropriate size
to retain key capabilities and ensure economies of scale. "43 In Shipbuilding and Repair
this critical mass now consists of 2 of the 6 largest shipbuilders in the country, BIW and
Electric Boat of Groton, CT. The impact of having two large shipbuilders owned by the
43 General Dynamics Form 10-Q, (August 1996)
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same company remains to be seen. Economies of scale in terms of material purchases,
software development, and heavy machinery purchases will be more readily realized with
two large construction bases. A common information system, 3-D CAD package, and
material vendors are being discussed.
3.22 Financial Status
The financial data for BIW are combined with Electric Boats's contribution to
General Dynamics revenues and earnings. The numbers for General Dynamics are
provided in Table 3-8.
General Dynamics Financials ($ millions) 1996 1995 1994
Marine Engineering and Production Revenues $ 2,452 $1,884 1,733
Marine Engineering and Production Operating Profit $218 $194 $196
Profit Margin 8.9% 10.3% 11.3
Table 3-8 - General Dynamics Financial Status
Net sales and operating earnings increased
acquisition of Bath Iron Works. The margins are
steady but not staggering. General Dynamics has
enough of the shipbuilding market to ensure they can
3.23 Current Navy and Commercial Work
The Order Book at BIW
during 1996 primarily due to the
similar to the rest of the industry,
made a concerted effort to capture
be competitive.
currently consists of the ships in Table 3-9.
Ship Type No. Size Customer Value (Millions) Delivery
DDG-51 11 6600 It US Navy 3,276.7 08/02
LPD-17 1 25,000 It US Navy 500
Table 3-4 - Bath Order Book
Navy Work
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The bulk of the work is made up of the DDG-51 contract. Additional work
includes:
* Phase II Arsenal Ship, teamed with Raytheon. BIW has been granted $15
million to continue efforts to create Arsenal ship concept designs.
* Bath/Avondale/Hughes Aircraft Team won the LPD-17 contract on 17
December 1996. Total value of current contract for the first ship is $641
million. The award provides options for two additional ships bringing the
total value of the contract to $1.5 billion. Bath will provide combat systems
expertise for the first two and build the third ship of class.
Commercial Work
* Teamed with Kvaerner Masa on BATHMAX Project. Looking to bring higher
speed cargo ships to the US. Products range from 500-3000 TEU container
ships, Large Ferries, and Cruise Ships.
* Bath has decided to concentrate on the high performance end of the
commercial spectrum in terms of complexity in the products it offers.
"Competing against the Japanese and Koreans in the cut throat tanker
business where nobody is making money is not where we want to be. ",44
44 Suehrstedt, Eric, (1997), Personal Communication
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* BIW is not pursuing commercial work as aggressively as in the past.
Sufficient Navy order book for next few years
3.24 Future Strategic Plan
The future looks bright for BIW. They seem to have taken advantage of some of
the government funded productivity programs like MARITECH to improve their internal
management practices. The new General Dynamics management team seems intent on
bringing Bath into the 21st century with large investments in new infrastructure.
* Actively seeking SC-21, Surface Combatant for the 21st century design.
* $300 million dollar facilities upgrade including land level translator. This will
allow much more flexibility in the erection sequence of the different ships.
* Expanding into the river South of the finger pier
* Upgrading blast and paint - long considered choke point of material flow in
yard
* Trying to reduce use of indirect labor to reduce overhead costs. This is a Lean
concept. Japanese shipbuilders can produce the same ships for 2/3 the man
hours of a US yard. Improvements in worker skills will allow US yards to
make similar improvements.
* Treating structural steel and outfitting on same billing system allowing better
tracking of progress.
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* Having mechanics do their own QA prior to passing on down the line with
check sheets. Another Lean concept. This technique can ensure point of
origin discovery of errors.
* Total revision of initial MRP process for fabrication facility at the Hardings
plant. Could increase productivity and quality significantly if implemented
correctly.
* Bath may have trouble integrating new work into it's core DDG-51 work.
Studies need to be done to ensure core work not disrupted by LPD-17.
3.25 Shipyard Layout
* Land Area - 56 Acres between Bath and Portland facilities
* Pier Space - 4 Berths
* Crane Capacity - Biggest crane is 330 ton on erection ways. Additional 220
ton crane supplements large crane. Limited to 220 ton erection blocks. Use
overhead cranes in pre-outfit areas to move WIP. The layout is so congested,
cannot move with a fork truck. Using overhead cranes disrupts work in other
areas as the blocks travel overhead.
* Blast and Paint Facilities - Facility needs to be upgraded. Constrains the
construction process.
* Transfer Equipment - Use overhead cranes and heavy LO/LO trucks to move
blocks around the yard. All smaller pieces fabricated at Hardings plant come
to the waterfront by truck.
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* Capital for renovations - General Dynamics seems to have made the decision
to upgrade facilities at BIW. $300 million in improvements are underway.
Further renovations will need to be done to accommodate the LPD-17 project.
* Number of shipbuilding ways - 2 in use, 1 in reserve
Figure 3-13 shows the layout of BIW.
Figure 3-13 - Bath Yard Layout
3.26 Human Resource Management
* Size of Workforce - 7500-8000 people
* Have a hiring freeze clause in current contract with unions. This tends to
reduce the volatility of the workforce. Although this restrains management
from cutting overhead quickly in the short term, it may help productivity and
quality in the long term as the average experience per worker increases.
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* Working to cross train workforce to do more than one trade. This will reduce
the number of hands required on each product over its life time. By cross
training the workers, more value can be added to the pieces per worker than in
the past. This is similar to innovations Japanese workers. No cleanup
personnel are assigned in Japanese yards. The welders clean up after
themselves when the work is completed.
* Attempting to organize workforce into Integrated Product Teams to facilitate
feedback of producibility ideas from the production line to the design site.
3.27 Production Planning
Build Strategy and Constraints
* The constraint many people at Bath point to is Blast and Paint capacity. At
BIW, all material receives an initial surface preparation and priming. After
the blocks are well established in the On Block Stage, they receive a final
Blast and Paint. This limits the amount of blocks to around 2/week.
* In order to ease this constraint, BIW is investing in additional Blast and Paint
facilities. None of the World Class shipyards examined in a recent technology
survey conduct a final blast and paint as an entire unit. The cycle times are
short enough that the initial surface preparation sufficiently protects the ship
during the production process.45
* Cycle time improvement has been discussed for several years. It will require a
large investment in information systems, improved material handling, better
45 Storch, R.L., Clark, J., and Lamb, T. (1995) Technology Survey of US Shipyards - 1994, presented at the
Ship Production Symposium, Seattle Washington, January 25-27, 1995.
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inventory controls and a faster erection sequence. Perhaps with the use of
weld through primers and better material handling in the early stages, BIW
could eliminate the second Blast and Paint sequence altogether.
3.28 Phases of Construction
The phases of construction at BIW are limited by the Yard Layout. Expanding
the yard is difficult because of environmental concerns in the state of Maine. BIW began
as a yard that built wooden boats. It has evolved into a yard that builds some of the most
complex ships on earth. There is a definite need for more efficient flow of material
through the yard. With new contracts on the order books, the opportunity may have
arrived to make a real difference in material flow and sequencing of erection. Figure 3-
14 shows the material flow through BIW.
Figure 3-14BIW Work Block Assembly Flow
Detailed Design
* Bath has been incorporating line people and industrial engineers on same team
as CAD operators to make sure good production issues are established early in
the process.
* They use 3-D CAD for most of DDG Flight IIA using Computer Vision
software. Bath has made the commitment to 3-D CAD to have a good
information interface with the Navy.
* CATEA - This capability is a function of the merger with General Dynamics.
The software package can be used to find interferences and determine proper
sequencing of work during the Detailed Design phase. Navy operators, the
real customer, can actually take a tour around the space to determine their
preferences early in the construction process. Change in the early stages is
inexpensive. If plans need to be changed to accommodate the preferences of
ship's force later in the sequence, the cost of change increases exponentially.
Material Procurement and Handling
Bath is moving to a "pull" system along the lines of JIT with 2 weeks inventory.
They currently manufacture the parts for an entire unit to completion. Some parts in the
unit are not incorporated into the ship for 6-8 months. By this time, the Work In Progress
(WIP) may need additional surface prep. The parts are stored in many different
warehouses. Some WIP is stored in the weather for as long as 9 months. The local
manager of this process is very interested in trying to quantify some of the costs and
benefits of Just In Time (JIT) to his operation. Right now he has a gut feel that smaller
inventory buffers will be more difficult to manage. He feels that eventually the JIT
concept will save money for the entire shipyard but these savings will not be seen at his
level. The big picture is harder to see when your job is becoming more difficult. Even
though the manager knows JIT is the right thing to do, implementation will be difficult.
Things will get worse before they get better. By removing the buffers in the system and
enforcing higher quality standards, the process will eventually become more efficient.
Specific Observations include:
* Most material comes by truck
* Going to JIT for shapes (72 hours from vendors). Reducing the number of
vendors used. Shapes will come pre-kitted for one days worth of work.
* BIW's primary supplier, Bethlehem Steel is going out of business. This
may force Bath to build more of its own shapes. This may take the
constraints from Blast and Paint and move it to the burning tables.
* BIW cannot get its plate vendor to go to JIT due to MILSPEC DH-36.
The vendor will not break up specialized steel into smaller batches. They
also will only deliver plates in one load during the summer. This forces
Bath to store plates in the weather all year long and pay the inventory
costs. BIW would like to be able to standardize plates for LPD contract
and DDG contract. This should be an action item for the producibility and
ATC programs. Can the Navy accommodate BIW with a more widely
made but of same quality steel that could be used for both contracts?
* BIW is moving to an automatic marking machine using Opti-Nest which
determines what is needed for the next two weeks and finds the best way
to cut the plate. The program goes through many possible configurations
and picks the most efficient. This is different from traditional hand
scribed plate. In the past, plates were marked by hand to reduce the
amount of scrap produced. Opti-Nest will probably be much faster than
hand marking but will result in increased remnants and possible wastage.
Management of wastage will be very important. This could be another
interesting study for producibility people.
* Current material tracking system (SMIS) aggregates to level of pieces
(100/product), product(1-2/unit), unit (72/DDG-51 hull) maximum 200
tons each, hull breakdown.
* There are material constraints due to heavy machinery and yard layout.
Management uses flow limits to keep the process from backing up at the
constraints. More study will need to be done to determine what happens
when constraints are removed. Understanding choke points is critical for
cycle time reductions. This is a topic for analysis in Chapter 5.
* Bath must get its manufacturing and material handling processes under
control. There is much evidence of piece parts laying around the Hardings
yard in piles waiting to be transported to the waterfront
* Bath builds an entire unit of work at the same time. If the waterfront is not
ready for this unit, it is stored at Hardings until needed. Minimizing Work
In Progress (WIP) is a critical part of the Just In Time (JIT) philosophy.
The Navy should not encourage such practices with payment for work
accomplished. Payments should be standardized to even out the cash flow
of the contractor.
* The material remains in storage at Hardings for as long as 9 months
waiting to be called by the waterfront. The process of finding the
completed parts after 9 months of storage can be difficult.
* The JIT initiatives currently being put into place at BIW should help
streamline the manufacturing process.
* Current plans call for the waterfront to "pull" what they need from
Hardings on a daily basis. Hardings will also go to pull system internally.
More emphasis is being placed on the early stages of construction. If this
stage is well thought out and managed, improvements in the subsequent
stages can occur as well. If the initial manufactured pieces are of low
quality or inventories cannot support the work on the waterfront, the entire
process will be disrupted.
* The JIT transition will be difficult for BIW. It will experience growing
pains as machines and personnel that are operating at a less than optimal
pace are identified. If the managers can overcome these growing pains,
the JIT process will be healthy for BIW.
On Unit Construction
Bath uses its covered shops to produce much more than Ingalls in the On Unit
phase. Because of their constraints for waterfront space, BIW pre-outfits to a larger
percentage. This acts to increase the quality and productivity of the outfitting work.
Moving larger units around the yard is a constraint. Whenever a unit is moved, work on
the rest of the modules comes to a halt. Specific observations include:
* Most lifts are made with overhead cranes.
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* Bath produces as much of what will go into the ship as possible. Its union
agreements call for as many man hours as possible go to Bath workers.
* Working in controlled environment indoors clearly yields higher quality
products.
On Block Construction
* At Bath, much of this stage is out of the weather. This increases both the
quality and the productivity of the workforce.
* Bath pre-outfits in this phase to the maximum extent possible before
conducting a final blast and paint.
* The final Blast and Paint is the bottleneck in the entire construction process
but yields higher quality products.
On Board Construction
* BIW is limited to two final construction/launch areas or ways. They have a
third area but are hesitant to invest the money to make it active. These
facilities are in constant use. A critical factor for Bath is to reduce the amount
of time the ship spends on the erection ways.
* Bath has been able to reduce this time to a little over 9 months. As their order
book becomes more diversified in the next few years, coordination of the
erection sequence will be very important.
* By the time the ship is launched, the ship is between 72-74% complete. The
remaining work consists of pulling cables and fitting the sonar dome. This
will be discussed in greater detail at the end of this chapter.
* Bath has been pursuing accuracy control to the point where they can cut neat
the erection blocks. The objective of cut neat is to allow the blocks to come
together with little or no modifications. This goal is ambitious. Current
accuracy control at BIW does not support this goal.
* The addition of a land translator will make this stage more flexible. Bath is
currently limited to two erection sites. With a land translator they could put
more of their waterfront space to work simultaneously.
3.29 Performance
BIW has maintained adequate performance on its contracts with the Navy. It
produces quality products on time and for the most part under budget. Bath has not been
able to produce ships as inexpensively as Ingalls do to their internal process constraints.
The Navy seems to value the quality BIW is able to build into the ships as is evident by
its continued support of Bath with new DDG orders.
3.210 Use of Simulation
The managers at BIW all expressed interest in the use of simulation as a way to
improve their planning processes. In particular they would like to see:
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* JIT - What is the improvement to the bottom line of moving to a JIT inventory
process. The current manager at Hardings would like to be able to justify
expenditures to upper management. Right now he feels that he is making the
right decision although he wonders about the magnitude of investment in
capital and man hours required to produce the desired result. Simulation
would reinforce the positive aspects of JIT.
* Bath would like to be able to run several scenarios to determine which is more
cost effective for the initial manufacturing processes, build parts at BIW or
subcontract them out.
* Choke Point Analysis - Determining the true constraints of the yard is critical
to reducing cycle times. Being able to pinpoint the place in the yard that
requires an infra-structure upgrade has great value.
* Finally, being able to quantify the requirement to carry two types of steel
would be of interest. If simulation could be used to quantify the difference
between maintaining two lots of steel vice using the same steel for both DDG-
51 and LPD-17, the Navy may pay more attention.
3.211 Summary
Bath is a relatively small yard when compared to Ingalls. It struggles with
waterfront and production area constraints. This is very similar to many of the Japanese
yards. Constraints force management to properly plan each stage of construction. The
initial phases of operations at Bath require some attention. The improvements planned
for the Hardings plant go a long way to becoming more efficient. The outfitting of blocks
as observed in P02 at Bath was the finest quality observed in all of the shipyard tours.
Working in a controlled environment without the limitations of On Board outfitting is
clearly a more efficient process than that observed at Ingalls.
The current order book at Bath allows management to make significant
investments in infrastructure and process improvement. The required throughput to
sustain BIW is not as high as at Ingalls. With proper streamlining of material flow and
investments in new technology, BIW could come close to matching the quality and
productivity of the Japanese.
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3.3 - NASSCO, San Diego, California
Areas of specific interest:
* Degree of Outfitting
* Material Control
* Rework
* Design Change Integration
3.31 History
NASSCO - National Steel and Shipbuilding Company is an employee owned
major ship design, construction and repair facility. It was started as a small machine shop
in 1905. NASSCO has built hospital ships, oil tankers, ferries, container ships, combat
supply ships, tank landing ships, RO/RO and Oceanographic Research Ships. 25% of
business devoted to overhaul and repair. In all NASSCO has delivered 296 ships evenly
distributed between Navy and commercial work. NASSCO is a subsidiary of Morrison-
Knudsen Company Inc.
Three major business areas include:
* Ship Repair and Conversion
* New Ship Construction
* Industrial and Offshore Fabrication
3.32 Financial Status
NASSCO is a employee owned company that is not a publicl traded company and
so the financial data was not available. It was essentially rescued from bankruptcy by the
US Government after major performance problems on the AOE-6 project. Performance
on the converted T-AKRs was poor during the first stages of the project as well. As with
any conversion, additional scope was found that needed to be scheduled. In hindsight it
may have been more cost effective to build three additional three ships thus extending
the product line to try to capture economies of scale. The reason the conversions were
favored for the first group of ships was the expected short turn around time. This "quick
fix" turned out to take much longer than anticipated and cost almost as much as the new
construction ships.
Work on the New Construction T-AKRs has begun. Considerable learning was
gained on the Sealift Conversion projects. 46 Better schedule and cost performance is
expected on this contract.
46 Tedesco, M. (1997) Personal Communication
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3.33 Current Navy and Commercial Work
The Navy Contracts NASSCO has in its yard is included in Table 3-9.
Ship Type No. Size Customer Value (Millions) Delivery
AOE 1 19,700 It US Navy 365.8 10/97
T-AKR (C) 2 33,200 It US Navy 423.2 8/97
T-AKR 5 36,100 It US Navy 1,112.1 9/00
Table 3-9 - NASSCO Order Book
NASSCO relies on auxiliary and Sealift contracts from the Navy for its business. Recent
developments include:
* Selected for Phase II consideration for the Arsenal Ship Program. Some
concern within the Navy that NASSCO has not produced a combatant ship.
This could prove to be an advantage if producibility features are emphasized.
Teamed with Northrop/Grumman.
Commercial Ships
No current new construction work on the books.
Most recent commercial work includes:
* R.J. Pfeiffer, a 28,555 DWT open container ship for Matson lines in 1992
* Exxon Valdez and Exxon Long Beach 209,000 DWT tankers for Exxon in
1985.
NASSCO is better suited to building commercial ships than BIW or Ingalls. They have
been the recipient of several MARITECH contracts for new ship designs including a
crude carrier, a cruise ship and a trailer ship capable of transporting 500 truck trailers and
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200 automobiles. Having a standard design that can be used "off the shelf' to satisfy a
customer's needs is a major strategic advantage to reduce costs and cycle times. The
Japanese and Koreans use their marketing departments to push the standard shipyard
designs. If American shipyards can produce world class designs, they may be able to
draw more attention from world shippers.
3.34 Future Strategic Plan
"By the year 2000 NASSCO will be the most effective designer and repairer of
Navy and commercial ships, with at least one major international ship construction
project; and will have a proven record of dramatic, ongoing improvement in our
processes and products. "47
* NASSCO is vying for commercial work including a 160,000 Dead Weight
Tons (DWT) ARCO tanker and an even bigger 200,000 DWT B&P Tanker.
* Management is looking to win the next Navy auxiliary ship contract, ADCX.
Significant producibility changes could be made on this ship to do things
smarter and improve the Navy shipbuilding process. Auxiliary ships are more
like commercial ships than warships so learning may be possible that may
translate across platforms.
3.35 Shipyard Layout
* Land Area - 147 acres of real estate
* Pier Space - 8 positions for outfitting and repair
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47 NASSCO Vision Statement
* Crane Capacity - A Cranes - 3 with 90 ton capacity - limits erection blocks to
220 tons. B Cranes - smaller 40 ton cranes on rails. Cranes are used to move
most of the blocks around the yard. This can interrupt work going on in the
rest of the yard as the block passes overhead.
* Blast and Paint Facilities - NASSCO has sufficient capacity to support
subsequent phases.
* Transfer Equipment - Overhead cranes are used exclusively to move the
products around the shipyard.
* Capital for renovations - If any commercial work is contracted, investments
will need to be made in several areas. NASSCO management has taken a wait
and see attitude to improvements which is typical of US shipyards as a way to
avert risk.
* Deep water access to the Pacific.
* 2 building ways and one dry dock for new construction.
* Dry dock used for tankers with high block coefficient. Not deep enough for
finer ships.
* Major rail line brings steel and other material directly into the yard
Figure 3-15 depicts the shipyard layout at NASSCO.
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Figure 3-15 - NASSCO Shipyard Layout
3.36 Human Resource Management
* Current workforce of 5000 people. Peak as high as 7600.
* Assign a Project Manager for each program to provide interface with customer.
* Use modem effective information and control system to maintain clear visibility
of all aspects of each program.
* Used to integrate engineering work requirements and schedules with manpower
budgets, establish lead times for material procurement actions, and perform
critical path scheduling including work around and recovery schedules.
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* Gathers earned values and actual costs of work performed to produce schedule
and cost variance analyses.
* NASSCO point to this method as a competitive advantage.
3.37 Production Planning
NASSCO takes a manual approach to planning. The first step is to determine
people required in different trades. They attempt to keep manning levels constant as they
know trying to scale up quickly is expensive. Next the planners look at throughput rates
and capacity at the different stages of construction to determine choke points. Finally,
they look at crane capacity and equipment. There is currently no formal way of quickly
assessing the impact of new work on the core business. Most of the structural steel work
is done in the assembly stage and during On Board construction.
Current Constraints:
NASSCO is working at about 55% capacity. With present levels of manning
NASSCO can produce approximately 12 blocks per week with 1.5 shifts. In order to
increase the throughput, the first step is to hire more people. With the current
infrastructure, production planners assume they can expand to 20 blocks per week
without hitting another constraint.
At about 20 blocks per week, the constraint to production is the burning tables.
Another table would be required to sustain 20 blocks/week. With a new table, NASSCO
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could go to 22.5 blocks per week before they would need to invest in additional overhead
crane capacity. Most of the lifts at the yard are conducted with 90 A cranes. These lifts
consist of erecting, turning and moving. A smaller B crane would be needed first to
allow the A cranes to concentrate on erection. The cost of these improvements and
determining the cost-benefit relationship of investing in new infrastructure is a topic for
future work
3.38 Phases of Construction
Detailed Design
NASSCO maintains a strong design department. They have conducted several
recent design efforts under MARITECH sponsorship on product and car carriers. They
are trying to standardize the parts used to build the different ships in the yard. If the
simplest parts of the ship are common, they may be able to reach economies of scale in
early production. Managing the process of joining these common components into
individual blocks becomes a harder challenge.
Material Handling and Procurement
* Most material comes by truck or rail
* There did not seem to be as much work in progress at NASSCO as observed at
BIW. The products are very different. The DDG-51 is much more densely
outfitted than the T-AKR.
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* NASSCO is working to make Just in Time (JIT) a reality by coordinating timely
deliveries from its suppliers.
On Unit Construction
The outfitting process at NASSCO resembles that found at Ingalls. Much more
outfitting is done in the On Board phase. As can be seen in Table 3-10, next to no work
is done at this stage at NASSCO. The weather and space available at NASSCO do not
force the processes inside. This may lead to degraded productivity and quality.
On Block Construction
More of the outfitting is done here although still not to the level that Bath or some
of the foreign yards achieve. No Final Blast and Paint is conducted prior to erection.
Again, this is a function of both the process and the product at NASSCO. A T-AKR is a
huge truck carrier. The cargo carried by the T-AKR does not come aboard until a crisis
occurs. The DDG-51, on the other hand, is packed with weapons and electronics that
allow it to operate before delivery to the Navy. Coordination of the higher degree of
outfitting is more easily accomplished at earlier stages. The differences between ships
are captured in a complexity factor.
NASSCO does not see the value in pre-outfitting to a greater degree with its current
products and schedules. To increase throughput to the levels that would support building
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commercial tankers, NASSCO will need to do more outfitting away from the erection
sites.
On Board Construction
Most of the Outfitting work is left to the On Board phase. As discussed in
Chapter 2, this is the least efficient of the construction phases. Once the ship is on the
ways or in the water, access to different spaces is extremely limited. The controlled
environment and easy access to support services of the shop is not available.
Interferences with other trades must be overcome.
A breakdown of how much of the ship is built at each of the different phases of
construction is included in Table 3-10.
Phase of Construction Percent of Work Done
Structural Steel Outfitting
Planning - SOC 0 3% 4%
Fabrication - SOC 1 12% 16%
Sub Assembly - SOC 2 6% 1%
Assembly - SOC 3 41% 4%
On Unit - SOC 4 0% 1%
Block Outfit - SOC 5 4% 22%
On Board - SOC 6 33% 44%
Testing - SOC 7 1% 8%
Table 3-10 - NASSCO Stages of Construction
3.39 Performance
NASSCO experienced poor cost and schedule performance on the AOE contract
for a variety of reasons. Cost growth on this program has been estimated at 30%. This
resulted in the elimination of one ship from the contract to rescue the company from
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bankruptcy. Basically the Navy paid the same amount of money for one less ship. Work
has progressed more smoothly on the Sealift conversions and even better on the New
Construction Sealift ships. Understanding the constraints of the yard is critical to being
able to deliver at cost and on time.
3.310 Simulation
NASSCO has been exploring the use of simulation in their yards. Some of the
production people have been to Ingalls to visit the simulation group. NASSCO is not
convinced strategic modeling will do anything for them. They have approached Decision
Dynamics about the status of ShipBuild. There are many questions that arose during the
visit that could be investigated using System Dynamics.
* First, NASSCO will need to greatly improve throughput in blocks per week if
they are to smoothly work both Navy and commercial work. They are able to
push about ten blocks per week through their yard with the present manning
levels. Plans for ARCO tanker work indicate levels of 28 blocks per week will be
required. NASSCO does not know if they can support this increase in throughput.
They are bidding on new work that could put their base contract, the Navy Sealift
ships, at risk. Based on their performance on the AOE-6 program running
concurrently with the Conversion Sealift Ship, this increase in capacity is not
realistic. It would be interesting to study the constraints within the yard using
simulation to determine the constraints at each level.
* NASSCO went through a long battle with the Navy over delay and disruption on
the AOE-6 program. This dispute resulted in the cancellation of one of the ships
in the class. Perhaps a model similar to the Pugh Roberts Shipbuilding Model
could have been used locally to determine how much of the delay and disruption
was the fault of the contractor and how much was the fault of the Navy.
* NASSCO is trying to find a way to quantify the cost of internally generated
change. They have been encouraging employees to provide suggestions for how to
improve the process. Producibility issues play a large part in reducing costs and
cycle times. The problem that exists is determining the cost of making a change
to the design at a late stage in the contract. They have a formal billing system for
customer generated change orders. There is no rapid and efficient way to do a
cost benefit analysis for producibility issues.
* Every shipyard mentioned flattening manning levels as a crucial need in their
yard. They understand that in times of little work, the easiest way to cut overhead
is to lay people off. All also reported that hiring new people to support a new
contract is expensive. NASSCO mentioned this specifically as a problem on the
AOE-6. The Navy awarded NASSCO the task of converting 3 foreign container
ships into Sealift assets for the US Army. This called for the hiring of additional
personnel, especially structural steel workers. Productivity in the entire yard went
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down for a considerable time as experienced people were moved to new jobs and
new people were indoctrinated.
* Having dealt with large fluctuations in manning before, the senior management is
looking for ways to keep their current workers gainfully employed until the next
surge in work comes along.
3.311 Summary
NASSCO is the largest shipbuilder on the West Coast of the United States. It has
great potential to compete with the Japanese and Koreans on commercial ships if it can
maintain a strong base of Navy work. The Navy ships it builds are more like commercial
ships than any of the other yards visited. Learning across programs could be a valuable
factor for improving productivity and quality.
If NASSCO management can get a better handle on the constraints of the yard,
they may be able to make smart decisions about where and when to invest in
infrastructure. The design staff is capable of producing commercial designs. It remains
to be seen if these designs generate any commercial work.
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3.4 - Newport News Shipbuilding, Newport News, Virginia
A detailed tour of Newport News was not possible during the limited time for this
research. The preliminary information for NNS is included for completeness and will be
updated when the opportunity arises.
Areas of Specific Interest include:
* Building Double Eagle Tankers in same yard as Nuclear aircraft carrier.
* Impact on overhead of other program in a nuclear capable yard
* Problems encountered with shipfitting on Double Eagles
* Renovations are needed to retool for NSSN
* Impact of diverse products in same shipyard
* Innovation Center for CVX
3.41 History
Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) is the largest privately owned shipyard in the
United States. It was recently spun off by Tenneco to become its own company.
The company was founded in 1886. NNS has delivered nearly 800 ships ranging from
tugboats to super carriers. Famous ships produced at NNS include:
* Seven battleships of Teddy Roosevelt's Great White Fleet
* BG Texas and Pennsylvania
* Ranger - first US carrier built from keel up
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* Passenger Liners America and United States - Fastest commercial ships ever
built
* Enterprise - first nuclear aircraft carrier
* Los Angeles Class submarine
* Nimitz Class Carriers
* UST Atlantic, UST Pacific - largest ships built in Western Hemisphere
Newport News has become the sole provider of Nuclear Aircraft Carriers in the country
3.42 Financial Status
NNS Financials ($ millions) 1996 1995 1994
Marine Engineering and Production $ 1908 $1800 $1753
Revenues
Marine Engineering and Production $160 $184 $200
Operating Profit
Profit Margin 8.4% 10.4% 11.4%
Revenues/Employee ($000) 106 90 88
Table 3-11 - NNS Financial Status
As the Los Angeles submarine came to a close, more of the shipyard activity
became lower margin conversion and repair work. NNS has a considerable backlog of
work as will be outlined in the next section. Revenues per employee have been steadily
increasing indicating increasing productivity per worker.
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3.43 Current Navy and Commercial Work
Ship Type No. Size Customer Value (Millions) Delivery
CVN 2 75,000 It US Navy 4,350 12/02
NSSN 2 7500 It US Navy 1,229.4 6/00
T-AKR 2 33,200 It US Navy 425.6 3/97
Product Carriers 4 46,000 Fleeves Shipping 152.0 2/98
Product Carriers 5 46,000 It Hvide 245.7 12/98
Table 3-12 - NNS Order Book
Navy Work:
* The bulk of NNS order book is made up of the 2 Nuclear Aircraft Carriers,
CVN-75 and CVN-76. Plans are proceeding for CVN-77 as well.
* As the Los Angeles construction came to a close, NNS made a successful push
to acquire some New Attack Submarine (NSSN) work. They are currently
teamed with Electric Boat to produce next attack submarine.
* Conversion of 2 Strategic Sealift Ships, Gordon and Gilliland
* Overhaul of CVN-69
The commercial work at NNS is intriguing. The Double Eagle, Double Hulled
Tankers are the first new construction double hulled ship built in a US shipyard that meet
the requirements of OPA 90.48
* Mobil has recently purchased another of the Double Eagle tankers
* NNS may be taking a loss on the current commercial work hoping to generate
niche market for double hull tankers produced domestically. If productivity
can be improved using this work it may help future Navy construction costs as
well.
48 Maritime Reporter and Engineering News, (1997) Mobil to buy NNS Tanker, February 1997.
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3.44 Future Strategic Plan
NNS has committed themselves to become the only nuclear shipbuilder in the
country. They are currently investing in yard improvements including:
* Spending $70 million for Automated Steel Factory used to modify steel
fabrication capabilities using robotics and CAD/CAM technology
* Reconfiguring yard to build New Attack Submarine
* $28.5 million to increase the length of the longest dry dock to 2173 ft
CVX is the next big prize on the horizon. Current plans call for a less expensive,
possibly conventionally powered carrier. This could introduce competition to the carrier
market for the first time in 30 years. NNS is utilizing its innovation center to ensure it
remains the primary player in any new aircraft carrier contracts.
NNS made a concerted effort to build commercial ships after 15 years. Many
people say they are losing their shirts on this contract. NNS seems to feel the commercial
experience will pay great dividends down the line. How do they know this is not a
wasted effort? There have been rumors of many problems on the contract. The oversight
of dealing with Navy nuclear ships may have priced the yard out of commercial
competition. It will be interesting to see what happens with this effort.
3.45 Shipyard Layout
* Land Area - 550 acres along James River near port of Hampton Roads
* Pier Space - Eight Dry Docks, floating dry dock, four piers
* NNS is the largest of US Shipyards in terms of capacity and work force.
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Figure 3-16 - Newport News Shipbuilding
3.5 Avondale Shipbuilding
Only a quick tour of Avondale was possible. The details of the uard will be
fleshed out in later visits.
3.51 History
Avondale Industries is an employee owned company under an Employee Stock
Ownership Plan (ESOP). Avondale is a diversified company consisting of several
subsidiaries including the Shipyards, Modular Construction, Steel Sales, Boats, and IPDE
Technology Divisions. Avondale's Shipyard Division was founded in 1938 by two ex
river boat captains as a barge construction and repair facility. In 1959, Avondale was
purchased by Ogden Corporation. It remained part of Ogden Marine until 1987 when the
ESOP purchased the company.
3.52 Financial Status
Avondale Financials ($ millions) 1994 1993 1992
Marine Engineering and Production Revenues $475.8 $456.7 $576.4
Marine Engineering and Production Operating Profit $16.9 $3.4 $7.2
Profit Margin 4% 1% 1.5%
Revenues/Employee ($000) 83 91 89
Table 3-13 - Financial Data at Avondale
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3.53 Current Navy and Commercial Work
The order book at Avondale is listed in Table 3-14.
Ship Type No. Size Customer Value (Millions) Delivery
LSD 1 11,900 It US Navy 257 4/98
WAGB 1 15,000 It USCG 232.2 6/98
LPD 1 18,000 It US Navy 641.1 7/02
T-AKR 5 34,400 It US Navy 1,102.7 1/00
Product Carriers 2 38,000 AHL 71.5.0 7/97
Table 3-14 - Avondale Order Book
3.54 Future Strategic Plan
Avondale has established itself as the premiere builder of Amphibious ships in
this country. They also continue to push for commercial work. Investment in
infrastructure continues. Avondale has doubled the capacity of its Blast and Paint
Facility, increased On Unit and Fabrication capacity in the "Ship Module Factory." A
better material handling and control system will need to be put into place to make the
shipyard more efficient. There is an excess amount of storage space and warehouses in
the yard indicating much work in progress. Avondale may need to make similar changes
as BIW to its MRP system if they want to become as productive as the foreign
competition.
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3.55 Shipyard Layout
The layout at Avondale is shown below.
Figure 3- 17- Avondale Shipyard Layout
Key Factors include:
* Land Area - 268 acres
* Upper Shipbuilding area capable of constructing ships up to 250,000 dwt or 3
conventionally sized ships concurrently. The limitations of the dry dock is
81,000 It.
* Pier Space - 3 outfitting piers for a total of 6000 linear ft
* Crane Capacity - 600 ton floating crane, 250 ton turnover rig, 250 ton, 150
ton, and 100 ton outfitting cranes,
* Blast and Paint Facilities
* Transfer Equipment: Blocks are moved around the yard using movable cranes
and Heavy LO/LO trucks with a capacity of 250 tons. At the erection site, a
land a series of 280 ton jacks are used to move the completed ship into
position for launch. It takes almost eight hours to move the ship into position.
Ships constructed in the upper shipbuilding area move laterally in three
positions for launching by the large floating dry dock. Ships built in the lower
yard are moved laterally and parallel toward the river and side launched from
one of 5 positions.
3.56 Use of Simulation
Avondale is interested in exploring the impact of commercial and government
work in the same shipyard. Many people in the industry feel the two products are
mutually exclusive. The same workforce cannot do both. Avondale and NNS are
currently attempting both. Avondale would like to know if workers can be used across
programs effectively or if they should be separated into two worker pools. Being able to
cross programs allows the shipyard managers much more flexibility to keep people at
work. This practice may also lead to productivity improvements in Navy work.
3.6 Summary
This section examines the differences between the yards visited. The strategic
variables used to simulate each yard are presented in Table 3-15. The values in this table
are the result of observations, publicly released information and educated guesses. They
do not represent the exact values at any given time in these shipyards and should be used
for comparison purposes only. Some data is left blank for future research. As this work
continues, more detailed information will be gathered leading to more accurate results.
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Shipyard Parameters Bath Ingalls NASSCO NNS Avondale
Labor 7500 11000 5000 18000 4500
Peak Labor 10000 25,000 7600 30000 9000
Max Labor (Phase) Design (people) 250 200 250 300 350
Fabrication(people) 500 850
On Unit(people) 500 850
On Block(people) 500 850
On Board(people) 500 850
Outfitting Piers 4 3 8 4 3
Total Shipyard Area (acres) 55 788 147 550 268
Pre-outfitting 73% 65% 60% 65% 60%
Design Capacity (blks/wk) 3 2 3 4 6
Current Infrastructure Limits (blks/wk) 2 12 20 35
B&P (blks/wk) 2 8 10 35
Fabrication Equipment (blks/wk) 8 12 20 35
On Unit Area (blks/wk) 8 25 23 35
On Block Area (blks/wk) 6 30 25 40
Erection Area (blks/wk) 8 30 25 40
Cranes (block size) 220 300 250 300 250
Erection Sites (active) 2 6 3 9 8
Erection Site Limitations - Length (m) 260 270 310 400 310
Erection Site Limitations - Weight (It) 30,000 30,000 200,000 200,000 250,000
Erection Site Limitations Draft (m) 7 6 5 8 7
Dry Dock Capacity (It) 30,000 30,000 200,000 200,000 81,000
Capacity Utilization 75% 30% 55% 40% 50%
Current Throughput (blks/wk) 2 4.5 12 10 18
Table 3-15 - Shipyard Strategic Variables
Chapter 4 - Production Model Description
In this chapter, the Build Strategy for the SOCV and the shipyard characteristics
of Chapter 3 are used to create a System Dynamics model that is used to manage the
planning and construction process of SOCV. The model is used to increase
understanding and facilitate insights concerning the complexities of the project.
Shipbuilding consists of large, complex, capital intense projects. Shipbuilders consider
prototyping too expensive. Because of this, shipbuilding is a natural field for use of
simulation. 3-D product models of the ship allow many of the uncertainties involved
with the ship design to be examined virtually. Likewise, the process used to build the
product can be simulated. The experience gained using a simulation run many times will
prove invaluable to managers when they need to make real decisions.
Any large scale construction project demonstrates the following characteristics
which tend to make them harder to manage:
* Complex material flows, consisting of multiple interdependent components
* Dynamic behavior, not constant over time
* Nonlinear relationships
* Feedback between and feed forward
* "Hard" and "soft" data49
* Many factors operating simultaneously
49Sterman, J.D., (1992), "System Dynamics Modeling for Project Management", unpublished working
paper, Systems Dynamics Group. Sloan School of Management. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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In support of this work a System Dynamics project model is developed to
represent the shipbuilding process. The model is tuned to capture the specifics of Ingalls
shipbuilding. The analysis conducted in Chapters 3 and the Build Strategy Document
provide the basis for calibration to represent shipbuilding at Ingalls. This model has been
developed for proof of concept. The level of aggregation is high enough to allow several
case studies to be conducted relatively quickly. It is also detailed enough to capture
project dynamics as observed during the shipyard visits. Additional calibration, using
historical data and field observation, will be required to produce a model which can be
used to accurately predict project performance for cost and schedule. This model is
valuable for the behavior it can simulate and not for exact values. It can be used to test
the impact of certain policies and their relative magnitude.
The first task when building a System Dynamics model is problem identification
and model conceptualization. "In constructing a useful model of corporate behavior, it is
essential to have clearly in mind the purposes of the model. Only by knowing the
questions to be answered can we safely judge the pertinence of factors to include in or
omit from the system formulation. "50 The purpose of the Ship Production Model is to
provide a broader systems perspective for managers involved in the acquisition process
for SOCV, both in the government and in the private sector. The model supplements the
static planning programs of Critical Path Method (CPM) and Probabilistic Evaluation and
50Sterman, J.D., (1992), "System Dynamics Modeling for Project Management", unpublished working
paper, Systems Dynamics Group. Sloan School of Management. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Review Techniques (PERT) that are so widely used in ship construction. It captures the
dynamic features of feedback and prerequisite dependencies found in the shipbuilding
process. Once the Ship Production Model is complete, a base case can be developed.
The base case represents the present state of the way Ingalls build ships. The model can
be modified to represent any shipyard. The base case is used as a benchmark from which
policy analysis is conducted. The Ship Production Model is then used in Chapter 6 to
examine the differences between two shipyards and several process issues which may
improve the performance of the project. Each issue was mentioned specifically by the
shipbuilders as a concern for which they did not have the tools to examine.
4.1 Model Development
The Ship Production Model uses previously developed work to identify the key
structures found in most projects. Additional structure is then added to capture the
specific attributes of shipbuilding. The reference modes and dynamic hypotheses for
project structures can be found in several works including Industrial Dynamics 51 , System
Dynamics Modeling with Dynamo52, and the Vensim User's Guide 53. The key structures
used in the Ship Production Model are identified in this section. Several of the table
functions used in this model were developed in other studies including the Effect of
Overtime on Productivity and Quality.
51 Forrester, J.W. (1961), "Industrial Dynamics", Cambridge, MA, Productivity Press.
52 Richardson, G.P, and Pugh, A.L., (1982) "Introduction to System Dynamics Modeling with DYNAMO,"
Productivity Press, Portland, Oregon.
53 Vensim User's Guide, (1995) "Ventana Simulation Environment", Ventana Systems Inc.
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4.11 Previous Project Models
System Dynamics Project Models were first envisioned by Jay Forrester at the
Sloan School of Management in the early 1960's. Several of his students have used
Project Models to gain insight in many industries. 54 Similar structures for Project Models
have been developed and tested in previous studies. Some models, described in the
literature search, can represent the shipbuilding process. A brief summary of the project
models most suited for shipbuilding and the structures they introduced is listed below:
* Roberts - 1974 - First research and development project model. Introduced work
flow based on productivity and manpower, management decisions, and perceived
and actual progress.
* Cooper - 1978 - First large scale use of project model. Model of the Ship
Production process used for claims settlement. The model focused on rework
caused by customer changes. Key structures include rework, downstream
dependencies, overtime, defect discovery time and quality. Concepts introduced
include:
- Customer can influence cycle times and scope of work
- There is a distinction between first and higher order impacts
- Competition among activities for resources.
54 Ford, D. N., (August 1995), "The Dynamics of Project Management: An Investigation of the Impacts of
Project Process and Coordination on Performance," PhD Thesis. Sloan School of Management.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Cambridge, MA.
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* Richardson and Pugh - 1981 - Developed System Dynamics Textbook. Created a
small project model including real progress, undiscovered rework, perceived
progress, effort perceived remaining, hiring, and scheduling.
* Abdel-Hamid - 1984 - Modeled software development which contains many
structures similar to shipbuilding.
* Homer - 1993 - Built project models using constraints of available work and
infrastructure to limit production. Also introduced fatigue as a human resources
issue.
* Ford - 1995 - Points out that the structure of static planning models have not been
effectively coupled with dynamic feedback. Attempts to bridge the gap.
Developed multi-phase product development model with down stream constraints
for the computer manufacturing industry.
* Alfeld - 1996 - Shipbuild - starts as production planning model. Adds feedback
and causal loops after static plan is established. Still under development but holds
much potential as a commercial package.
Many of the structures used in these models were developed for different industries and
are tailored for Shipbuilding. Additional structure is taken from the Molecules of
Structure developed by Jim Hines and merged by Bob Eberlein into the System
Dynamics modeling software package, Vensim. 55
55 Hines, J., (1996), Molecules of Structure - Building Blocks for System Dynamics Models", Leaptec and
Ventana Systems.
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4.12 Ship Production Model Characteristics
The Ship Production model consists of several interacting sectors. These include
the following:
* Multi Phase Work Accomplishment and Rework -
* Labor Adjustment - Project Labor adjustment and Shipyard Hiring and Firing
* Schedule Completion
* Financial
* Quality Effects
* Productivity Effects
* Shipyard Constraints
Each sector will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections. Multiple phases
are modeled with inter-phase dependencies. These phases are consistent with the Build
Strategy developed for SOCV and are listed below.
* Design
* Fabrication
* On Unit Construction
* On Block Construction
* On Board Construction
The next step in the progression of this model would be to tune it to match the Product
Work Breakdown Structure (PWBS) currently being proposed by NSWC Carderock as a
standard for the industry. With common production sequence, each yard could be
compared directly
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Three types of constraints limit the work accomplishment in the model.
* Labor - limited to 200 shipyard designers and 850 production people per ship
* Process constraints between phases - Early portions of ship must be built
before the later portions. Must have panels with frames and strakes before we
can mount the machinery foundations. We must have the foundations in place
prior to landing the main engines.
* Facilities - Engineering Work Stations, Building Ways, Lift Capacity,
Covered Manufacturing Space, Assembly Area, and Blast and Paint all act to
constrain the flow of material through the yard. These hard constraints should
not be allowed to effect production although in some yards they do.
Management should be able to control the rate of work based on the
workforce. These constraints cause managers to react and are included in the
model to determine there impact on the process. When hard constraints are
experienced, investment in additional infrastructure should be made.
Quantifying the benefits of investment in infrastructure is one of the primary
purposes of this model
4.13 Model Features
The scope of the problem is defined by the boundaries chosen for any model. For
this reason it is critical to identify the boundaries. The level of aggregation is also
important to identify. In order to make a model sufficiently compact, some simplifying
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assumptions must be made. Every detail of the shipbuilding process can not be included
in the model. The point at which aggregation begins depends on the purpose of the
model. The boundaries of this model are depicted in Figure 4-18. The purpose is to
concentrate on those aspects the shipyard has under their control.
Not Modeled:
Competition
Market
Navy Design Effort
Material Constraints
Process Complexity
Different Labor Trades
Government Oversight
National Economy
New Technology
Tests and Trials
Exogenous Factors:
Change Orders
Shivpyard Basework
Work Breakdown
Wage Rates
Initial Project Definitior
Added Scope
Endogenous Factors:
Project Scope
Project Schedule
Inter-Phase Dependency
Rework Generation
Rework Discovery
Project Productivity
Project Quality
Labor Adjustment
Figure 4-18Model Boundaries
For this model, all construction work starts out as drawings and raw stock. From
these basic components, parts are either manufactured or purchased from an outside
source. All material is assumed to be ordered and delivered in time to support the
process.
These parts are combined to form units of structural steel and subsystems in the
first assembly stage. The outfit units and steel units are brought together with additional
drawings for assembly and outfitting guidance to form erection blocks. The blocks are
combined at the erection site to form the finished product, the ship. Additional outfitting
is done at the erection site. The amount of parts used to make a unit is an average of all
the units. Likewise the blocks use an average number of units and drawings. Finally the
ship is erected from the blocks in a sequence identified in the Build Strategy.
This model is much more closely aligned to the Build Strategy of a new ship than
any other shipbuilding project model. It is being used to find problems before they occur
instead of assessing blame after the fact. It contains many of the internal precedence and
constraints planned for incorporation into Shipbuild. The work profile and the cycle
times are true representations of a real ship program. The determination of how many
blocks are needed is formed using the Build Strategy in Appendix A. The shipyard
infrastructure and labor constraints are determined in Chapter 3.
Specific features include:
* Rework is modeled as iteration required to be done based on the shipbuilder's
definition of quality
* Customer driven design changes are modeled as increased scope and plugged
into rework sector
* The Financial Sector determines overhead rate, unit costs, and project
performance in terms of cost and schedule.
* The Schedule Sector is used to calculate Willingness to Change Workforce
and Schedule Pressure. These are dynamic decisions based on how far along
the project has progressed. The Schedule sector is also used to determine
whether the project is ahead or behind schedule.
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* Productivity is a function of Schedule Pressure, Phase of Construction,
Fatigue and Work Force Experience.
* Quality Goal is a management policy decision but is affected by many of the
same factors as productivity.
* Base Work is a function of attractiveness against industry competitors and
project performance. In this model it will be exogenous.
4.2 Model Structure
The Ship Production Model consists of 7 sectors. They are:
* Work Flow and Rework
* Labor Determination
* Productivity
* Quality
* Phase Initiation and Schedule
* Financial
* Shipyard Constraints
The equations used in each sector are discussed below. The full set of equations are
found in Appendix B.
4.21 Multi Phase Work Flow and Rework Sector
The Work Accomplishment core structure comes from the Molecules of
Structure 56. This structure is the core of any project model. The components of the Work
Accomplishment sector are shown in Figure 4-17.
Figure 4-19 - Work Accomplishment Sector
56 Hines, J.H., (1996), "Molecules of Structure - Building Blocks for System Dynamics Models," Leaptec
and Ventana Systems.
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A description of the flow of work through the model starts with the initial
conditions for the project. Phase Definition is an exogenous variable based on the
required work content set by the Build Strategy. The work is broken out by phase of
construction. The amount of work done in each stage is a strategic decision based on the
constraints of the shipyard. The magnitude of work conducted in each phase represents
the way Ingalls currently builds ships.
Phase Definition[phase] =Design(12500), Fabrication(39726), On Unit(8680), On
Block(] 7187), On Board(36902) work orders
A work order represents the smallest of the tasks needed to build a ship consisting of 20
hours of work. This is the smallest increment of work that is tracked at several shipyards.
To go to finer detail does not match up with how progress is currently reported in the
yards. Some shipyards would like to go to reporting of progress in a more timely fashion.
When this happens, the smallest unit can be adjusted accordingly.
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The Work Remaining is a level. The initial value is set by Phase Definition. The
level is reduced by the Gross Completion Rate. The flow of Discovered Rework and
Added Scope contribute to the Work Remaining. The value of Work Remaining at any
time is the integration of the difference in these two flows.
Work Remaining[phase] = INTEG(Discovering Rework[phase]-Gross
Completion Rate[phase], Phase Definition[phase])
The Gross Completion Rate is a flow which is affected by Productivity, Project
Labor, and Constraints to Production. The work completion rate is the minimum of
either the labor or infrastructure constraints. If the amount of work to be done is zero, the
Gross Completion Rate returns a value of zero as well.
Gross Completion Rate[phase] =IF THEN ELSE(Work Remaining[phase] >0,
MIN(Infastructure Constraints to Production, Possible Labor Completion
Rate[phase]), 0)
The work is either completed correctly or becomes Undiscovered Rework based
on the Quality of the project. Quality is a strategic variable determined initially by the
shipyard. Several factors, discussed later affect the value of quality.
Work Completed Correctly[phase] = INTEG(Gross Completion Rate[phase] *
Work Quality[phase], 0)
Undiscovered Rework[phase] = INTEG(Gross Completion Rate[phase] * (1-
Work Quality[phase]) - Discovering Rework[phase], 0)
Correct Work and Undiscovered Rework are both Reported Work Complete.
Reported Work Complete[phase] = Work Completed Correctly[phase] +
Undiscovered Rework[phase]
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Faulty work that needs to be redone is uncovered by Rework Discovery in both
the current phase and with Downstream Rework Discovery. In-phase discovery can be
done by the workers themselves or by people assigned to Quality Assurance.
Downstream Discovery is usually done by workers in the next phase who find the inputs
to their process lacking. Downstream Discovery is affected by how long it takes for the
faulty equipment to be or drawing to be incorporated into the next phase. For the Design
it may take as long as six weeks to find the problem. The Undiscovered Rework feeds
back in to Work To Do after it is found.
Any Change in Scope to the project generated by the customer or internal needs is
added to the Discovered Rework. Change in Scope goes through the same Time to
Schedule Change as Rework for proper integration into base work.
Discovering Rework[phase] = MAX(O, MIN(Undiscovered Rework[phase]/
TIME STEP, Undiscovered Rework[phase]/Rework Discovery Time[phase] +
SUM(Downstream Rework Discovery[downstream!,phase]))) + Added
Scope[phase]/Time to Schedule Change
Downstream Rework Discovery[downstream,phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Phase is
Active[downstream] :AND.Prerequisite Dependency[downstream,phase],
Undiscovered Rework[phase]/Prerequisite Rework Discovery
Time[downstream,phase], 0)
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4.22 Labor Adjustment Sector
The Project Labor is a level which is adjusted using the Net Project Labor
Adjustment. Labor is added and subtracted from the project based on the Desired Labor
of the phase. A certain amount of Time to Adjust Labor is required to make labor
adjustments. This represents the time to either indoctrinate shipyard personnel to the
project or release people back to the labor pool. Additionally, the number of people that
can be added or subtracted from a program during one week is capped by the Maximum
Weekly Labor Adjustment.
Project Labor[phase] = INTEG(Net Project Labor Adjustment[phase], Desired
Labor[phase])
Net Project Labor Adjustment[phase] = MIN(Maximum Weekly Labor
Adjustment[phase], (Desired Labor[phase] - Project Labor[phase])/Time to
Adjust Labor[phase])
Maximum Weekly Labor Adjustment[phase] = 50 people/week
Time to Adjust Labor[phase] = 3 weeks
The Available Workforce is a stock which represents the pool of qualified people
in the yard available to work on new ship projects. The initial value is the difference
between Base Work Required Labor and the Veteran Workforce. Adjustments to the
Available Workforce are then made by the Net Project Labor Adjustment for each phase
of work depending on the manpower needs of the phase.
Available Workforce[phase] = INTEG(-Net Project Labor Adjustment[phase],
Veteran Workforce-Base Work Required Labor)
The Base Work Required Labor is an exogenous variable which represents the
number of people in the shipyard working on base work. At Ingalls, the Base Work in
the yard includes the production of DDG-51 and LHD-1, as well as Arsenal Ship design
work
Base Work Required Labor = 8000 people
The Veteran Workforce is a stock representing the number of trained workers
available to meet the Order Book of the shipyard. The initial value for the yard is set at
11,000 people. This Workforce is reduced by Normal Attrition and Layoffs. It is
increased by newly trained workers after a Training Time. This Training Time can be as
long as 2 years for some trades. It is set as an average training time of nine months.
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Attrition is set at approximately 10 % per year. This is the typical number of people who
leave Ingalls every year for a variety of reasons including retirements disciplinary
terminations and voluntary separation. Layoffs, involving the reduction of productive
labor, occur based on the labor needs of the shipyard.
Veteran Workforce = INTEG(Training-Attrition-Layoffs, 11000)
Layoffs = IF THEN ELSE(Order Book<2, Veteran Workforce-Total Required
Labor, 0)
Total Required Labor = SUM(Desired Labor[phase!]) +Base Work Required
Labor
Attrition = Veteran Workforce *0.002
The Veteran Workforce is increased by the flow of new people being trained. A
period of 4 weeks is required to acquire New Hires representing the delay in recruiting
new workers. Additionally, it takes 9 months for a Trainee to become a productive
worker through Training. The stock of Trainees is emptied by Training. Only the
Veteran Workforce can provide suitable labor for the project. The Total Shipyard
Workforce is the sum of the pools of people in Trainees and Veteran Workforce. This
value is used to determine the Overhead Rate in the Financial Sector.
New Hires = IF THEN ELSE(Veteran Workforce> Total Required Labor, 0, (Total
Required Labor- Veteran Workforce)/Hiring Time)
Hiring Time = 4
Trainees = INTEG(New Hires-Training, 0)
Training = Trainees/Training Time
180
Training Time = 36 weeks
Shipyard Workforce = Trainees+ Veteran Workforce
The Desired Labor of the phase is used to adjust the Project Workforce. It is the
minimum of the Maximum Labor allowed for each phase and the Planned Work
Remaining over the Normal Productivity times the Scheduled Time Remaining. It also
takes into account the Planned Relative Effort Intensity. This allows a smooth ramp up
and ramp down of the work force. Without using a planned intensity, labor adjustments
at the beginning and end of the project are erratic and tend to overshoot what is actually
required.
Desired Labor[phase] = MIN(Maximum Labor[phase],IF THEN ELSE(Time +
Time to Adjust Labor[phase] > = Sched Start Time[phase] .AND: .NOT:Phase is
Done[phase], XIDZ((Planned Work Remaining[phase] / Normal
Productivity[phase]) *Planned Relative Effort Intensity[phase], Schedule Time
Remaining [phase], Maximum Labor[phase]), 0))
Maximum Labor[phase] = 200,850,850,850,850 people
4.23 Phase Initiation and Schedule Completion
The planned completion time of each phase is established by the Build Strategy
and the Schedule of Events in Appendix A. Phase Initiation depends on prerequisite
tasks being completed to a satisfactory level. Shipbuilding in the past was an entirely
linear construction process much like building a skyscraper. In the last 20 years it has
evolved into a much more modular process with much of the ship being built in smaller
packages and then erected into the entire ship. More concurrence is possible between
phases thus reducing the total amount of time needed to build the ship.
<Work Completed Correctly>
<Undiscovered Rework> Project Compl Time
Project is Done
Irted
INIT SCHED START TIME
Time
Prerequisite Required Fraction Complete
Start Slip Trigger Increment
Figure 4-21 - Schedule Sector
The Initial Scheduled Start Time is set for each phase in the Build Strategy
Document. It represents when in the construction process the yard would like to start
each phase. An Initial Schedule Completion Time is also determined by the Build
Strategy. The actual start and completion of each phase depend on other factors
experienced during the simulation. In order for the phase to start. certain prerequisite
tasks need to have been completed. For the phase to end, a certain percentage of the work
in that phase must be completed. The actual times may not match the planned times.
Initial Schedule Start Time[phase] = Design(0), Fabrication(54), On Unit(54), On
Block(60), On Board(1 02) weeks
Sched Start Time[phase] = INTEG(Scheduled Start Slip Time[phase], Initial
Schedule Start Time[phase])
Initial Schedule Completion Time[phase] = 102,102,88,102,128 week
Sched Comp Time[phase] = INTEG(sched comp time slip[phase],Initial Schedule
Completion Time[phase])
Expected Completion Time[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Active[phase],
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Prerequisite Del
Time + Expected Time Remaining[phase],Sched Comp Time[phase])
Initial Phase Length[phase] = INITIAL(Initial Schedule Completion Time[phase]
- Initial Schedule Start Time[phase])
The Schedule Time Remaining is used to determine how much time is left to do
the project work. If the project runs into trouble, the managers can do several things to
correct for project deficiencies:
* Slip the schedule to the right
* Increase the labor working on the project
* Work overtime with the existing workforce
All of these options have an associated cost. Based on observations in the shipyards, all
are used. Determining which is the most effective policy or combination of policies is
very difficult. Each case can all be simulated using the model depending on what policy
management chooses. In this sector the schedule slippage formulation is depicted. It
depends on the Schedule Time Remaining.
Schedule Time Remaining[phase] = MAX(O,Sched Comp Time[phase] - Time)
The schedule is allowed to slip to the right if the expected completion date
exceeds a certain limit. Several factors must exist for a slip in schedule to occur.
Schedule Slippage is only allowed for the last 12 weeks of the project. This is a
management decision that can be modified. The schedule is slipped in discrete increments
when needed.
Scheduled Start Slip Time[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Active[phase] .OR:
VMIN(Prerequisites in Place[phase,prereq!]) > 0 .:OR:(Time + TIME STEP <
Sched Start Time[phase]) , 0,Start Slip Trigger Increment/TIME STEP)
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Sched Comp Time Slip[phase] = Scheduled Start Slip Time[phase] + IF THEN
ELSE(Phase is Active[phase] :AND:Schedule Time Remaining[phase] < SLIP
ZONE :AND:Expected Time Remaining[phase] - Schedule Time
Remaining[phase] > SLIP TRIGGER, SLIP INCREMENT/TIME STEP, 0)
When the prerequisite tasks required to proceed to the next phase are completed to a
certain level, the process is allowed to move to the next phase.
Prerequisites in Place[phase,prereq] =IF THEN ELSE((Prerequisite
Dependency[phase, prereq] = 0) .:OR.Reported Fraction Complete[prereq] >
Prerequisite Required Fraction Complete, 1, 0)
The amount of time the schedule is slipped, if it needs slipping.
SLIP INCREMENT = 4
The amount of time behind schedule at which the completion date will be slipped.
SLIP TRIGGER = 8 week
The distance from the end of a project at which schedule slippage becomes an alternative.
SLIP ZONE = 12 week
The slip increment for starting a phase up if things are behind schedule
Start Slip Trigger Increment = 0.5 week
The fraction of the schedule that has passed adjusts itself in response to schedule
slippage.
Fraction Schedule Passed[phase] = IF THEN ELSE (Time > Sched Start
Time[phase], IF THEN ELSE(Time < Sched Comp Time[phase], (Time - Sched
Start Time[phase])/(Sched Comp Time[phase] - Sched Start Time[phase]), 1), 0)
Several Equations are used to determine what part of the project is active and
when they can be finished. Each phase is turned on at the Scheduled Start Time if the
prerequisites are in place. Flags are used to indicate whether the phase is active or
completed by returning a value 1 or a 0.
Phase is Started[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Time > = Sched Start Time[phase], 1, 0)
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Phase is Active[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Started[phase] .AND. .NOT:
Phase is Done[phase], 1, 0)
Phase is Done[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Reported Fraction Complete[phase] >
Required Fraction Complete[phase], 1, 0)
Project is Done represents a flag to indicate that the project is completed. Once
the On Board outfitting is done, the project is completed. In reality, the project would
require extensive trials and testing. For this model, the project is completed once all the
planned work is done.
Project is Done = Phase is Done[ONBOARD]
4.24 Financial Sector
The Financial Sector is used to track project performance for cost. The Weekly
Costs are determined based on the number of people working on the project. The
Overhead Costs are determined by the total number of people working in the shipyard.
Charges for Schedule Overruns are also modeled. Material costs are also included as a
percentage of labor costs for simplification. These charges all add up to the total project
cost.
Total Weekly Cost
in C
Proj
<Initial Schedule Completion Time>
harge
Overrun Charge Rate
ect is Done>
Weekly Phase Labor Cost
Wage Rate Labor <Desired Labor>
Net Labor Adjustmern---<Desired Labor>
<Time to Adjust Labor>
<Maximum Weekly Labor Adjustment>
Figure 4-22 - Financial Sector
Weekly Costs are determined by the Labor Costs and the Overhead Costs. The
Labor Costs are determined by the Project Labor times the average weekly labor rate for
the yard. The Weekly Overhead Costs are a function of the total number of people
employed by the yard and the infrastructure available. The weekly costs for each phase
are summed to determine the Total Weekly Costs.
Weekly Phase Labor Cost[phase] = Project Labor[phase]*Wage Rate
The Wage Rate represents an average rate for all shipyard personnel. It includes their
base salary and any benefits including medical, dental and retirement.
Wage Rate = 1600 dollars/person/week
The overhead rate represents 33% of the direct charges on the project as reported by
Ingalls on the DDG-51 program.
Weekly Overhead Cost[phase] = Weekly Phase Labor Cost[phase]*Overhead
Fraction
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Weekly Costs[phase] = Weekly Phase Labor Cost[phase]+ Weekly Overhead
Cost[phase]
Total Weekly Cost = SUM(Weekly Costs[phase!])
The Total Cumulative Project Cost is the sum of all of the Phase Costs and any
penalties for missing schedule milestones. The Overrun Charges are identified in the
Build Strategy.
Project Cost = SUM(Cumulative Phase Cost[phase!])+Overrun Charge
Overrun Charge = IF THEN ELSE(Project is Done, 0, MAX(O, Overrun Charge
Rate *(Time-(10+ Initial Schedule Completion Time[ONBOARD]))))
Overrun Charge Rate = 350000 dollars/week
4.25 Quality Effects
Quality is a critical factor in the operation of the Ship Production Model. A base
quality is chosen for each shipyard. Improved quality requires an investment in the
control of the project. Shipyards choose to manage quality in different ways. Japanese
shipyards dedicate much effort to finding the root causes of quality problems in the
process. This tends to increase the overall quality of the products coming through the
yard. American yards tend to use rework to correct quality problems as needed. They do
not generally trace the cause of each flaw back to its origin. The competitive nature of
the commercial shipbuilding market force the Japanese to find problems and correct
them. The Cost Plus Fixed Fee type contract associated with many Navy contracts does
not promote perfect first time quality.
In this model, quality is defined as the amount of work done correctly. The
quality of the work done in each phase determines how much rework is generated in the
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process. Quality is affected by several factors including the quality of previous work,
fatigue and stress. Figure 4-23 shows the relationships between variables in this sector.
Figure 4-23 - Effects on Quality
The Work Quality is determined by the cumulative impact of many effects.
Normal Quality is degraded by an effect for morale, fatigue, schedule pressure and
prerequisite quality. A formulation to allow some noise to the equation is included.
Work Quality[phase] = Normal Quality[phase] * Effect Morale Qual[phase]
*Effect Fatigue Qual[phase] * Effect Schedule Press Qual[phase] * PROD(Effect
Prereq Qual Qual[phase,prereq!]) * (1 - RANDOM 0 10 * QUALITY NOISE)
The effect of fatigue on quality is a function of the average overtime used. During the
first few weeks overtime is used, no effect is felt on quality. As the use of overtime
becomes chronic, quality begins to drop as the work force is tired.
Effect Fatigue Qual[phase] = TABLE EFF FATIGUE QUAL(Avg Overtime
Frac[phase])
Avg Overtime Frac[phase] = INTEG((Overtime Fraction[phase] - Avg Overtime
Frac[phase])/Time to Average Overtime, )
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The effect of morale on quality is a function of how well the project is
performing. If the project proceeds on schedule with few problems, no effect is
perceived. When the project starts to experience difficulties, the morale of the workforce
drops. Performance based goals which may lead to added incentives are not reached.
Effect Morale Qual[phase] = TABLE EFF MORALE QUAL((Expected
Completion Time[phase] - Initial Schedule Completion Time[phase])/Initial
Phase Length[phase])
Next is the effect of prerequisite quality on quality. If the quality of the upstream
phases is high, the following phases have higher quality. If the design is poorly done, all
the work that follows will experience quality problems.
Effect Prereq Qual Qual[phase,prereq] = IF THEN ELSE(Prerequisite
Dependency[phase,prereq], XIDZ(Work Completed Correctly[prereq], Reported
Work Complete[prereq], 1), I)
The effect of schedule pressure on quality represents management pressure to
complete the project. This pressure at first increases quality as increased manager
oversight focuses the workers on the task at hand. As Schedule Pressure progresses over
a longer period of time, the stress of meeting a deadline starts to degrade the quality.
Effect Schedule Press Qual[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Active[phase],
TABLE EFF SCHED PRESS QUAL(XIDZ(Expected Time Remaining[phase],
Schedule Time Remaining[phase], 5)), 1)
4.26 Productivity Effects
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The productivity on the project is another important variable. It is used to
determine the rate of work that is possible by the workforce. It is effected by many of the
same dynamics as quality. Productivity has been the weakness of American shipyards for
many years. Studies conducted in the late 1960's identified many of the same problems
we are experiencing with productivity today. 57 Why has it taken more than 30 years for
US shipyards to try to improve the productivity of their workforce? These studies
measure productivity but do not measure quality. These two should both be measured as
quality has a major impact on productivity. To compete with the foreign yards on
commercial contracts, productivity and quality improvements are critical. No amount of
subsidy in the world can take the place of a highly trained, productive and motivated
work force.
<TABLE OVERTIME FRAC>
Overtime Fraction
Expected Time Remaining
Avg Overtime Frac Schedule Time Remaining <Reported Work RemainingSNormal Productivity E ect Sched Press Prod
ABLE EFF SCHED PRESS PROD>
rale on Prod
Phase is Done <TABLE EFF MORA PROD> <Time>
Expected Completion ime
<Sched Comp Time>
Reported Fraction Complete
57 Beazer, W.F., Cox, W.A., and Harvey, C.A., (1972), "US Shipbuilding in the 1970's," Lexington Books,
Lexington MA
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Figure 4-24 - Effects on Productivity
The Gross Productivity is the amount of work that people can get done in a week.
It is the result from the cumulative effects of morale, fatigue, schedule pressure, and the
completeness of the previous phase. Gross Productivity is difficult to measure on a daily
basis in the shipyard.
Gross Productivity[phase] = Normal Productivity[phase] *Effect of Morale on
Prod[phase] * Effect Fatigue Prod[phase] *Effect Sched Press Prod[phase] *
PROD(Effect Prereq Readiness Prod[phase,prereq!])
Effect Fatigue Prod[phase] = TABLE EFF FATIGUE PROD(Avg Overtime
Frac[phase])
Effect of Morale on Prod[phase] = TABLE EFF MORALE PROD((Expected
Completion Time[phase]- Initial Schedule Completion Time[phase])/Initial Phase
Length[phase])
Effect Prereq Readiness Prod[phase,prereq] = IF THEN ELSE(Prerequisite
Dependency[phase,prereq],IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Done[prereq], , PREREQ
EFF SPEED LOOKUP(Reported Fraction Complete[phase])), 1)
Effect Sched Press Prod[phase] = TABLE EFF SCHED PRESS PROD(MIN(5,
XIDZ(Expected Time Remaining[phase],Schedule Time Remaining[phase], 5)))
PRODUCTIVITY NOISE = 0
4.27 Shipyard Constraints
The constraints to production in the shipyard are a function of the installed
equipment. Every shipyard visited had concerns about what the limiting factor was for
increasing their throughput. The constraints listed below in Figure 4-25 represent
structures that are constraints in all shipyards. The values for the constraints at several of
the yards visited are included in Chapter 3. The specific constraints in the equations
below represent two shipbuilding positions at Ingalls Shipbuilding.
On Unit Converter
On Unit Area
Cranes Blast and Paint Area
Figure 4-25 - Constraints to Production
The constraints modeled include:
Blast and Paint Area = 8 Blocks/week
Cranes = 500 lifts/week
Work Stations = 100 drawing/week
Fabrication Equipment = 900 work order/week
On Block Area = 30 Blocks/week
On Unit Area = 100 products/week
Erection Sites = 30 Blocks/week
Each constraint is converted to determine how many work orders per week it can
support. For the Design Phase the only constraint Engineering Work Stations. For
Fabrication it is Fabrication Capacity which represent the number of burn tables, bending
and rolling machines in the yard. On Unit Capacity is the amount of covered space set
aside for assembly of units. The On Block phase can be constrained by space for
bringing units in contact with structural steel and Blast and Paint capacity. On Board can
be constrained by the number of Erection Sites available and Crane Capacity.
Infrastructure Constraints to Production[DESIGN] = Engineering Capacity
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Engineering Capacity
Fabrication Equipment
Design Converter Work Stations
e
Infrastructure Constraints to Production[FABRICA TION] = Fabrication
Capacity
Infrastructure Constraints to Production[ONUNIT] = On Unit Capacity
Infrastructure Constraints to Production[ONBLOCK] = MIN(On Block
Capacity, Blast and Paint Capacity)
Infrastructure Constraints to Production[ONBOARD] = MIN(Crane
Capacity,Erection Site Capacity)
For Ingalls the constraint to production is the number of burn tables available in
the fabrication area. Plans for this facility include a complete renovation once sufficient
work merits the upgrade. The entire set of equations used in the Ship Production Model
can be found in Appendix B.
4.3 Base Model Run
With the key sectors and equations in the Ship Production Model identified we
can examine a base run of the ship construction process. In this section the parameters
for the SOCV identified in the Build Strategy are used to determine the cost, schedule
and quality of the project at Ingalls. The base case is used for comparing dynamic
hypotheses concerning the project performance at the end of this chapter and for
comparisons with another shipyard in the next chapter. Several policy decisions are
examined including the effect of quality, optimum manning levels and the use of
overtime.
4.31 Model Behavior - Base Case
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The base case behavior is shown in the figures below. The graphs for Total
Project Costs and Phase Costs, Project Labor by phase, Work Quality and Undiscovered
Rework are included. The Project Completion time is approximately 128 weeks.
Figure 4-26 - Base Run Costs
The cumulative costs of each phase are shown in Figure 4-27 with a finer scale to
determine what costs are associated with each phase.
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Figure 4-27 - Base Run Phase Costs
On Block Construction ends up being the most expensive phase followed by
Fabrication. Although more work orders are completed in Fabrication, the Gross
Productivity of this phase is higher. A breakdown of the percentage of the project costs
and the project initial work definition is included in Table 4 -16.
Phase Work Packages Percent of Work Cost $M) Percent of Cost
Design 12500 10.95% 15.54 5.38%
Fabrication 39726 34.79% 74.41 25.76%
On Unit 14123 12.37% 59.43 20.58%
On Block 26300 23.03% 78.04 27.02%
On Board 21530 18.86% 61.39 21.26%
Over Run Charges 0 - 0 -
Total 114179 100% 288.81 100%
Table 4 -16 - Cost Percentage by Phase
The reason for the difference between the percent of work and the percent of cost in each
phase is the productivity.
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The next measure to determine project performance is quality. The work quality
for the base run is represented in Figure 4-26.
Work Quality by Phase
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Figure 4-28 - Base Run Work Quality by Phase
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The quality on the project is above 75% for most of the project. Some problems
occur in the beginning of each phase due to rework discovery from the previous phase.
On Board in particular takes a large dip in quality and then recovers. The problems with
quality lead to some problems with Rework in some phases as shown in
Figure 4-29.
Figure 4-29 - Base Undiscovered Rework
The project labor for the base case is shown in Figure 4-30. Manning reaches the
constraint of 850 people in each phase after design. It may be more cost effective to raise
the cap on manning to allow more people to work on the project when needed. The
impact of raising or lowering the manning cap will be discussed in more detail in the next
section.
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Figure 4-30 - Base Case Labor by Phase
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One of the most interesting features of the Vensim software is the ability to do
causal tracing. Finding the root cause of quality or productivity problems is something
every production planner at the shipyard would like to be able to do quickly. Using
causal tracing the problems in productivity in each phase can be examined. As shown in
Figure 4-31, a problem in productivity in the On Unit phase.
Graph for Gross Productivity
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Figure 4-31 - Productivity of Phases
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To determine the root causes of this loss in productivity, a closer look is taken at
the factors effecting this phase. The results are shown in Figure 4-32.
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Figure 4-32 - Factors Effecting On Unit Productivity
The primary factor effecting the productivity in the On Unit phase is a lack of
prerequisite readiness from the Fabrication Phase. Additionally, the Design Phase is
effecting On Unit work.
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Although the real problem is occurring in Fabrication and Design, the loss of
productivity does not show up until the small parts are assembled in the On Units phase.
The Fabrication productivity and the causes effecting it are included in Figure 4-33. A
combination of factors effects Fabrication productivity. Fatigue contributes to the
degradation indicating excess use of overtime. Additionally, the availability of drawings
from the design stage have an effect on productivity in Fabrication.
Figure 4-33 - Effects on Fabrication Productivity
This productivity degradation is magnified in the On Unit phase by design
problems and fatigue. This behavior is typical in many yards. The interesting point is
that the root causes of the problem can be found using a model of the process. Production
planners spend countless hours in the shipyard trying to determine what can be traced in a
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few minutes. If the model is calibrated to actual data in the yard, valuable insights could
be found that are not intuitively obvious to shipyard managers. Corrective measures
could then be taken to improve the conditions at the phase that is causing the root
problem. In this case, the labor may need to be increased in Design and On Unit
construction. A cost trade off can be conducted between sticking with the base case and
adding labor to keep the process moving smoothly. Adding people to the project may run
into training and quality problems. Issues like these will be discussed in the next section.
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4.4 Policy Investigation on SOCV Project
In this section several of the policies identified in the Build Strategy to control the
project costs are examined. The base run provides a benchmark with which to compare
our policy analyses. The policies that are investigated include:
* Project Quality
* Use of Overtime
* Maximum Manning Levels
These issues are all part of the shipyard production planning process prior to the start of
the construction sequence. In most cases the policies used are chosen from successful
projects. No two projects are exactly the same. Being able to rapidly analyze these
issues using simulation has generated great interest at several yards. Being able to test
drive a policy through the entire construction cycle is a valuable tool.
4.41 Effect of Quality on Project Performance
The level of quality in a product is a strategic decision every manufacturing firm
must make. In the past, it was generally thought that high quality meant high costs.
Japanese car manufactures, especially Toyota, proved that quality could be built into the
product. As quality increases, rework is reduced and the cost of building the product
decreases." Most of the US shipyards do not have the same commitment to quality that
the Japanese shipyards exhibit. For the US yards, increasing quality has a significant
58 Womack, J.P., Jones, D.T., and Roos, D., (1990) "The Machine That Changed the World", Rawson
Associates, New York, NY.
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cost. Instead of finding the root causes of low quality, they choose to correct it with
rework. This tends to increase the total hours they can charge to any particular contract.
When asked, the shipyards are not willing to discuss the quality in their yard or do
not understand the impact of first time quality. Quality is not an attribute that is easily
quantifiable. Quality, for this paper is defined in context with rework. Products that do
not require rework have sufficient quality to continue in the process. This does not mean
that they are perfect, just that they pass the Quality Assurance for that level. The better
the quality on any small component, the easier it is to assemble down the line. BIW
estimates that they have about 3% rework on their ships. Ingalls, like a true competitor,
estimated they had 2.5% rework. Neither one of these representations is realistic. The
grinding, cutting and shipfitting required to bring the ship together because the parts
don't fit is rework. Ingalls and Bath both seem to have internalized these modifications
to the assemblies as part of doing business. Based on my observations, perfect first time
quality is not being sought in US shipyards.
The closest to a realistic discussion of shipyard quality occurred at NASSCO
where it was estimated that between 20 and 25% of all fabricated parts required some sort
of rework. This level is more along the lines of what other industries are tracking for
quality and rework. Striving for perfection is a lofty goal. The Japanese are much further
down the line than American companies in this area. US yards do not yet grasp the fact
that increasing the quality of the product can decrease overall costs.
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For the first policy analysis, three levels of quality are investigated. The best
possible situation with 100% quality is simulated to show what we could possibly
achieve. This run represents the project every manager dreams about. It is also the
representation project planners get from static models like CPM or PERT. These
packages are not very effective once the project has started and rework or other problems
are experienced on the project. They cannot capture the feedback between phases and the
non linear effects experienced in shipbuilding. The base quality at Ingalls is set at 85%.
This is high based on some of the benchmarking studies conducted in other
manufacturing industries. 59 These studies were conducted on companies that had quality
problems. Finally a lower value of quality, 65% is simulated which is close to the level
described as problematic. The impact each of these values has on the total cost of the
project is shown in Figure 4-34.
59 Cooper, K. G. March 1993. The Rework Cycle: Benchmarks for the Project Manager. Project
Management Journal. pp. 181-186.
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Figure 4-34 - Effect of Quality on Cost
The difference in end cost is dramatic. The cost of the project more than doubles
when the quality drops form perfect to 65%. Clearly improving the quality of the
products will help at each subsequent phase of production. As quality decreases, the
amount of rework required increases. More work to do forces the assigned labor to work
harder. This leads to additional problems with productivity as the effects fatigue and
schedule pressure come into play. The result is a project that is delivered later at much
higher costs.
The yard that had the highest quality for its final products, BIW, did not
understand that quality should not be a function of repetitive rework. At BIW, the quality
efforts were being concentrated in the On Block area. By this time the prerequisite
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quality of Fabrication and On Unit have determined the inherent quality of the ship. Only
using extreme measures in the ship fitting effort can the quality be brought to a higher
level at significant cost to the customer. The same dynamic took place on high
performance German automobiles. The quality of the product was not high. The effort to
make them better quality after line production added tens of thousands of dollars to the
sticker price of the car. 60 Understanding where the emphasis of the management effort
needs to be placed is difficult. Most managers focus on where the most man hours are
being expended. At Bath this was in On Block Construction in PO1 and PO2. The
critical place to look for quality is in the early stages of Fabrication and On Unit
Construction. Bath has started to make improvements in this area which is encouraging.
4.42 Manning Levels
Properly planning the staffing levels on a ship project and in the yard is a very
difficult problem. If too many people are assigned to a ship, they tend to get in one
another's way. If too few people are assigned, they get fatigued as the Schedule Pressure
and Overtime hours build up. Ingalls has determined through trial, error and simulation
with their Strategic model that a maximum of 850 people works well for them on DDG-
51. For the SOCV, the value of 850 people for each phase after design was also used as
the cap. Other yards are still not sure what number is most efficient.
A policy analysis is conducted to determine if the 850 is the optimum level for
maximum labor on the SOCV project. Three cases are examined. The first is the base
60 Womack, J.P., and Jones, D.T., (1996) "Lean Thinking", Simon and Schuster, New York NY.
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case using Ingalls value for maximum labor on DDG-51. As was seen in the last section,
this cap resulted in a 128 week project with no over run charges. The level is increased to
the old labor cap at Ingalls, 1200 people. Finally the cap is reduced to 400 people to see
what the impact of a minimum staffed project would be. The scheduled completion times
for each phase are left the same. The results of the variations in staffing are depicted in
Figure 4-35.
Figure 4-35 - Maximum Project Labor
With increased staffing the project finishes slightly earlier but with an increase in
cost of over $25 million. The minimum staffing case results in a longer schedule. As the
project pushes beyond the prescribed limits, over run charges add up. Schedule pressure
and fatigue degrade productivity. The project is eventually terminated behind schedule
and over budget at around 200 weeks.
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Overall shipyard manning is another area of strategic interest. Manning levels
fluctuate with the amount of work the shipyard has on the order book. This problem will
be discussed in more detail Chapter 5 as an area of future investigation with the Ship
Production Model.
4.43 Overtime Policy
The final policy examined is the use of overtime on the project. Overtime can be
used to effectively smooth out the peaks and valleys in manning levels as the project
progresses. The Build Strategy identified several weeks toward the middle of the project
where more blocks than usual were being erected. In the short run, increasing overtime
tends to motivate the workforce. Overall productivity goes up as the workers see more
money coming home in their pay checks. As the use of overtime continues, however, this
trend reverses itself. As workers become fatigued, the productivity and quality of their
work dropped off. This tends to put the project further behind schedule. It may also
trigger the use of still more overtime which may exacerbate the problem.
Three cases are simulated. The base case uses overtime moderately. The project
must be several weeks behind schedule before overtime is authorized. The slope of the
table function is gradual and peaks at around 1.5 times the normal work week. The
second case uses overtime as soon as a problem occurs, the peak overtime is double the
normal work week. The final case is for no overtime. All policies were observed at some
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point in the shipyard visits. Determining which policy is the most efficient is of great
interest to the yards.
The results of the different uses of overtime are shown in Figure 4-36.
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Figure 4-36 - Cost of Varying Overtime
The case of heavy overtime results in longer completion time and higher end
costs. This is counterintuitive. A look at the Gross Productivity for each phase in which
heavy overtime is used in Figure 4-37 provides some answers. As the labor is forced to
work longer hours, fatigue starts to reduce productivity. This trend is gradual at first but
drives productivity to lower values in later stages.
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Figure 4-37 - Effect on Productivity of Overtime Policies
The case in which no overtime is used is similar to the minimum staffing result.
The project falls behind schedule and cannot recover. The costs continue to grow linearly
as the penalties for schedule over runs accumulate. Hiring new people is delayed by the
requirement that they be trained. The project is eventually canceled.
The base case seems to provide the best compromise between too much overtime
and too little. The shape of the table function which describes the overtime policy is
adequate for this level of analysis. Use of overtime is an effective tool is it is controlled.
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4.4 Summary of Policy Analysis
The base case of SOCV through Ingalls establishes the benchmarks for further
analysis in Chapter 6. Based on the quick analysis of quality, manning levels and
overtime using the Ship Production Model, the following actions are recommended:
* Work to achieve higher qualities in the early stages on Design, Fabrication
and On Unit Construction. If the small pieces are of high quality, they enable
the larger assemblies to fit together. If the larger assemblies do not need to be
bent or cut to fit together, their is a better chance that when it comes time to
erect the ship, the pieces will fit.
* When a quality problem does occur, trace the problem to its root cause, even if
it means disrupting the entire flow of material for a period of time. This
prevents unnecessary rework in later stages. The benefits of finding the root
causes in the process are much greater than correcting a problem with iteration
at the end of the assembly line.
* The maximum manning level of 850 works well with the current schedule. In
order to shrink the cycle time, more labor will need to be applied. This could
lead to additional coordination problems. Further refinement of the optimal
manning on the project should be conducted using real productivity data.
* Use overtime moderately and not for more than a few weeks at a time. It is an
effective tool to increase the work intensity of the labor. If used chronically it
will cause problems with quality and productivity which will further delay the
project.
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* The current shape of the overtime table function in the Ship Production Model
is sufficient. Calibrating with actual data would be the next step in the
process.
* It is critical to remember that actions taken to correct one problem may
adversely effect another situation. Feedback is an important concept to keep
in the back of any managers head. The entire system must be taken into
consideration. Using an interactive model like the Ship Production Model can
help to teach managers not to discount other areas in the yard where their
policies may cause problems. For example, using overtime in the Fabrication
phase may help to meet the deadline for that phase. However, quality
problems from Fabrication may cause all the subsequent phases to experience
productivity problems. The real costs of working overtime in Fabrication will
not be felt until the rest of the ship comes together. In some circumstances the
overall effect of a policy may push costs higher on the ship project instead of
the desired reduction in cost.
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Chapter 5 - SOCV Case Studies - BIW vs Ingalls
One of the basic premises in System Dynamics is that most of the problems
management experiences are a result of endogenous factors to the system and not
exogenous shocks. Deming stated, "...workers performance is determined solely by the
system in which they are working. Management must not only recognize that most of the
failure for a system to produce the desired results is due to the system itself but that
management must change itself and the system, to improve the outcome. "61 If one
believes most problems are internally generated, many of the solutions to management
problems are within reach.
All of the shipyards visited experience difficulties dealing with the complexities
of the shipbuilding process. Some have a better understanding of the dynamics than
others. All yards are able to describe feedback but have trouble quantifying its impact.
Ingalls has an easier time than the other yards as they have used system dynamics project
models for over 15 years to manage their internal production processes. Even Ingalls
would like to improve their model to capture more things in real time and to investigate
issues at a lower level of aggregation. All yards found value in being able to better
predict the costs and benefits of these issues using simulation. Shipyard managers are
able to describe the different facets of the process individually but could not address the
system as a whole.
61 Rack, F.H., (1995) Increasing U.S. Shipbuilding Profitability and Competitiveness, Ship Production
Symposium, The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineer.
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System Dynamics project models have been very effective in capturing issues like
feedback and internal dependencies associated with large projects. A systems perspective
is valuable to any manager on any large project. "The System Dynamics perspective is
the single most valuable tool I have experienced in my 30 years in ship construction
management.62 " The true impact of management decisions cannot be fully evaluated
without the "big picture."
Ingalls and BIW, the two producers of DDG-51, will be compared qualitatively to
determine why Ingalls out performs BIW for cost on DDG-51 contracts. This
comparison provides the framework of several topics of interest. The Key Events
Schedules are examined. Suggestions from personnel at both yards about why the cost
difference occurs are included. Finally, the performance on the SOCV project at both
yards will be modeled to determine if the difference in the process can be simulated using
the Ship Production Model at its current level of complexity.
Several issues concerning the management of the SOCV program will be
investigated using the Ship Production Model. Both Ingalls and BIW have expressed
specific interest in quantifying changes to the way they build ships. The issues include:
* Level of Advanced Outfitting
* Shipyard Constraints
62 Goldbach, Richard, (1996) President and CEO of Metro Machine, Personal Communication
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* Quantifying Benefits of Investment in Infrastructure
Ingalls is interested in determining the impact of increasing the level of pre-
outfitting on the ships it builds. BIW is interested in quantifying the impact of investing
in infrastructure to ease choke points in the shipyard.
Finally, other issues the Ship Production Model could be modified to support are
discussed. There is great potential for a tool that can quickly analyze management
policies and provide an indication of the behavior these policies generate.
5.1 Ingalls vs. BIW on DDG-51
Ingalls has consistently provided better cost performance to the Navy on the
DDG-51 program. According to publicly released information outlined in 5-1 , the
average value for the difference between BIW and Ingalls is around $10 million per ship.
Some sources closer to the program estimate the difference to be between 500,000-
750,000 man hours per ship and along the lines of $20 million per ship.
Construction Costs BIW Ingalls
Total DDG-51 Built 12 10
Total Costs (Millions) $2891.7 $2304
Average Costs (Millions) $240.975 $230.4
Table 5-1 Comparison of DDG-51 Costs63
5.11 - Key Events Schedule
63 Colton and Company (http://www.coltoncompany.com/index.htm
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In order to quantify the differences in the processes used at each yard a schedule
of events for both yards is included in Tables 5-2 and 5-3.
BIW Key Events Schedule Months Before Delivery
Contract Award 55
Start Cutting Steel 36
Start Fabrication 33.5
Start Pre Outfit 31
Lay Keel 21.5
Complete Machinery Loadout 19
Complete Final Sighting 16.5
Complete Hull Assembly 15
Complete Combat Systems Loadout 13
Complete Tank Painting 12
Launch 12
Complete Pull Main Cables 11.5
Complete Combat/AEGIS Weapon System Loadout 9
Complete Main Machinery Alignment 7
Load Fuel Oil for SSTG Activation 6.5
Light Off AEGIS System 6.5
Light Off SSTG 6
Battery Alignment 6
Spin Main Engines 5
Compartment Air Tests 4
Dock Trials 4
Transit to Portland for dry-docking 3.5
Dock Ship 3.5
Undock Ship 3
Compartment Inspection 3
Transit to Bath 2.5
Builders Trials 2
Incline 2
Acceptance Trials 1
Delivery 0
Table 5-2 - BIW Key Events Schedule
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Ingalls Key Events Schedule Months Before Delivery Duration
Contract Award 52 0
Start Fabrication 38 0
Assy Start Fabrication 38 8.25
Pre-Outfitting Starts 33.25 9.5
Assy Erection Starts 31 10.25
On Unit Outfitting 31 11
Lay Keel 26 0
On Block Outfitting 19.75 4.25
Testing 19.75 4.25
Float Off 15 0
On Board Outfitting 15 14.75
Testing 15 14.75
Main Engine Light Off 9 0
Alpha Trials 3 0
Delivery 0 0
Table 5-3 - Ingalls Key Events
The durations for the BIW process were not available. A discussion of the differences
between both process is included at the end of this section.
5.12 Shipyard Suggestions
People at both yards were asked to discuss the differences between yards and the
reasons why the Ingalls product is less expensive. The answers varied widely. They
represent the responses from managers, designers, marketing people, and production
planners.
* BIW is the lead design yard for the DDG-51. If it makes a design change it must
be formally documented and passed on to the other yards. Ingalls is the follow on
yard for design and does not need to update BIW on producibility changes.
* Ingalls does not even bother to draw sketches of 2" pipe and below. It just uses
the rough drawings provided by BIW.
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* The larger area for layout at Ingalls allows more flexibility in the process and a
more efficient use of material flows
* Workers at BIW claim the two ships are not same quality product. They believe
Ingalls is not held to same quality standards by the Navy. BIW claims the
operators know which ship is better. Quality will play a major factor in the Life
Cycle Costs (LCC) of the ships. It may be too early in Life Cycle of the DDG-51
to try to assess the impact quality has on LCC. CG-47, another older class of
ships that was split between Ingalls and Bath may shed some light on this issue.
* Labor Rates are cheaper in Mississippi.
* Mississippi is a "Right to Work" State meaning the workers do not have to join
the union. This may allow increased flexibility when it comes to labor
negotiations.
* BIW deals with the International Association of Mechanics which is a very
powerful union. The union has shut down the yard several times in the last ten
years.
* BIW states they lose less work days to weather than Ingalls. This can not
possibly be true. Even though much of the initial stages of construction at Bath
are indoors, the weather in New England for the past few winters has been bad
enough so the workers could not get to the yard on many occasions.
* BIW claims the Overhead Rates on the last DDG-51 bid submitted by Ingalls was
made with the assumption that LPD-17 contract would go to Ingalls. Now that
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LPD-17 has been awarded to the Avondale/Bath consortium, the difference in
price will go away.
5.13 Qualitative Assessment
I have tried to make some impartial observations of the two shipbuilding
processes. These observations are made based on visits and numerous conversations with
people working at both yards.
* BIW pre-outfits its blocks to greater extent than Ingalls. They launch the ship
around 70-75% completed. This may lead to higher quality and productivity in
certain shipyards. At Bath, the larger blocks act as a constraint to the process. A
final blast and paint of the construction blocks is conducted to make up for the
long time the pieces are kept in storage and to improve quality. Moving the larger
blocks around the yard disrupts the entire process at Bath. At Ingalls, no final
blast and paint is done thus removing this constraint to the process. Although
more work needs to be done On Block, it may cost less in terms of disruption.
Comparing the final product of both yards, BIWs process leads to higher quality
at the expense of increased man hours.
* BIW is constrained in the draft of ship it can launch by the depth of the Kennebec
River. For this reason, the ship must be transferred down the river to Portland,
ME to install the sonar dome. This process requires an additional dry docking
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which is a labor intensive evolution. All services must be removed from the ship
in support of this requirement. Ingalls fully outfits the ships it builds, including
the sonar dome, and then uses a land translation system to move it to a dry dock.
This is the most dramatic difference between the two processes.
* Looking at the key events schedules and the capacity utilization, it can be seen
that Ingalls can produce ships at a much faster pace than BIW. Ingalls
management would like to pursue a more aggressive schedule if they could get
more work. The current division of DDG-51 work calls for 1.5 to 2 ships for each
yard per year. Ingalls has the capacity to build 5 DDG-51s each year. The
constraints at BIW limit throughput to about 2 or 3 ships per year. The price for
the DDG-51 is set by the process at BIW. Ingalls seems to adjust its schedule to
mirror the man hours expended at BIW. Until the required throughput at Ingalls
is increased, the Navy will pay the BIW price for ships.
Overall performance on this class of ships has been excellent. The current cost
growth has been placed at (-14%) indicating competition is working to reduce program
costs. 64 Although competition seems to be having the desired effect for the government,
on this project, better cost and schedule performance can be achieved. Additional savings
could be made if the throughput were faster. 3 ships per year is not enough to satisfy the
64 Simmons, L.D., (1996) "Assessment of Options for Enhancing Surface Ship Acquisition," IDA Paper P-
3172, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia.
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capacity of two major shipyards. Hard decisions need to be made. The logical decision
is to award the Arsenal Ship to BIW for construction. Arsenal Ship, combined with the
LPD-17 work will keep Bath busy for several years. Award all of the entire next batch of
DDG-51 work to Ingalls.
Bath will need time to complete the extensive renovations currently planned for
their yard. Maintaining the DDG-51 production line while making radical changes will
be difficult. The government could guarantee BIW a steady order book for the time it
takes to recoup its investments in infrastructure. Meanwhile, Ingalls can produce as
many DDG-51 ships as are budgeted for that year. Cost and schedule improvements
should be possible with a larger throughput at Ingalls. In this way, the Navy could gain
productivity improvement at both shipyards without huge expenditures.
5.13 Performance of Bath vs. Ingalls on SOCV
In order to quantitatively compare the two shipyards, the Ship Production Model
was modified to represent the process at BIW. Real production data on the DDG-51 was
not available. For this reason, the SOCV was run through both yards. The total scope of
work and the schedule is the same for both yards. The schedule may not be optimal for
BIW as it was developed during the Build Strategy for Ingalls. The Build Strategy was
modified to reflect a higher level of outfitting calculated to depict the different way ships
are built at Bath. The quality of the On Block and On Board stages is raised to 95%
representing the higher degree of quality in P02 at Bath. The modifications for BIW to
the strategic parameters representing the ship are included in Table 5-4.
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SOCV Strategic Parameters Ingalls Value Bath Value
Number of Units 101 400
Design Schedule (wks) 112 112
Engineering Hours 250,000 250,000
Design Staff 200 250
Production Hours 2,052,000 2,052,000
On Block Quality 85% 90%
Fabrication Work (work orders) 12,500 12,500
Structural Staff 850 850
Productivity Goal (mh/tonne) 80 80
Fabrication (work orders) 41,040 45,980
On Unit Work (work orders) 12,314 22,676
Erection Schedule (wks) 41 41
On Block Work (work orders) 21546 19841
On Board Work (work orders) 27702 14172
Project Deadline (wks) 150 wks 150 wks
Over Run Penalties ($/wk) 350,000 350,000
Blast and Paint (blocks/week) 6 2
Erection Sites 2 1
Table 5-17 - BIW and Ingalls Parameters
The maximum labor for each phase is left at the original level. The constraints to
production are modified as discussed in Chapter 3 to the levels of BIW. A base run is
conducted at BIW and compared to the Ingalls base run in Figure 5-38.
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Figure 5-38 -Ingalls vs. Bath on SOCV
The constraints at Ingalls are less restrictive than at Bath. The Build Strategy
limited the impact of SOCV at Ingalls to two shipbuilding ways. At BIW, only one
erection site is available. SOCV at Ingalls is less expensive by almost $100 million. The
primary reason is that BIW has a very difficult time meeting the schedule required for
SOCV based on their current configuration. This difference is much higher than the $10
million dollar difference on DDG-51. The schedule for SOCV was set by the Build
Strategy for Ingalls. The amount of overtime and schedule pressure required to meet this
schedule has significant effects on productivity. The productivity in the On Block and
On Board stages fall off as the bottleneck at Blast and Paint limits production as shown in
Figure 5-39.
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Figure 5-39 - Productivity at BIW on SOCV
In the next few sections, modifications to the processes at Ingalls and BIW are
evaluated. The modifications represent case studies in ship production. A dynamic
hypothesis is formed for each case. Modifications to the Ship Production Model are used
to simulate the effects associated with the hypotheses. The results are then discussed.
5.2 Increase the Levels of Pre-Outfitting
"There is not much more you can get out of steel fabrication in terms of
producibility. That's not where we see the shipyard delays anymore. The problem is in
outfitting and in running the distributed systems through the ship (HVAC, cabling and
piping). This is where the Japanese have us beat. They put a tremendous amount of
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planning into the way they outfit the ship. "65 US shipbuilders do not pre-outfit to the
extent of many of the foreign yards. Japanese shipyards have found pre-outfitting to be
beneficial to reducing cycle times. Some of the Japanese yards are lifting over 1000 tons
in each block. This allows most of the work to be done away from the erection site and
reduces the dependency of the completion of one part of the ship on another. The weight
of blocks in most US yards are limited to under 300 tons.
Extensive pre-outfitting requires superior tolerance control to ensure the pieces
made in different parts of the yard will fit together when needed. It also requires large
overhead cranes to move the heavy blocks into place. The crane issue is easier to fix than
accuracy control. Without better accuracy control, the US yards will continue to build
most of the ship in the On Block and On Board phases. The productivity of the overall
process will continue to lag behind the foreign competition until more work can be done
off the ship.
5.21 Problem Description and Reference Modes
"The shipyards themselves do not know the full effect of moving work to earlier
stages. The direction is known but the quantitative effect by stage and type of work is
not. "66 Can a difference in end cost and schedule time be realized if the work is pushed
65 Safina, Mike, (April 1997), personal communication.
66 Simmons, L.D., (1996) "Assessment of Options for Enhancing Surface Ship Acquisition," IDA Paper P-
3172, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia.
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further forward in the process? It is generally agreed that productivity in the later stages
of construction drops as the ship becomes more complete and more interferences are
experienced. It is not clear what the impact of this productivity drop has on the final cost
of the ship. One problem is data consistency. Collecting the same production data from
several shipyards is difficult. Each yard describes the way it builds ships differently. The
indicators they track to manage the process are different. Even if some of the variables,
are common across yards, they may be defined differently. With standardization of
Product Oriented Work Breakdown Structures, data may be able to be collected in more
useful form in the future.
Each US shipyard decides what level to outfit the blocks it erects based on the
constraints of the yard. BIW pre-outfits to a greater extent than the other yards because it
is limited to two active construction ways. To reduce the amount of time spent in the
construction ways to a minimum, the blocks have much more work done prior to
erection. At Ingalls, as discussed in Chapter 3, the Erection Area is much less restricted.
The Land Level Translator allows many ships to be erected at the same time. A similar
situation occurs at Avondale where 8 ships can be erected at the same time. Although
Ingalls and Avondale may be able to physically do more work On Board than BIW, it
may not be an advantage in terms of productivity or quality. The level of completeness at
launch for several of the yards visited is included in Figure 5-40. The level to which the
Japanese yard Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI) has been outfitting is also
included as a reference point. Ingalls is able to outperform BIW even with low levels of
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Figure 5-40 - Level Of Pre-Outfitting
5.22 Dynamic Hypothesis
The dynamic hypothesis to be investigated in this section is that moving more
work to the On Unit and On Block phases will increase the quality and productivity of the
entire construction sequence and eventually reduce the end cost of the ship. Recent
advances in distributed systems and cable junction boxes may allow US shipyards to add
much more complexity earlier. With proper planning, accuracy control, and increased lift
capacity, US yards should be able to do more work away from the erection site. The base
case of SOCV through Ingalls shipyard developed in Chapter 4 will be modified to
investigate this hypothesis.
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pre-outfitting. There is no incentive for Ingalls to become more productive on the DDG-
51 contracts unless they are rewarded for their efforts.
Level of Complete at Launch
85%
5.23 Analysis
To simulate this case, the initial scope for each phase identified in the base case is
modified. The total number of outfitting work orders remains the same. The number of
work orders that are done in the On Unit and On Block phases are increased while the
number of work orders done On Board is reduced. The amount of work done by the time
the ship is launched is increased increments from 65% to 75% and finally to 85%. The
Normal Productivity of the On Unit and On Block are higher than On Board for reasons
discussed in the Build Strategy.
Three cases are examined and compared for their relative cost and schedule
performance. The first is the base case. Ingalls launches ships with 65% of the outfitting
complete. The jump to 75% complete represents the level of pre-outfitting of BIW.
Finally the 85% complete represents the pre-outfitting of a world class commercial
shipbuilder, IHI. Changes made to the base case for each of the levels of outfitting are
included in Table 5-18.
SOCV Work Definition Base Percent Preoutl Percent Preout2 Percent
Design 12500 12500 12500
Fab 39726 39726 39726
On Unit 14123 23% 21683.55 35% 24781.2 40%
On Block 26300 42% 24781.2 40% 27878.85 45%
On Board 21530 35% 15488.25 25% 9292.95 15%
Table 5-18 - Pre-Outfitting Levels
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5.24 Results
The difference in total cost of the SOCV project at Ingalls using different levels of
outfitting is represented in Figire 5-39. The use of increased pre-outfitting reduces the
end cost of Ingalls.
Preoutfitting at Ingalls
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Figure 5-41 -Effect of Higher Pre-Outfitting
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The higher quality in the On Unit and On Block phases reduces the total amount
of rework generated. As a result of more work being done earlier, the rework that is
created is discovered and scheduled for correction earlier. This reduces the spike of
Discovered Rework that shows up in Work Remaining towards the end of the Base Case.
The "worse before better" dynamic is experienced. Initially costs are higher than the base
run because more work is being done earlier. The end costs come out less by a
substantial amount. Understanding that things will get worse before they get better is
critical. A policy may have short term detrimental effects that must be taken into account
with an eye on the long term solution.
Based on the preliminary results of this analysis, it would benefit Ingalls to pre-
outfit their blocks to at least the 75% complete at launch level of BIW. This higher
231
degree of outfitting results in almost $10 million dollars in savings. The returns drop off
as the level of outfitting gets higher. Making the initial jump from 65% complete to 75%
complete at launch will require investments in quality control and greater coordination in
the On Block construction stage. The On Block area will need to be covered to prevent
damage to installed systems by the weather. Lift capacity will not need to be enhanced as
the maximum block size can be kept below the 300 ton limit at Ingalls.
To make the jump to world class levels at 85% complete at launch will require
much more change at Ingalls. More room will be required for On Unit work. Lift
capacity will need to be increased to 450 tons per block. The estimated returns for this
level of outfitting are $13 million over the base case but only $3 million less than the
75% complete case.
5.3 Choke Point Analysis and Infrastructure Investment at BIW
Cycle Time reduction is something every shipyard visited is thinking about.
Finding ways to do things smarter and faster is a priority in most industries. For
shipbuilding in the United States, this may not be the case. The amount of work currently
offered by the Navy is not enough to stimulate maximum throughput efforts. To drive
cycle times down there must be more work for the shipyards to build once they finish
their current orders. One way to maintain labor at the yard is to slow the construction of
existing ships to a minimum. This acts to decrease the productivity of work on existing
ships but keeps the workforce employed until the next contract comes through. To be
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competitive on commercial contracts, however, cycle time and productivity are the two
major issues.
The next policy analysis concerns the constraints to production. If domestic yards
can stimulate commercial work, they will need to reduce cycle time to remain
competitive. The choke points at all shipyards have been identified in Chapter 3. If it is
found necessary to ease the choke points, an investment needs to be made in additional
infrastructure.
5.31 Problem Description and Reference Modes
At BIW, the primary constraint to production is the Blast and Paint Facility. In
order to increase the amount of blocks that BIW can produce each week, the throughput
in this area needs to be increased. The cost of increasing the Blast and Paint Capacity to
allow double the throughput per week is estimated at around $5 million dollars. The
problem for production planners is quantifying the benefits the additional capacity
provides to the shipyard. What is the payback time for this investment? Do other
constraints exist that would nullify the investment in new Blast and Paint Facilities?
5.32 Dynamic Hypothesis
By easing the Blast and Paint constraint at Bath Iron Works, the throughput of
blocks through the On Block phase and through the yard can be increased. This increase
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in throughput leads to a reduction in cycle times and an eventual reduction in costs on the
SOCV project.
5.33 Analysis
To simulate this hypothesis, the capacity at BIW of the Blast and Paint Facility is
doubled in the Ship Production Model. The performance is then compared to the base
case. This type of analysis shows the power of simulation. When the model is properly
calibrated, these "what if' questions can be investigated quickly and cheaply. In the past
the way to determine whether a policy will work was to conduct a pilot program in a
small portion of the shipyard. Pilot programs can not capture the true impact of a policy
on the entire shipyard. With simulation, management can get the answers to their
questions without a major disruption of the day to day operation of the yard. The values
that the simulation produces may not be exact, but the relative behavior of one policy can
be compared to the baseline or other policies.
5.34 - Results
The base run at BIW in Figure 5-42 indicates the cost of building the ship is
significantly higher than Ingalls. The project costs after doubling the capacity of the
Blast and Paint Facility are represented in Figure 5-42.
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Figure 5-42 - BIW B&P Compare
The primary reason for the decrease in end cost is the smoother flow of material
through the yard. The bottleneck at Blast and Paint caused productivity in the On Block
and On Board phases to drop to very low levels in the base case. The effect that captured
this problem is the Effect of Prerequisite Readiness. Because material was constrained at
Blast and Paint, the On Board portion of the project was delayed. More work to do late
in the project resulted in the use of higher levels of overtime. Fatigue and schedule
pressure effects combined to reduce productivity.
After the capacity of Blast and Paint was increased, the productivity problems are
not as severe. The Effect of Prerequisite Readiness still causes a dip in productivity.
The schedule pressure and fatigue effects still are active indicating the process is not yet
235
Graph for Total Cumulative Project Cost
400 M
300 M
200 M
100 M
0
in
0 16 32 48 64 SU 9b 112 125 144 1OU
Time (week)
Total Cumulative Project Cost - BATHI dollars
Total Cumulative Project Cost - BATH2_----------------------- dollars
Graph for Total Cumulative Project Cost
f70 illi:
,1 r\/ ~AT\ ~·1
ideal. The modified BIW run experiences some problems but not near the level as in the
base run.
The capacity of Blast and Paint was doubled again to see if more improvement
could be made to the end costs. The results were the same end cost indicating another
constraint had been reached. The next bottleneck was determined to be engineering
capacity to produce timely drawings. In order to remedy this situation, BIW could
supplement their in house design team with contractor or hirer more people.
This analysis indicates that investing $5 million in increasing the Blast and Paint
Capacity would contribute to a reduction in the end costs of the ship of more than $70
million dollars. Actually putting a number on the benefits is not as important as realizing
that an order of magnitude difference can be achieved between the amount invested and
the benefits which result. It is also interesting to see that as we raise the constraints to
production in some areas, other constraints may be activated. Understanding these
constraints and the benefits that could be achieved by easing them is a huge advantage for
the shipyards.
5.4 Additional Uses for Ship Production Model
There are many other possible uses for the Ship Production Model or similar
models. These include:
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* Effect of Navy or Shipyard Generated Changes
The cost of adding scope or changing the contract after contract award is
detrimental to the cost and schedule performance of the program.
Government initiated change should be kept to an absolute minimum once the
contract is awarded and detailed design begins. Producibility changes should
be encouraged during the detailed design stage but should be kept to a
minimum after production starts.
* Shipyard Manning Level
US Shipyards are characterized by their casual use of the labor force. This
means that they only employ the work force when needed. 67 Determining
when to start laying people off or to find busy work for them to do until the
next surge in work is a critical strategic decision that each shipyard must
decide. US Shipyards tend to take a short term view of the problem and
reduce the number of people to cut overhead costs as soon as the order book
experiences a dip. When more work is contracted, new labor needs to be
procured. The people that were let go may not be available to be rehired.
Significant training time is required to produce an effective ship builder. The
process may take as long as 4-5 years based on the trade needed. The true cost
of bringing new people into the shipyard in terms of loss of Productivity,
Rework, and Training is not well understood.
67 Frankel, E.G. (1990) "The Path to US Shipbuilding Excellence - Remaking the US into a World Class
Competitive Shipbuilding Nation", NSRP 1990 Ship Production Symposium, August 21-24, 1990,
Milwaukee, WI.
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* Bid Formulation
The shipyards could use data from a previous ship project and make the
necessary changes to represent a proposed ship. The model could be used to
determine what the approximate cost of the ship would be if the process
remains the same. The yard could also account for changes in infrastructure
and manning and determine what impact a change in the process would have
on the costs.
* Benchmarking the Competition
As part of a benchmarking effort, the shipyard could collect as much
information as possible about the competition and make the appropriate
changes to the model. Using the same ship package developed for their bid,
the yard could determine the approximate costs at the competitor's yard. In
this way, the shipyard could determine where they need to improve. The
constraint in Blast and Paint at Bath is an example of a place where
improvement could be made to lower end costs.
* Schedule vs. Cost
One question the Navy almost never asks is what is the cost of accelerating or
slipping the schedule to meet the demands of the shipyard. If the order book
is starting to dwindle in the yard, it may be more practical to increase the work
intensity on the ship. In this way the labor pool could be kept at a steady
level. Likewise, when a problem occurs it may be more beneficial to slip the
schedule to the right instead of working overtime to meet an impossible
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deadline. If Navy and shipyard planners could quickly examine the trade-off
between cost and schedule a better decision could be made to the benefit of all
parties.
Emerging Work Impact on Shipyard
Many yards will automatically bid on emerging work despite the order book.
Sometimes having too much work can lead to problems with base work.
Determining when emergent work will have a detrimental impact on the core
business is critical. The emergent work could be modeled as added scope to
determine if the current constraints of the yard can support the additional
throughput.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, the simulated building of SOCV at Ingalls and Bath is conducted
to examine the differences between the two yards. The Ship Production Model is used to
examine several dynamic hypotheses concerning the management of SOCV. The results
of this analysis indicate that despite the higher quality of work at Bath, the constraints of
the shipyard limit the productivity. Improvements to the process at both yards are
examined. The results of this analysis indicate potential savings are possible at both
yards. Ingalls must work on quality and its level of outfitting. BIW must work on the
constraints to production in the Blast and Paint facility and at the erection site.
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The Ship Production Model, while by no means perfect, can be used to examine
many of the complex issues raised by the Navy and the shipyards concerning the
management of a shipbuilding project. The current level of detail is meant as a research
tool for proof of concept. The aggregation of data is at the strategic level. As better
process information is collected and calibration to historical data is completed, the model
will become a valuable analytical tool that will enable quantitative decisions instead of
just "gut feel."
Simulation holds great potential in the shipbuilding world. 3-D project models
can provide information for designers, manufacturers, customers. and anyone else
involved in the construction of a ship will become a reality in the very near future. The
process used to produce this product must not be ignored. Improvements to the process
can be facilitated by the use of simulation to examine management hypotheses. Model
results can be used to advocate one change over another. A clearer understanding of the
decisions made on a project by the government and the shipyard can be realized. Without
simulation, choices are made based on values that can be quantified easily and not on the
potential benefit to the shipyard or product end cost..
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Chapter 6 - Conclusions
The current Affordability Crisis in which the Navy finds itself has been described
an analyzed. A possible remedy for increasing the throughput of the private shipyards,
high performance commercial ships, is discussed. The Build Strategy of one particular
high speed container ship, SOCV, is presented. The ways in which ships are built in the
major shipyards in this country are investigated and compared. The combination of the
characteristics of the ship and the shipyards are used in a System Dynamics model, the
Ship Production Model.
The Ship Production Model is used to conduct case studies concerning the
difficulties many yards experience in ship construction. The values of interest the Ship
Production Model can provide are:
* Cost
* Schedule
* Quality
* Productivity
Causal tracing can be used to find the root causes of quality or productivity problems on a
project.
Shipbuilding is a natural field for increased use of simulation in that few products
of each type of products are built. The largest production line in operation is the DDG-51
class with plans for 30 or more ships over a 15 year period. When compared to the
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hundreds of thousands of cars Ford rolls off the assembly line each year one realizes
shipbuilding is a craft, not a mass production industry. The throughput of the same
product on which to make improvements in shipbuilding is far less available than other
industries. Increasing throughput is crucial to improving productivity in this country.
The Ship Production Model is used to check the validity of the Build Strategy
created for SOCV and to test hypotheses for improving the process in any shipyard. It is
also used to make quantitative comparisons of the way two competitors build the same
ship. At this stage the model is a research tool used for proof of concept. Many of the
structures and table functions in the model were developed for other industries. In order
to tune the model to provide more accurate results for any specific shipyard, more
research at a finer level of detail than the strategic level needs to be conducted.
The next step for the Ship Production Model is to go to back to the shipyards to
benchmark the quality, productivity, and constraints at each phase of construction. If
additional structure is deemed necessary to capture the problem of interest, modifications
should be made. Confidence can be built in during model development by including as
many people in the yard as possible. All of the participants in the acquisition process, the
ship owner, the shippers, the Navy, and the shipyard should be included in the model
development and calibration if possible.
6.1 Implications for Navy Acquisition Process
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Models like the Ship Production Model can be used by the Navy to make smarter
decisions about how contracts are awarded. Bid price can not be the only criteria for the
award. If the shipyard can be properly simulated, the impact of new work in the shipyard
can be measured. The true cost of awarding a new contract to an already overloaded yard
can be determined. When one yard comes in with a bid much lower than the competition,
it could be asked to quantify via simulation the improvements it plans to make to achieve
such savings. This reduces the risk the government must assume when dealing with the
private yards.
The model can become the receptacle for all of the shipyard and the governments
assumptions and objectives concerning the project. Once a view of the other sides
position is apparent, better communication will result. By jointly building a model, all of
the important issues will need to be discussed up front. If disputes arise later over any
aspect of the process, the model can be used to find common ground.
Determining the true impact of acquisition reforms is another field in which
simulation can help. The impact an acquisition reform has on any ship program can be
modeled. A dynamic hypothesis of how to improve the process can be formulated and
modeled prior to implementation. In this way, only the reforms that have considerable
favorable impact on the process will be considered. If too many reforms are attempted at
the same time, the true impact of each measure may never be realized.
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6.2 Future Work
As previously mentioned, much must be done to take the proof of concept,
strategic level research model to a working, useful, accurate tool for program managers at
a specific shipyard on a specific ship. I plan to take the model with me to NASSCO for
my next tour of duty. The model will be tuned to meet the constraints of NASSCO. The
base work in the yard will be modeled. I will attempt to use the model to make
predictions about project performance.
One recent development that could spur increased use of System Dynamics
modeling for shipbuilding is the reopening of the Quincy shipyard as Massachusetts
Heavy Industries (MHI). The 5 dry docks and huge 1200 ton overhead crane left over
from the old Navy yard will soon be put back in operation on the construction of product
tankers. The methods proposed for shipyard operation are state of the art. The Samsung
yard in Korea provides the design and many of the processes planned for incorporation in
this yard. This would be a perfect place to determine if the Ship Production Model can
really produce fast and accurate results.
The product is well defined, a 46,000 DWT product tanker. The shipyard is being
reconfigured from the ground up. The model could start with the conceptual way the
production planners intend to lay out the yard. State of the art CAD/CAM fabrication
machines, robotics, JIT material deliveries and high levels of pre-outfitting are all being
discussed for this shipyard. As the machines are put in place, time studies can be
244
conducted to determine the real productivity of a worker at each machine. The impact of
things like prerequisite dependencies, fatigue, morale and quality on productivity can be
directly measured. This data can be used to fine tune the Ship Production Model to the
point where confidence in the results can be achieved. The model would then become a
valuable planning tool for any changes envisioned for the yard.
Quincy is within easy driving distance of MIT. Perhaps a joint venture between
the Ocean Engineering Department and the Systems Dynamics Group under the Lean
Ship Initiative could be formed to study modeling at MHI. A unique opportunity exists
to further the research. The lessons learned here could be implemented Navy wide.
6.3 Flight Simulator
New program managers can use a model similar to the Ship Production Model as
a flight simulator. This will allow them to try out any idea they have to improve the
process. A model like this could be used in conjunction with a text like Ship Production
to allow the reader to investigate some of the hypotheses proposed in the book.68 Several
case studies could be developed which look at the effect of exogenous shocks like higher
material costs or labor problems that require management to make changes in the yard.
The policies needed to survive such a shock could be investigated. Strategies for dealing
with complex problems could be formulated. Simulation could provide valuable
experience to novice managers who do not have the luxury of poor performance on a
68 Storch, R.L., Hammon, C.P., Bunch, H.W., Moore, R.C., (1995), "Ship Production," 2nd Edition,
Cornell Maritime Press, Centreville Maryland.
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contract. The amount of money involved and oversight on any ship program reduces the
opportunity for new managers to "fly by the seat of their pants." Without the opportunity
to make mistakes, managers take much longer to learn the best policies to use.
Overseeing the process of designing, planning, building and testing a new class of
ship is one of the most challenging tasks any manager could hope to undertake. The
difficulty of the ship design, huge budgets, many customers providing oversight and
congressional interest all contribute to the complexity of the situation. The only way to
unravel the complexity is through the use of detailed simulation. With proper simulation,
better decisions can be made in a timely manner for the benefit of all. Simulation may
provide the competitive advantage shipbuilders need to get back into the world shipping
market.
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Appendix A: Build Strategy Development
A Build Strategy is created for a commercially viable Sealift ship, SOCV (Sealift
Option for Commercial Viability). The format used was developed for the NSRP by a
Build Strategy Project conducted at NSWC Carderock. 69 SOCV is a high performance
container ship capable of maintaining 35 knots in heavy seas. This ship can also be easily
converted to meet surge Sealift needs for the Department of Defense as a RO/RO ship.
Several National Defense Features (NDF) have been designed into the ship to allow quick
conversion. A description of SOCV and its capabilities are provided. This ship
represents the high performance commercial ship contracts domestic yards are hoping to
attract to supplement their Navy work. SOCV has the powering requirements of a
combatant ship and an advanced hull form making it similar to the ships US yards are
currently building.
The key events that characterize the ship construction cycle is developed. The
Build Strategy is geared for Ingalls shipbuilding based on the source selection made in
Chapter 3. The Build Strategy permits its use, with minor modifications, within the
current capabilities of most domestic yards for comparison purposes in Chapter 5.
Specific coordination of SOCV work with the base work of Ingalls is required.
Production planning is conducted using a hull block construction method with zone
outfitting. The block break criteria and construction sequence are formulated. This ship
69 Lamb, T., (February 1994), "Build Strategy Development, The National Shipbuilding
Research Program," Carderock Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Bethesda, Maryland.
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has been designed by a civilian firm, SOCV@MIT. It contains installed NDF equipment
like ramps, ventilation ducts and added sprinkler capacity which are part of the military
requirements for the ship.
The Build Strategy provides the work breakdown of the ship into smaller
packages. These packages will be fed into the Ship Production Model in Chapter 4 as the
work profile. When combined with the management and infrastructure parameters of the
specific shipyard identified in Chapter 3, all of the inputs required for simulation will be
available including:
* Total scope of work
* Work profile
* Shipyard resources and constraints
* Labor
* Management Decisions and Policies
These inputs will be discussed further in the summary of this section.
Figure A-43 depicts the process used to build the SOCV. This process is typical
of shipbuilding in this country. The different shipyards may vary in how much work is
done in each stage but the basic flow of material is the same in every yard observed.
These differences will be discussed in Chapter 3 and quantified in the analysis portion of
Chapter 5. The Contract Design is the product of an Integrated Product Team (IPT)
including the shipyard, the commercial ship owner/operator, the Navy, MSC, and the
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possible customers who will use SOCV to ship their high value cargo. By including all
the "customers" for this ship in an IPT, many of the concerns about producibility,
maintenance, conversion to a sealift ship, and ease of cargo handling can be discussed
before the first piece of steel is cut. All phases after Contract Design are the
responsibility of the ship builder.
Figure A-43 - Ship Construction Process
The different phases of construction are discussed later in this chapter. A major
productivity problem identified by several studies and observed during the shipyard tours
is that US shipyards tend to delay outfitting until much later in the construction sequence
than the Japanese. 7 0 A way to measure this is the percentage of outfitting work done in
the On Unit, On Block, or On Board construction phases. This subject will be discussed
in detail in this chapter and investigated by the use of simulation in Chapter 5.
70 Wilkins, J.R., Kraine, G.L., and Thompson, D.H., (Aug 1993) Evaluating the Producibility of Ship
Design Alternatives, Journal of Ship Production, Vol 9, No 3, pp 18 8 -2 0 1.
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Build Strategy - Purpose
"A Build Strategy is an agreed design, engineering, material management,
production and testing plan prepared before work starts, to identify and integrate all
necessary processes. "' The Build Strategy provides a framework for the effective
development and communication of the many aspects of a ship construction contract. It
is a critical part of the Production Planning of a ship. The Build Strategy could be the
difference between a successful and a disastrous project. Producing a useful Build
Strategy requires a superior understanding of the required resources and associated
constraints of the shipyard and the product of interest. The product of interest for this
particular Build Strategy is a high performance, commercially viable container ship,
SOCV.
SOCV Description
The SOCV represents a significant innovation in the design of container ships.
SOCV is a commercially viable container ship with a capacity of 1526 TEU. It can also be
quickly converted to a Fast Sealift Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) Ship used to transport Army
vehicles from the continental United States (CONUS) and the area of conflict. The design
represents a material alternative to the Strategic Sealift assets outlined in "Joint Vision
2010" and the Defense Mobility Requirements Study (DMRS). The major requirements
placed on this design is that it must be commercially viable while easily convertible for use
as a maritime asset for surge Sealift missions.
71 Lamb, T., (February 1994), Build Strategy Development, The National Shipbuilding Research
Program,Carderock Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Bethesda, Maryland
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In the commercial mode, this design represents a significant advance in ship
technology. The requirements for SOCV calls for a minimum of thirty-five knot sustained
transit speed. It has the unique ability to maintain speed in heavy seas. High powered gas
turbine engines, steerable waterjets and state of the art cargo handling systems put this
vessel in its own class in terms of the performance it can deliver. The SOCV design plans
to exploit the emerging Just In Time (JIT) market for goods between Europe and North
America. SOCV will set the standard for high performance cargo vessels in the future.
Table A-19 provides the principal characteristics of the SOCV hull form.
LOA 256 m SHP 240 MW
LBP 229 m Sustained Speed 36.5 kts
Extreme Beam 45 m Trim 0 m
Beam @ DWL 39.8m Full Load KG 16.84 m
Cb 0.38 1 0.7
Design Draft 12 m Lightship KG 17.1 m
Depth @ Main Deck 30 m Cargo Capacity 1524 TEU
Full Load A 35,634 tonnes Cargo tonnes 10,000
Lightship w/margin 17,468 tonnes
Number of Shafts 5 Waterjets
Table A-19 - SOCV Characteristics
Shipyard Selection
The number of US Shipyards that can construct SOCV is limited because of the
size of the ship. Table A-19 above gives the proposed dimension for length, beam and
draft. Because of it's size requirements, it has been determined that only 4 US Shipyards
currently have the capability to build this class of ships without a major investment in
new infrastructure. Construction of these ships will commence in 1998. The possible
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building positions in each of these yards is listed in Table A-20. Projections have been
made based on the current and future order books of these yards in Chapter 3. The
positions available at each yard are also indicated.
SOCV Capable Shipyards Shipbuilding Positions Available Positions
Avondale 8 2
Bath 3 2
Ingalls 6 4
Newport News 3 1
NASSCO 3 1
Table A-20 - Possible SOCV Shipyards
Source selection was announced after a more detailed look at the capabilities and
constraints of these in Chapter 3. Ingalls was selected to build SOCV. Additional
simulation was used to compare the performance on SOCV at Ingalls and Bath.
Contractual Issues, Dates and Schedule
The basic concept for the acquisition of the SOCV is that the US government will
fund the construction of these ships. The entire ship will be considered a National
Defense Feature. (NDF). The ships will then be chartered to the commercial shipping
market as high performance commercial container ships. A clause in the charter
agreement will state that in time of war, the charter is canceled and the ship will return to
a designated facility for quick conversion to a RO/RO ship. The charter rate will be set
by market forces. The SOCV concept is proposed as a replacement to the inactive ready
reserve and the current Strategic Sealift Program. The SOCV program will:
* Generate revenues for further construction
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* Act as a test bed for new HM&E technology
* Stimulate commercial work in domestic yards
* Provide a superior product for DOD logistics planners
The initial phase of the SOCV program consists of four ships to be built for the
government. The ships are due for delivery as follows:
* Award Contract on 15 May 1997
* SOCV 1 - 15 March 00
* SOCV 2 - 15 September 00
* SOCV 3 - 1 June 01
* SOCV 4 - 1 December 01
To complete this aggressive schedule the first block of steel will be erected on 2 August
1998. A critical part of meeting this schedule will be to define, order, and receive all
required long lead time material including those pieces internally manufactured and those
purchased from subcontractors.
A list of the long lead time material is provided in the next section. Material
should be delivered Just In Time (JIT). This will require additional attention to detail to
ensure the correct parts are ordered in the correct quantity the first time. The scheduled
delivery time of the first ship requires 34 months. 18 months is required for the
procurement of long lead time material. The planned cycle times for the follow on ships
is 25 months. The delivery dates are spaced so as to only occupy two erection sites at a
time. The primary driver for cycle time on the first ship is long lead time material.
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Payments:
The payment terms are related partly to the milestones achieved during the
building process and partly to the desires of the builder. Half of the payments will follow
the traditional payment schedule outlined below in Table A- 21. Meeting the necessary
milestones is required for this portion of the payments.
Milestone Percent Million US$
Contract Signing 5% 6.25
Cut First Steel 5% 6.25
Lay Keel 15% 18.75
Launch 15% 18.75
Delivery 60% 75
Table A- 21 - Payment Schedule
The other half of the payments will be at the discretion of the shipyard. Whatever
financing scheme works out better for the financial stability of the company will be used.
This is an incentive to the contractor for building this ship. It will allow the shipyard
more freedom in dealing with subcontractors, facilitate volume purchases or fund
improvements in infrastructure. Allowing the shipyard the flexibility of planning the use
of capital will act to stimulate improvements in the yard that may be reflected in the end
cost of the ship.
Liquidated Damages:
There are no liquidated damages applying to this contract although the following
performance penalties apply:
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* For the first 10 days over schedule, no penalty is applied.
* For every additional calendar day the shipyard will be required to pay $50,000
US, up to a maximum of 5% of the contract.
Cancellation:
Cancellation of the contract can be caused by:
* Delayed delivery longer than 90 days
* Deadweight tonnage 1500 heavier than specified
* Cargo Volume 5000 cubic meters less than specified
* The ship owner will assume the risk for the attained speed and fuel
consumption
Drawing Approval:
The government has two weeks to approve or make comments on detailed design
drawings. After this period they will be assumed approved. It is critically important to
maintain a good working relationship in the early stages of a ship program. Many of the
problems experienced on Navy ships could have been avoided by experienced people
making informed decisions at the correct time. This is the case with ABS and the USCG
as well. Approval for changes must be sought and followed up in a timely fashion to
eliminate problems later in the project. Two weeks is a reasonable amount of time to
properly analyze and make decisions on a change. Changes which take longer than two
weeks may be too extensive to include on the hull under construction. They should be
deferred to the next hull if necessary.
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Construction Inspection:
The construction of the ship will be subject to oversight provided by:
* ABS: Hull surveyor, electrical and machinery surveyor
* USCG: Ship Surveyor, machine surveyor, electrical surveyor, and a nautical
surveyor
* SUPSHIP: Hull, mechanical and electrical surveyors
For tests on equipment and systems, a 24 hour notice is required from the builder.
Should the surveyors not attend, the tests will not be repeated. As many tests as possible
should be conducted in the workshops with access to necessary services. Before calling
the inspectors, the system will have been fully checked and tested by the shipyards QA
department
Trials:
The following dock trials will be undertaken along side the pier:
* Main Engine Test
* Auxiliary Machinery
* Deck Machinery
* Container Location and Security
* Controls and Instrumentation
* Standby and Emergency Systems
* Electric Power and Lighting Systems
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* Chain Stoppers
* Steering Gear
* Ramps
* Lifeboats and Davits
* Pumps and Fluid Systems
* Air and Sounding Pipes
* Heating, Ventilation, and A/C Systems
* Refrigeration Plant
* Communications System
Sea Trials will consist of:
* Measured mile speed trial
* Torsion Measurement of main engine torque
* 12 hour endurance and fuel consumption at 25%, 50%, 75%, and 90% power
* Maneuvering, turning and stopping
* Crash Astern, Crash Ahead, Astern Trial
* Windlass Trail, full extent of cable out
* Setting of Remote Controls
* Adjustment and calibration of navigational equipment.
Quality:
The quality of the finished steel products will be in accordance with ISO 9000.
USCG and ABS rules will be followed as necessary. The SOCV will be classed by ABS
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and will receive a certificate of inspection from the USCG. Other items will be in
accordance with pertinent industry standards.
Production Planning
The tasks accomplished during Production Planning are depicted in Figure A-44.
Figure A-44 - Typical Hull Planning Functions 72
The ship is divided during Hull Block Planning into a discrete number of units.
These units take into account the constraints of the shipyard. The size and weight of the
units are determined by the capacity of overhead cranes that can move these units into
place. The boundaries of the zones are identified in the Production Plan and cover the
functional areas of the ship. The zones for SOCV include:
* Machinery
72 Bunch, H. (1994) Ship Production Notes
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* Cargo
* Bow
* Stern
* Accommodations
By breaking the ship into zones, a logical sequence of construction can be planned.
Master Construction Schedule and Key Events
The Master Construction Schedule is developed by the shipbuilder as a
management tool to monitor the progress of the construction process. The primary driver
for the start of construction is the anticipated delivery of long lead time material. The
longest lead time items include main and auxiliary engines. The schedule reflects the
desire to install these items as soon as they come into the yard. This reduces the need
amount of time the shipyard needs to store this equipment. Once fabrication starts, the
Master Schedule reflects inputs from the customer and from the ability to push blocks
through the yard selected for construction.
The Master Construction Schedule for SOCV is shown in Table A-22
Event Description Event Duration (weeks) Weeks to Delivery
001 Award Contract (M) 0 150
002 Detail Design 112 150
003 Mat'l Procurement 112 150
004 Production Planning 80 150
005 Lofting 32 100
006 Start Construction (M) 0 82
007 Structural Fab 36 82
008 Lay Keel (M) 0 76
009 Structural Erect 42 76
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010 Machinery Install 26 64
011 Piping Install 26 62
012 Elect/Elex Install 26 62
013 HVAC Install 20 60
014 Complete Erection 0 34
015 Tank Closeout 8 32
016 Stern Release (M) 0 32
017 Systems Testing 6 24
018 Launch (M) 0 18
019 On Board Outfit 10 18
020 Compartment Close 6 8
021 Drydocking 1 3
022 Inclining 0 3
023 Dock Trials (M) 0 2
024 Acceptance Trials (M) 0 2
024 Builders Trials (M) 0 1
026 Delivery (M) 0 0
(M) indicates a Contract Milestone
Table A-22 - Master Construction Schedule
This schedule is aggressive when compared to warship construction. The LPD-17
procurement and construction cycle will take almost 5 years to complete. The DDG-51
construction cycles examined in the next chapter take up to 55 months. This schedule is
not as aggressive as some commercial ship contracts. The Japanese have been able to
reduce cycle times for product carriers to under 11 months from award of the ship to
delivery. The Szczecin shipyard in Poland was also able to reduce production cycle times
for mid sized product carriers to 11 months. Samsung, one of the major Korean
shipyards has reduced cycle times on product carriers to six months. A faster cycle time
ensures the product will meet the requirements of the market it was meant to exploit. If
cycle times get to be too long, the entire economic situation may have changed. With
reduced cycle time there is less technological innovation during the construction
sequence. This may reduce the amount of change required to keep the ship current.
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Reducing cycle times requires a thorough understanding of the entire shipbuilding
process. To relieve the constraints to production will require investment in infrastructure,
worker training, and sub contractor relationships.
For the follow on ships, the limitations of long lead time materials are not a
problem. A 25 month schedule is planned to push the ships out as quickly as the
constraints of the shipyard will allow. The SOCV program is assigned two erection
ways. The major constraint to the timing of delivery of the follow on ships is the time
spent in the erection process.
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on ships are included in Table A-23.
Event Description Duration (weeks) Weeks to Delivery
001 Award Contract (M) 0 100
002 Detail Design 58 100
003 Mat'l Procurement 58 100
004 Production Planning 54 100
005 Lofting 32 100
006 Start Construction (M) 0 82
007 Structural Fab 36 82
008 Lay Keel (M) 0 76
009 Structural Erect 42 76
010 Machinery Install 26 64
011 Piping Install 26 62
012 Elect/Elex Install 26 62
013 HVAC Install 20 60
014 Complete Erection 0 34
015 Tank Closeout 8 32
016 Stern Release (M) 0 32
017 Systems Testing 6 24
018 Launch (M) 0 18
019 On Board Outfit 10 18
020 Compartment Close 6 8
021 Drydocking 1 3
022 Inclining 0 3
023 Dock Trials (M) 0 2
024 Acceptance Trials (M) 0 2
024 Builders Trials (M) 0 1
026 Delivery (M) 0 0
(M) indicates a Contract Milestone
Table A-23 - Follow On Ship Schedule
A reduction in Navy combatant ship cycle times would allow the Navy to meet
the current threat with less risk. Given the long lead times currently experienced, Navy
planners are required to design flexibility into their platforms for additional contingencies
should the world threat situation change between design and delivery of the ship. The
Navy currently uses inordinate amounts of change or added scope to the contract to keep
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The Key Events for the follow
the most current technology on the its new ships. This is a very expensive way of doing
business. Cycle time reductions would help both the Navy and the shipyards. The Navy
would receive the ships it needs in a more timely manner and the need for expensive
changes would be reduced. The contractor could make productivity improvements which
would help his bottom line on the more stable design. To accomplish cycle time
reductions to the same level as Japanese shipyards will require a complete overhaul of the
way the Navy designs and procures ships.
The Master Construction Schedule is combined with the Block Erection Plan to
create the Key Events Schedule. Critical Hull Structural unit numbers are taken from the
Block Assembly Plan of the next section.
Block Breaks
Construction Blocks are three dimensional assemblies formed by joining two or
more structural panels. The Block Assembly Plan and the Assembly Sequence define
how the different sections of the ship will be built and eventually put together. If we
consider the ship to be a puzzle, the block breaks identify the size and shape of the puzzle
pieces. The Block Break Criteria is a function of the characteristics of the ship and the
constraints of the shipyard. The key is to make the pieces of the ship as producible for
that particular yard as possible. Once the Block Break Plan has been established, it will
be reviewed for producibility.
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Block Break Criteria
The dimensions of the construction breaks are determined by several factors
including:
* Length and width of plates available from steel manufacturers
* Transverse bulkhead spacing
* Maximum size and weight of outfitted blocks which can be handled and
transported using yard equipment
* Location of major longitudinal bulkheads and major structures like main
engines
* Amount of pre-outfitting to be accomplished prior to erection 73
A similar method as the LX Generic Build Strategy study was used to select where the
breaks would occur. The general guidelines are listed below:
* All block breaks are made above the deck and aft of transverse bulkheads
* All stiffeners on the transverse bulkheads are located on the forward side
* Blocks do not exceed 15 meters in length as this is the maximum plate length
available for over the road or rail transport.
* Block heights are generally one deck high except in finer portions of the bow
and some tanks where arrangements allow multi-deck blocks.
* Block widths were kept to multiples of three meters whenever possible to
allow use of full plate widths. The maximum size of the plates are utilized to
73 Hough, J. (April 1994), LX Preliminary Design (PD) Generic Build Strategy, Naval Sea Systems
Command, Washington, D.C.
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reduce wastage. The maximum plate width allowed for over the road travel is
3 meters.
* Block weights are not to exceed 250 tons
* Pre-outfitting to this limit is encouraged although not mandatory
* Preliminary Frame spacing is set at 1.5 meters
* Plate thickness, frame sizing and stiffener sizing are limited to a few standard
sizes.
The Block Numbering Scheme is taken from a zone definition exercise developed for a
an NSRP SP-9 Panel Short Course on Implementation of Zone Technology. The blocks
are numbered using a six digit scheme which is described in Table A-24.
Zone Code Description (M XX ZZ Y)
M - Functional Zone Indicator XX - Long Location ZZ - Vert Location Y - Trans Location
S Stern 01 Forward 01 Lowest 0 Center
M Machinery 02 4 Deck 1 Starboard
C Cargo 03 Middle 03 3 Deck 2 Port
B Bow 04 2 Deck
A Accommodations 06 Aft 05 House
Table A-24 - Zonal Block Numbering Sequence
For example, the first block in the bow zone on the lowest level is designated
B01010. The zones and general Block Breaks are shown in the profile view of SOCV
can be found at the end of this section with the identification of specific blocks by deck.
The blocks identified for this study are tentative. If the shipyard has better ideas about
consolidation of the blocks into larger Grand Blocks the Build Strategy can be modified
in Detailed Design.
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Block Assembly Sequence
The next step in the process is to determine in what order the blocks will be
manufactured and assembled. It is critical to take into account the constraints at each
phase of construction. Long Lead Time material needs to be ordered and planned for
installation. The timing of Key Events like the landing of Main Machinery must be
planned so the supporting structure is in place. All of these considerations go into
producing a block erection Claw Chart which represents the sequence in which the pieces
of the ship will be put together. The sequence of blocks shown in the profile view
represent the week in which each block will be erected. The amount of time spent in the
construction ways should be minimized.
The following considerations were taken in to account for the Block Assembly
Sequence
* To keep the yard evenly employed an average of 10 units or 3 blocks per week are
planned.
* A unit on average consists of a 15 meter by 9 meter assembly.
* A block consists of units joined together transversely. The blocks are no more
than 15 meters long and 45 meters wide. The maximum weight of a block is
limited to 250 tonnes.
* Some weeks are loaded more heavily during the layout of the machinery rooms.
* As the ship comes to closer completion, the load in units/week starts to drop off.
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* A logical sequence for erection is used with sequential blocks laid out in
consecutive weeks.
* The ship starts in the middle and works towards the ends.
* Critical long lead time material, identified in the next section, is scheduled for
assembly when available.
* As soon as a machinery room is completed, the deck on top of it is assembled to
reduce exposure to the weather.
* More complicated sections like the bow are assembled during low throughput
weeks.
The block breaks and the ercetion sequence is shown in Figure A-45.
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Material Procurement
Concurrent to Production Planning, the material needed to build the ship is
identified and ordered. Internally generated and vendor provided components should be
ordered for Just In Time (JIT) delivery. Material ordered too early results in higher
inventory costs, degradation of product due to storage methods and loss of liquidity of
shipyard cash flow. Late delivery of material results in disruption to the production plan.
Out of sequence work may need to be used to make up for the material shortfalls. Of
particular interest is long lead time material like main propulsion engines. The ordering
of these items early in the process is critical to reducing cycle times. Keeping a close eye
on manufacturers lead times is a prerequisite for efficient insertion into the ship at the
correct stage. The items found in Table A-25 represent typical long lead time materials.
The manufacturers lead times represent real numbers provided by the vendors for the
specialized gear like waterjets. The other values were taken from the LX Generic Build
Strategy study.
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Item Description MFG Lead Time Land On Ship Required Order
(Weeks) (WBD) Date (WBD)
Reduction Gears 78 72-67 150
SSGT 2500 kw 72 72-67 145
Reefer Plant 72 78 150
Machinery Control 72 72-67 145
Main Engines 72 72-67 145
LM-6000
Water Jets 72 66-64 139
Switchboards 64 72-67 136
Motor Fire Pumps (1000 gpm) 56 78-67 135
Distilling Plant 56 66 123
A/C Unit 200 tonne 56 69 126
Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 52 69-67 122
Seawater Cooling Pump 52 69-67 122
Potable Water Pump 52 69-67 122
JP-5 System Pump 48 57 106
Ventilation Fans 48 65-60 114
Lifeboats and Davits 40 50 91
Lighting and Electric Cables 30 55 86
Sewage Plant 20 80 101
Steel 16 96 113
Deck Machinery 20 72 93
Navigation Gear 12 39 52
Communications 12 39 52
Table A-25 - Long Lead Time Materials and Procurement Schedule
Construction Stages
The stages of construction were identified in Figure A-43. These will be
investigated for several shipyards in the next chapter. Most shipyards in this country use
a modular method for constructing ships. This tends to minimize the amount of time a
ships remains in the construction ways prior to launch. The amount of pre-outfitting a
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shipyard accomplishes before launch of the ship is a function of the yard's installed
facilities and characteristics.
Detailed Design
The first of the contractor's actions after award of the contract is Detailed Design.
The requirements introduced by the customer in the Contract Design are converted into
actual working documents and drawings. This process may require a few months for a
commercial ship or longer for a complex military ship prior to the start of construction.
The Detailed Design provides input for Production Planning, Material Procurement, and
Manufacturing. Detailed Design continues as construction starts supporting the
downstream phases. Only a small portion of the drawings needed to build the ship are
completed when construction of the ship starts. The overlap between phases is very
difficult to manage. If changes need to be made for producibility, safety or cost, they
should be made as early in Detailed Design as possible.
Detailed Design is the first point where the contractor can make improvements to
the product or process. Hopefully, many of the producibility issues were raised in the
Contract Design IPT. In Detailed Design, the shipyard uses all of its competitive
advantages to produce the ship for less cost while meeting owner requirements. As much
effort should be made as possible prior to start of construction to get good ideas from the
customer and the production people. As many common components as possible should
be used to gain economies of scale in the Fabrication stage. As the design matures,
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producibility improvements become more difficult and expensive to accommodate. After
a certain point, most producibility items are not worth the interference with the rest of the
construction process to be included.
Producibility
Several factors were examined to try to keep
A producibility checklist is used to ensure as many
design at an early stage. The following decisions
guidance. 7475
the design as producible as possible.
good ideas are incorporated into the
are made using several sources for
* The block breaks take advantage of the maximum size plates that can be
delivered over the road.
* Standard plate and shape sizes are used throughout the ship.
* WT or bulb T stiffeners are used instead of W-T.
* Thin plate will be avoided to reduce welding distortion.
* Transom stern is flat with sharp corners instead of curved plates
* The shape of the bow is very simple with limited double curvature.
* The amount of double curved plates on the entire ship is minimized.
* No sheer or camber in the decks.
74 Bunch, H.M., (1993) Producibility Check-Off List, Revision 2, October 27, 1993, Department of Naval
Architecture and Marine Engineering, University of Michigan.
75 Brown, A.J. and Barentine, J.B. (1996) The Impact of Producibility on Cost and Performance in Naval
Combatant Design, Naval Construction and Engineering Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA.
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* As much flat plate as possible is used. Any additional shaping adds
complexity and cost to the project.
* Block Breaks are matched to transverse bulkheads where possible
* Trunks and enclosures are arranged at block divisions
* Common deck heights are used where possible
* The three engine rooms are laid out in identical fashion with the main engines
offset to accommodate shafting
* The spaces are arranged to minimize piping and ventilation runs
* Systems are arranged by zones. The habitability spaces are directly on top of
each other minimizing redundant piping runs.
* Longitudinal piping and cable boxes are provided to minimize overhead runs.
* Standard outfit packages are used for state rooms and sanitary spaces
* HVAC is run in trunks
Although this list is not complete, significant effort was taken in the conceptual stage to
make SOCV a producible ship. Even though the application requires a high performance
hull form, good decisions made early in the design can pay off during the construction
phase. Additional inputs taken from the SOCV IPT and implemented early in the design
can reduce the need for change to the project once fabrication begins. As much
information as possible should be taken into account in the early stages. As the process
moves into the fabrication stage, most change will be reserved until the next hull. Critical
safety and performance change will be allowed only under extreme circumstances.
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For SOCV, the total design and engineering hours are estimated to be 250,000
man-hours or 6250 man weeks at 8 hours per day. Ingalls will need to decide whether to
absorb this work with their own staff or supplement with a design firm. Ingalls recently
finished a redesign for DDG-51 Flight IIA. The only other design work on the horizon is
the Arsenal Ship program..
Fabrication of Products
Fabrication begins with the cutting of the first piece of steel. Burn tables are used
to produce shapes from steel plates using a variety of cutting techniques. Other plates are
pressed or rolled to form the curved sides of the ship. The frames and strakes are formed
using I beams of Ts. The small assemblies that will be brought together to form units are
either manufactured by the yard or purchased from sub contractors. Accuracy control at
this initial stage is very important for the rest of the construction process. It is estimated
that only 13% of the man hours required to produce the SOCV will be expended at this
stage. It is the most important stage for determining the quality of the end product.
Many managers choose to concentrate their efforts on later phases of construction where
more man hours and heavy equipment are required. Without a firm handle on product
and process control in the fabrication stage, the later phases will experience difficulties.
The impact of poor quality in the early stages can be demonstrated with simulation.
The total amount of steel and outfitting throughput for this project is 17,500
tonnes. The net required working area of the assembly shops is approximately 16,571
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m2. The utilization over the 74 weeks of structural fabrication will be approximately 1.65
tonne/ m2/year. This utilization rate can be absorbed using a single shift at Ingalls.
The first ship will be erected in 101 blocks over a period of 58 weeks. In
addition, base work in the shipyard chosen will continue. The second SOCV will follow
with a six month delay. Each SOCV will require approximately 10 units or 3 blocks per
week. The maximum throughput the yard could sustain without large increases in
infrastructure will need to be examined. If this load raises the capacity utilization to
levels higher than 90%, the schedule may need to be shifted until more room is available
in the yard. The 90% capacity utilization limit provides adequate margin for emerging
work or other commercial contracts.
Just In Time (JIT) delivery of raw stock and pieces should be arranged with
subcontractors. This reduces the amount of work in progress and forces the yard to
improve its internal flow of material. Incoming material should be packaged as a unit by
the subcontractor in one day equivalents. This reduces the amount of support or "no
touch" labor needed by the shipyard to start work each day.
Fabrication is the first stage in which producibility factors are critical. If many of
the smallest components of the ship are common, the fabrication process requires less
retooling of machines. This will reduce the number of man hours and improve the
quality of the products moving through this phase.
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On Unit
This stage of construction is conducted independent of the hull structure. As
much of the fabricated parts, equipment and pipework as possible is assembled in
packaged units at the shop level, detached from the structural steel. The different systems
of equipment are tested in the shop to prevent costly tear out for faulty equipment later in
the outfitting process. All equipment and pipe packaged units receive a final coat of paint
prior to installation aboard ship. These measures act to reduce the amount of work that
must be done in the constrained environment of the ship. The units that will be installed
as separate packages include:
* Fuel Oil Transfer Pump
* A/C Plants
* Vent Fans
* Luke Oil Pumps
* Fire Pumps
* Desalinization Plant
* Refrigeration Plant
* Electrical Generators
* Switchboards
* Main Propulsion Engines
* Control Console
* Exhaust Stacks and Silencers
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* Waterjets
* Sea Water Pumps
* Sewage Systems
On Unit Outfitting can be done indoors in a controlled environment allowing high
quality and productivity. Error! Reference source not found. provides a look at the
change in productivity from one outfitting stage to the next. The units produced in the
stage will be introduced to the structural steel support foundations in the next outfitting
stage.
Outfitting Stage Difficulty Factors
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Figure A-46 - Outfitting Productivity 76
As a result of benchmarking Japanese shipbuilding, one of the practices instituted
by several US yards has been to increase the amount of work done On Unit. This pushes
much of the labor hours to an earlier stage. It also tends to spread the work being done
around the yard. Interference among trades is minimal. All necessary interfaces for
services including welding leads, electrical and pneumatic lines are readily available.
In order to be able to invest so much of the total man hours to pre-outfitting,
accuracy control must be tight. If a block that has been fully outfitted is determined to be
too far out of tolerance, the time and effort invested in pre-outfitting is lost. The
responsibility for accuracy control should be on the lowest level, in the shops. If proper
tolerance can be measured at this early stage, the rest of the assembly will proceed
smoothly. If the work force at the lowest level is not held responsible for their products,
rework will be required to correct the deficiencies. Quality deficiencies will be traced to
their source. The faulty equipment will be returned to the error originating station and
not passed on down the line for rework.
On Block
The assembly of outfit components onto structural subassembly or blocks prior to
erection is called On Block outfitting. In this stage the packaged systems are placed onto
structural steel. In many shipyards, the assembly of structural steel and outfitting are
76Lamb, T., (February 1994), Build Strategy Development, The National Shipbuilding Research Program,
Carderock Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Bethesda, Maryland
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tracked separately. The functions are basically the same and should be accounted for
with the same system. Smaller components are brought together to form larger blocks.
As much of the piping, ventilation, lighting and machinery as possible is installed prior to
erection on the ways. A critical component of this stage is the decision to conduct a final
blast and paint. Proper preparation of material coatings and use of weld through primer
could eliminate the need for a final blast and paint at this stage. This could reduce the
amount of interference experienced in this phase. World class shipbuilders find it
unnecessary to conduct a final blast and paint. Half the US shipyards visited use final
blast and paint while the other half does not. The quality of the yards that do not conduct
a final blast and paint in this country is below those that take time to add this step to their
processes. Both hot and cold work is done at this stage. Hot work consists of welding
structural steel units together into blocks. Cold work consists of attaching On Units
packages which may be bolted to the deck.
Local cable runs and joiner doors are installed. Initial paint out, pipe lagging and
bulkhead insulation are all be applied in this stage. The limit to how much can be done
during On Unit and On Block Outfitting is the capacity of the overhead crane or other
block transfer equipment. For this ship in the selected yard, the limit for pre-outfitting is
set at 300 tons/block.
On Board
On Board Construction consists of the final erection of the ship and additional
outfitting work not able to be accomplished On Block. This is the most difficult
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outfitting stage in which to work. Many interferences and constraints are experienced at
this stage. Structural bulkheads and overhead decks tend to limit access to compartments
of interest. Although the construction area will normally be out of the weather, many
other trades compete for access to different spaces. As little work as possible should be
scheduled for On Board outfitting.
As the blocks are erected and welded together in accordance with the Assembly
Plan, other considerations need to be taken into account. Main machinery equipment
must be loaded when the structural decks are in place. Inter-block systems, like cables
and piping, need to be run and connected. When all of these functions occur
simultaneously, the result is a very busy and crowded work space.
After the ship is launched the rest of the On Board outfitting is accomplished.
This includes final alignment of propulsion shafting and bearings, final paint and
preservation, and other cosmetic items not on the critical path prior to sea trials. This
stage also signals the transition of the ship from the shipyard to the Navy. An extensive
compartment close out list is used to correct any remaining discrepancies. Light off of
main and auxiliary machinery and extensive testing occurs during this period.
Productivity Goals
The direct productivity goal for this ship is set at 80 man-hours/tonne steel. This
is the better than the national average productivity for a ship of this type and size of about
110 mh/tonne. Another measure of productivity used internationally is man-
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hours/compensated gross ton (CGT). The vessel gross tonnage is 17,500 tonnes. The
associated gross tonnage factor is 0.95 yielding a compensated gross tonnage of 15,650
tonnes. The total man hours required to produce this ship is 2,052,000 hours. For
comparison purposes, good European yards use 45 man hours/CGT. Japanese yards are
using 29 man hours/CGT. 77 The productivity overseas is clearly higher than what can be
accomplished domestically. For US yards to compete internationally, this is the place
where improvements must be made.
Summary
The SOCV Build Strategy is used establish many initial values and set the work
profile for the Ship Production Model in Chapter 5. The Build Strategy defines what will
be produced. A summary of the important outputs from the Build Strategy development
process are provided below in Table A-26.
77 Frankel, E.G. (1990) The Path to US Shipbuilding Excellence - Remaking the US into a World Class
Competitive Shipbuilding Nation, NSRP 1990 Ship Production Symposium, August 21-24, 1990,
Milwaukee, WI.
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Parameter Value
Number of Blocks 101
Design Schedule (wks) 112
Keel to Launch (wks) 58
Design Staff 200
Structural Staff 850
Productivity Goal (mh/CGT) 80
Engineering Hours 250,000
Production Hours 2,052,000
Fabrication Work Orders 41040
Assembly Work Orders 61560
On Unit (20% of Assembly w/o) 12312
On Block (35% of Assembly w/o) 21546
On Board (45% of Assembly w/o) 27702
Overhead (% of direct costs) 33.3
Project Deadline (wks) 150 wks
Over Run Penalties ($/wk) 350,000
Table A-26 - Dynamic Model Inputs
In Chapter 3 the attributes of the shipyard selected to produce the SOCV were
discussed. Additional strategic variables which describe the shipyard are identified. The
constraints to production are discussed and quantified. The management policies needed
to run the shipyard are discussed. Additional characteristics of the workforce are
investigated.
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Appendix B - Model Equations
All of the equations used to simulate the Ship Production Model are included
here. Some of the structures were taken from the Molecules of Structure created by Jim
Hines. Other formulations were borrowed from the work in the Vensim users manual.
Most of the quations were built based on the yard observations, Ken Cooper's paper, and
David Ford's work. These references can be found in the reference sheet.
.Review
This work represents a multiphase project model of the shipbuilding process.
The phases include: design,fabrication, on unit outfitting, on block
outfitting and on board erection. These phases demonstrate prerequisite dependency
and work quality flow through. Several constraints to work flow are include: labor,
material, work space, and lift capacity
.Control
Control parameters for the model.
FINAL TIME = IF THEN ELSE(Project Compl Time > 0,
QUANTUM(Project Compl Time+15*UNIT TIME, 10*UNIT TIME),
MAX FINAL TIME)
- week
S The time at which the simulation ends.
INITIAL TIME = INITIAL(VMIN(INIT SCHED START TIME[phase!]))
- week
- The initial time for the simulation
I
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MAX FINAL TIME = 800
- week
S The maximum number of weeks for simulation even
when the project is not finished.
SAVEPER = 1
- week
S The frequency with which data is stored.
TIME STEP = 1
- week
S The solution interval for simulating the model.
UNIT TIME = 4
- week
S Unit time used for dimensional consistency
.Subscript
A list of subscripts used by the model.
downstream <-> phase
- Nil
- Downstream phases.
prereq <-> phase
- Nil
- The prerequisites for doing phase (other phases)
phase : DESIGN, FABRICATION, ONUNIT, ONBLOCK, ONBOARD
- Nil
- The phases that make up the construction process.
.Activity
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Project is Done = Phase is Done[ONBOARD]
- dmnl
- Flag to indicate that the project is completed.After On Board outfitting is done,
-:SUPPLEMENTARY
Phase is Active[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Started[phase] :AND: :NOT:
Phase is Done[phase], 1,0)
- dmnl
- Flag to show which phases are active.
Phase is Done[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Reported Fraction Complete[phase] > Required
Fraction Complete[phase], 1,0)
- dmnl
- Flag to indicate if the phase is finished.
Phase is Started[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Time >= Sched Start Time[phase],1,0)
- dmnl
- Flag to indicate if a phase has been started.
.Definition
The size, scheduling, work requirements and patterns for the project.
INIT SCHED START TIME[phase] = 0,54,54,60,90
- week
- The week at which each phase of the project starts.
Initial Schedule Completion Time[phase] = 102,102,88,102,128
- week
S The initial scheduled completion time for each phase.
Prerequisite Dependency [DESIGN,prereq] = 0,0,0,0,0 -~
Prerequisite Dependency [FABRICATION,prereq] = 1,0,0,0,0-~1
Prerequisite Dependency[ONUNIT,prereq] = 1,1,0,0,0 --
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Prerequisite Dependency[ONBLOCK,prereq] = 1,1,1,0,0 --
Prerequisite Dependency[ONBOARD,prereq] = 1,1,1,1,0
- dmnl
- Switches showing which phases depend on which for completion.
Prerequisite Required Fraction Complete[phase] = 0.3
- dmnl
- The required completeness on prerequisite work before a
phase can be started. Could be by [phase,prereq].
Required Fraction Complete[phase] = 0.98
- dmnl
S The fraction of a phase that needs to be complete before
the phase can be stopped.
Phase Definition[phase] =12500,39726,14123,26300,21530
- work orders
- The definition of how much work needs to be done in each phase in equivalent
units. For design, the units are engineering man hours. For Fabrication, the units
are work orders which represent 20 hours of production labor. For On Unit, the
units are products which represent 100 work orders per product. For On Block,
the units are blocks which represent 3-5 products per block. For On Board, the
units are erection man hours. All values are converted to work orders for
consistency.
Planned Fraction Schedule Passed[phase] = IF THEN ELSE (Time + Time to Adjust
Labor[phase]> Sched Start Time [phase],IF THEN ELSE(Time + Time to Adjust
Labor[phase] < Sched Comp Time[phase], (Time +Time to Adjust Labor[phase] - Sched
Start Time[phase])/(Sched Comp Time[phase] - Sched Start Time[phase]),1),0)
- dmnl
- The fraction of the schedule that has passed. Adjusts itself in response to
schedule slippages.
Planned Relative Effort Intensity[phase] = XIDZ(Planned Work Profile[phase]
(Planned Fraction Schedule Passed[phase])*(1 - Planned Fraction Schedule
Passed[phase]), LOOKUP AREA(Planned Work Profile[phase],Planned Fraction
Schedule Passed[phase], 1), 1)
- dmnl
- Relative effort intensity as determined by the planned profile of effort - for the
fraction of time in a phase left remaining.
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Planned Work Profile[DESIGN] ([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.2,1),(0.8,1),(1,0)) -- 1
Planned Work Profile[FABRICATION] ((0,0),(0.2,1),(0.8,1),(1,0) )--1
Planned Work Profile[ONUNIT] ((0,0),(0.2,1),(0.8,1),(1,0)) -- I
Planned Work Profile[ONBLOCK] ((0,0),(0.2,1),(0.8,1),(1,0)) --~
Planned Work Profile[ONBOARD] ((0,0),(0.2,1),(0.8,1 ),(1,0))
- dmnl
- The planned profile of effort for each phase - shows ramp
up and ramp down of the planned effort.
Planned Work Remaining[phase] = ACTIVE INITIAL(MAX(0,Reported Work
Remaining[phase] -
Project Labor[phase]*Normal Productivity[phase]* Time to Adjust Labor[phase] *
XIDZ({planned work profile[phase](fraction schedule passed[phase]) +}
Planned Work Profile [phase](Planned Fraction Schedule Passed[phase]),
Planned Work Profile[phase](Fraction Schedule Passed[phase]), )),
Reported Work Remaining[phase])
- unit
- The planned amount of work remaining as used in hiring decisions.
Relative Effort Intensity[phase] = XIDZ(Planned Work Profile[phase]
(Fraction Schedule Passed[phase]) * (1 - Fraction Schedule Passed[phase]),
LOOKUP AREA(Planned Work Profile[phase],Fraction Schedule
Passed[phase], 1), 1)
- dmnl
- Relative effort intensity as determined by the planned profile of effort
- for the fraction of time in a phase left remaining.
Work Remaining[phase] = INTEG(Discovering Rework[phase]-Gross Completion
Rate[phase],Phase Definition
[phase])
- units
- The amount of work remaining to be done in each phase
Time to Schedule Change = 4
- weeks
Added Scope[phase] = 0,0,0,0,0
- workorders
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- Additional Scope of work added by the Navy at some prescribed date after the
project has started.
Order Book = 3+STEP(150,-1 )+STEP(250,-2)
- Ships
- The amount of work the shipyard has under contract
.Schedule
Items relating to schedule and triggers for schedule slippage
Project Compl Time = INTEG(IF THEN ELSE(Project Compl Time = 0:AND:
Project is Done,Time/TIME STEP,0),0)
- week
The time at which the project was completed.
Expected Completion Time[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Active[phase],
Time + Expected Time Remaining[phase],Sched Comp Time[phase])
- week
- The excpected time at which the phase will complete.
Fraction Schedule Passed[phase] = IF THEN ELSE (Time > Sched Start Time[phase],
IF THEN ELSE(Time < Sched Comp Time[phase],(Time - Sched Start
Time[phase])/
(Sched Comp Time[phase] - Sched Start
- dmnl
Time[phase]), 1),0)
The fraction of the schedule that has passed. Adjusts itself in response
to schedule slippage.
Initial Phase Length[phase] = INITIAL(Initial Schedule Completion Time[phase]
- INIT SCHED START TIME[phase])
- week
- The initial length of the phase in weeks.
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Prerequisites in Place[phase,prereq] =IF THEN ELSE((Prerequisite
Dependency[phase,prereq] = 0):OR:Reported Fraction Complete[prereq] > Prerequisite
Required Fraction Complete[phase], 1,0)
- dmnl
- Switch to indicate if all prerequisites are in place.
Sched Comp Time[phase] = INTEG(sched comp time slip[phase],Initial Schedule
Completion Time[phase])
- week
- The scheduled completion time.
sched comp time slip[phase] = Scheduled Start Slip Time[phase] +
IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Active[phase] :AND:
Schedule Time Remaining[phase] < SLIP ZONE :AND:
Expected Time Remaining[phase] -
Schedule Time Remaining[phase] > SLIP TRIGGER,
SLIP INCREMENT/TIME STEP,0)
- week/week
- The slippage in the scheduled completion time.
Sched Start Time[phase] = INTEG(Scheduled Start Slip Time[phase],INIT SCHED
START TIME[phase])
- week
- The scheduled start time.
Scheduled Start Slip Time[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Active[phase] :OR:
VMIN(Prerequisites in Place[phase,prereq!]) > 0 :OR:
(Time + TIME STEP < Sched Start Time[phase]),
0,Start Slip Trigger Increment/TIME STEP)
- week/week
- The amount of time the scheduled start time slips in response to slippage
in prerequisite phases.
Schedule Time Remaining[phase] = MAX(O,Sched Comp Time[phase] - Time)
- week
- The amount of time remaining in the schedule.
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SLIP INCREMENT = 4
- week
- The amount of time the schedule is slipped, if it needs
slipping.
SLIP TRIGGER = 8
- week
- The amount of time behind schedule at which the completion date will be slipped.
SLIP ZONE = 12
- week
- The distance from the end of a project at which schedule slippage becomes an
alternative.
Start Slip Trigger Increment = 0.5
- week
- The slip increment for starting a phase up if things are behind schedule.
.Workforce
Net Project Labor Adjustment[phase] = MIN(Maximum Weekly Labor
Adjustment[phase], (Desired Labor[phase] - Project Labor[phase])/Time to Adjust
Labor[phase])
- person/week
- The net adjustment of labor (additions or reductions. Notice this is capped.)
Desired Labor[phase] = MIN(Maximum Labor[phase],IF THEN ELSE(Time + Time to
Adjust Labor[phase] >= Sched Start Time[phase] :AND: :NOT:Phase is Done[phase],
XIDZ((Planned Work Remaining[phase] / Normal Productivity [phase])
*Planned Relative Effort Intensity[phase],Schedule Time Remaining
[phase],Maximum Labor[phase]),O))
- person
- The amount of labor it is management would like to have.
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Project Labor[phase] = INTEG(Net Project Labor Adjustment[phase],Desired
Labor[phase])
- person
- The number of people of a given skill on a given phase.
Maximum Weekly Labor Adjustment[phase] = 10,100,50,50,50
- person/week
- The maximum rate at which labor can be adjusted for a phase.
Time to Adjust Labor[phase] = 2,2,3,3,4
- week
S The amount of time required to adjust labor to target values.
Maximum Labor[phase] = 200,850,850,850,850
- person
- The maximum labor associated with each phase of work
Attrition = Veteran Workforce*0.002
- people/week
- The normal attrition rate due to retiring leaving the industry.
Available Workforce[phase] = INTEG(-Net Project Labor Adjustment[phase]
,Veteran Workforce-Base Work Required Labor)
person
Total Required Labor = SUM(Desired Labor[phase!])+Base Work Required Labor
- people
- total number of people required to fill needs of shipyard
Trainees = INTEG(New Hires-Training,0)
- person
- Number of new trainees in the shipyard
Hiring Time = 4
- weeks
- The amount of time required to hire new labor
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Layoffs = IF THEN ELSE(Order Book<2,Veteran Workforce-Total Required Labor,0)
- person
- The amount of people layed off in a week if order book drops below two ships
New Hires = IF THEN ELSE(Veteran Workforce>Total Required Labor,0,(Total
Required Labor-Veteran Workforce)/Hiring Time)
- person/week
- The amount of people required to fulfill the needs of the shipyard
Training Time = 36
- weeks
- The amount of time it takes to train a shipyard worker.
May be greater for some trades.
Shipyard Workforce = Trainees+Veteran Workforce
- person
- The total number of people working in the yard
Veteran Workforce = INTEG(Training-Attrition-Layoffs, 11000)
- person
- The amount of people working in the yard
Training = Trainees/Training Time
- person/week
- The amount of new trainees fully qualified to work on ships produced per week
Base Work Required Labor = 8000
person
.Constraints
The infrastructure constraints to the system. These should not be allowed to control the
destiny of the company. They should be identified and dealt with accordingly. Knowing
that a constraint exists acts to provide a demotivating factor for improvements. If we do
better here,we still have to take care of Blast and Paint. Blast and Paint has been broken
for years so what will change?
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Blast and Paint Area = 6
Infrastructure Constraints to Production[DESIGN] = Engineering Capacity -- I
Infrastructure Constraints to Production[FABRICATION] = Fabrication Capacity --
Infrastructure Constraints to Production[ONUNIT] = On Unit Capacity -- I
Infrastructure Constraints to Production[ONBLOCK] = MIN(On Block Capacity,Blast
and Paint Capacity) -- i
Infrastructure Constraints to Production[ONBOARD] = MIN(Crane Capacity,Erection
Site Capacity)
- work orders/week
- Represents the choke point of the installed infrastructure
Blast and Paint Capacity = Blast and Paint Area*BP Converter
BP Converter = 400
- work order/block
- Converts blast and paint capacity to products
Crane Capacity = Crane Converter*Cranes
- work orders/week
- The total amount of work that can be moved per week by crane
Crane Converter = 25
- work orders/lift
- Total number of products that can be supported per lift. Each product requires a lift.
Each Block requires three lifts. Therefore each lift represents one fourth of the
required amount per product.
Cranes = 500
- lift/week
- Crane capacity in terms of lifts available per week. Average of the time it takes to
accomplish all lifts in the yard.
Design Converter = 10
- work orders/drawing
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The total number of work orders that can be supported by each design
Work Stations = 100
- drawing/week
- Total number of drawings per week able to be supported by CAD hardware
Engineering Capacity = Design Converter*Work Stations
- work order/week
- Number of work orders capable of being supported by current hardware per week
Fabrication Capacity = Fabrication Equipment
- work order/week
- Total number of products that can be supported by installed fabrication equipment
per week
Fabrication Equipment = 1500
- work order/week
- The amount of work orders the fabrication equipment can support per week
On Block Converter = 400
- work orders/block
- The number of products that make up a block
On Block Area = 10
- Blocks/week
- The amount of blocks that can be pushed through the On Block area per week
On Block Capacity =On Block Converter*On Block Area
- work order/week
- The amount of products that can be supported by the On Block facilities per week
On Unit Area = 16
- product/week
- The constraint for the On Unit area
On Unit Capacity = On Unit Area*On Unit Converter
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- work order/week
- Throughput measured in work orders per week the infrastructure for On Unit
Outfitting can support
On Unit Converter = 100
- work order/product
- The total amount of work orders needed for each product
Erection Site Capacity = Erection Site Converter*Erection Sites
- work orders/week
- The amount of work orders/week the building ways at the yard can support can
support
Erection Site Converter = 4000
- work orders/Site
- The amount of work orders possible for each building site
Erection Sites = 2
- sites
- The number of sites capable of erecting a ship
.Productivity
The total amount of work people get done, and are able to get done.
Normal Productivity[phase] = 2,2,2,1.5,1
- work orders/person/week
- The normal amount of work that is done in the absence of
any effects on productivity. Identifies the choke points in the process.
Avg Overtime Frac[phase] = INTEG((Overtime Fraction[phase] - Avg Overtime
Frac[phase])/
Time to Average Overtime, 1)
- dmnl
- The average overtime fraction used as a measure of fatigue.
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Effect Fatigue Prod[phase] = TABLE EFF FATIGUE PROD(Avg Overtime Frac[phase])
- dmnl
- The effect of fatigue on productivity.
Effect of Morale on Prod[phase] = TABLE EFF MORALE PROD((Expected Completion
Time[phase]
- Initial Schedule Completion Time[phase])/Initial Phase Length[phase])
dmnl
The effect of morale on productivity
Effect Prereq Readiness Prod[phase,prereq] =
IF THEN ELSE(Prerequisite Dependency[phase,prereq],
IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Done[prereq],
1,PREREQ EFF SPEED LOOKUP(Reported Fraction Complete[phase])), 1)
- dmnl
- The effect of prerequisite readiness on work speed.
Effect Sched Press Prod[phase] = TABLE EFF SCHED PRESS PROD(MIN(5,
XIDZ(Expected Time Remaining[phase],Schedule Time Remaining[phase],5)))
- dmnl
S The effect of schedule pressure on gross productivity.
Gross Productivity[phase] = Normal Productivity[phase] *
Effect of Morale on Prod[phase] *
Effect Fatigue Prod[phase] *
Effect Sched Press Prod[phase] *
PROD(Effect Prereq Readiness Prod[phase,prereq!])
* (1 + (RANDOM 0 1() - 0.5) * PRODUCTIVITY NOISE)
- work order/person/week
- The gross amount that people can get done in an hour neglecting
any quality or potential rework measures.
PREREQ EFF SPEED LOOKUP((0,1),(0.5,1),(1,0))
- dmnl
- Table relating the fraction complete of a phase to
effect on work speed of prerequisites that are not
yet completely finished.
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PRODUCTIVITY NOISE = 0
- dmnl
- The noise in productivity.
TABLE EFF FATIGUE PROD ([(0,0.6)-(2,1)],(0.5,1),(1,1),(1.1,0.95)
,(1.2,0.9),(1.3,0.85),(1.4,0.8),(1.5,0.7 )
- dmnl
- Table showing the effect of fatigue (average overtime) on
productivity.
TABLE EFF MORALE PROD (-1,-0.5,0,0.5,1,1.5,2,4,2,1,0.85,0.75,0.7,0.65)
- dmnl
- The table describing the effect of morale on productivity.
TABLE EFF SCHED PRESS PROD ([(0,0.8)-(20,2)],(0,1),(1,1),(2.93814,1.13947)
,(4.84536,1.22632),(6.59794,1.24211),(10,1.25))
- dmnl
- Table showing the effect of schedule pressure on productivity.
Time to Average Overtime = 8
- weeks
- The time taken to formulate the impact of average overtime in determining its
impact on fatigue.
.Quality
Equations describing quality and its determinants.
Normal Quality[phase] = 0.85
- dmnl
- The normal quality of work done when no factors affecting quality are
deteriorating performance.
Effect Fatigue Qual[phase] = TABLE EFF FATIGUE QUAL(Avg Overtime Frac[phase])
- dmnl
- The effect of fatigue on quality.
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Effect Morale Qual[phase] = TABLE EFF MORALE QUAL((Expected Completion
Time[phase]
- Initial Schedule Completion Time[phase])/Initial Phase Length[phase])
- dmnl
- The effect of morale on quality
Effect Prereq Qual Qual[phase,prereq] = IF THEN ELSE(Prerequisite
Dependency [phase,prereq],
XIDZ(Work Completed Correctly[prereq],Reported Work Complete[prereq], 1),1)
- dmnl
- The effect of prerequisite quality on quality. Quality is not a measurable quantity in
the
shipyard. Must be determined by internal factors and acceptance by the customer.
Effect Schedule Press Qual[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Active[phase],
TABLE EFF SCHED PRESS QUAL(XIDZ(Expected Time Remaining[phase],
Schedule Time Remaining[phase],5)),1)
- dmnl
- The effect of schedule pressure on gross quality.
QUALITY NOISE = 0
- dmnl
- Noise output as a result of quality variation.
TABLE EFF FATIGUE QUAL ( 0.5,1,1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.5,1,1,0.95,0.9,0.85,0.8,0.7)
- dmnl
- Table showing the effect of fatigue (average overtime)on quality.
TABLE EFF MORALE QUAL (-1,-0.5,0,0.5,1,1.5,2,1,1,1,0.95,0.9,0.85,0.85)
- dmnl
- The table describing the effect of morale on quality.
TABLE EFF SCHED PRESS QUAL (0,1,2,5,10,1,1,0.95,0.9,0.8)
- dmnl
- Table showing the effect of schedule pressure on quality.I
303
Work Quality[phase] = Normal Quality[phase] *
Effect Morale Qual[phase] *
Effect Fatigue Qual[phase] *
Effect Schedule Press Qual[phase] *
PROD(Effect Prereq Qual Qual[phase,prereq!]) *
(1 - RANDOM 0 1( * QUALITY NOISE)
- dmnl
- The quality of work being done by people.
.Progress
Work that is actually getting done.
Discovering Rework[phase] = MAX(0,MIN(Undiscovered Rework[phase]/
TIME STEP,Undiscovered Rework[phase]/Rework Discovery Time[phase] +
SUM(Downstream Rework Discovery[downstream!,phase])))+ Added
Scope[phase]/Time to Schedule Change
work order/week
The rate of discovery of rework and new work due to change
Possible Labor Completion Rate[phase] =Project Labor[phase]*Gross
Productivity[phase]* Overtime Fraction
[phase]
- work order/week
- The amount of work that can be done as a factor of Labor constraints
Gross Completion Rate[phase] =IF THEN ELSE(Work
Remaining [phase]>O,MIN(Infrastructure Constraints to Production
[phase],Possible Labor Completion Rate[phase]),0)
- work order/week
- The rate at which both correct and flawed work is being
completed based on labor and infrastructure constraints.
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Undiscovered Rework[phase] = INTEG(Gross Completion Rate[phase] * (1-Work
Quality
[phase]) - Discovering Rework[phase],O)
- work orders
- The amount of work that is done incorrectly and requires
correction, but has not yet been detected.
Work Completed Correctly[phase] = INTEG(Gross Completion Rate[phase] * Work
Quality
[phase],O)
- work orders
- The amount of work that is completed correctly.
Downstream Rework Discovery[downstream,phase] = IF THEN ELSE(
Phase is Active[downstream] :AND:
Prerequisite Dependency[downstream,phase], Undiscovered Rework[phase]/
Prerequisite Rework Discovery Time[downstream,phase],O)
- work order/week
- The discovery of errors in downstream phases.
Expected Time Remaining[phase] = IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Started[phase],
IF THEN ELSE(Phase is Done[phase],
0,MIN(2*Initial Phase Length[phase],
XIDZ(Reported Work Remaining [phase],
Normal Productivity[phase] *
Expected Effective Labor[phase],
2*Initial Phase Length[phase]))),
Initial Phase Length[phase])
- week
- The expected time remaining to the completion of the
phase.
Expected Effective Labor[phase] = XIDZ(Project Labor[phase],
Relative Effort Intensity[phase],
Reported Work Remaining[phase]/Normal Productivity [phase]/
Initial Phase Length[phase])
- person
- The expected effective workforce
Normal Rework Discovery Time[phase] = 6,5,3,3,2
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week
The normal time it takes to discover errors.
Overtime Fraction[phase] = TABLE OVERTIME FRAC(XIDZ(Expected Time
Remaining[phase
],Schedule Time Remaining[phase], 1))
- dmnl
- The amount of overtime being worked.
Prerequisite Rework Discovery Time[DESIGN,phase] = 6
Prerequisite Rework Discovery Time[FABRICATION,phase] = 4
Prerequisite Rework Discovery Time[ONUNIT,phase] = 3TIONphase]
Prerequisite Rework Discovery Time[ONBLOCK,phase] = 3 -- 1
Prerequisite Rework Discovery Time[ONBOARD,phase] = 1
- week
- The time to discover errors in prerequisite work.
Reported Fraction Complete[phase] = Reported Work Complete[phase]/
Phase Definition[phase]
- dmnl
- The fraction of work that is reported to be complete.
Reported Work Remaining[phase] = MAX(O,Phase Definition[phase] -
Reported Work Complete[phase])
- work orders
- The reported amount of work remaining.
Reported Work Complete[phase] = Work Completed Correctly[phase] + Undiscovered
Rework[phase]
- work orders
- The amount of work that is reported to be complete.
Rework Discovery Time[phase] = Normal Rework Discovery Time[phase] * TABLE
EFF FRAC COMP[phase](Reported Fraction Complete[phase])
- week
- The time required to detect existing problems.
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TABLE EFF FRAC COMP[DESIGN] ((0,1),(0.5,1),(0.6,0.8),(0.7,0.6), (0.8,0.4),(1,0.2))
TABLE EFF FRAC COMP[FABRICATION] ((0,1),(0.5,1),(0.6,0.8),(0.7,0.6),
(0.8,0.4),(1,0.2)) -- 1
TABLE EFF FRAC COMP[ONUNIT] ((0,1),(0.5,0.9),(0.75,0.4),
(1,0.2)) --EFF FRAC COMP[ONBLOCK] ((0,1),(0.5,0.9),(0.75,0.4), (1,0.2))
TABLE EFF FRAC COMP[ONBLOCK] ((0,1),(0.5,0.9),(0.75,0.4), (1,0.2))
TABLE EFF FRAC COMP[ONBOARD] ((0,1),(0.5,0.9),(0.75,0.4),(1,0.1))
- dmnl
- Table showing the effect of the fraction complete on the speed with which errors are
discovered.
TABLE OVERTIME FRAC ([(-0.2,0)-(4,2)],(-0.1,0),(0,0.3),(1,1)
,(1.2,1.1),(1.5,1.2),(2,1.3),(3,1.3) )
- dmnl
- Table showing the overtime fraction as a function of behind schedule.
.Financial
Financial performance of the project
Weekly Overhead Cost[phase] =Weekly Phase Labor Cost[phase]/3
- dollars
- The cost of maintaining the shipyard features and shipyard personnel
Weekly Costs[phase] = Weekly Phase Labor Cost[phase]+
Weekly Overhead Cost[phase]
- dollars/week
- The ongoing cost of a phase including labor and materials.
Weekly Phase Labor Cost[phase] = Project Labor[phase]*Wage Rate
- dollars/week
- The cost of labor for each particular phase.
Total Cumulative Project Cost = SUM(Cumulative Phase Cost[phase!])+Overrun Charge
- dollars
- The total cumulative cost of running the project
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-:SUPPLEMENTARY
Cumulative Phase Cost[phase] = INTEG(Weekly Costs[phase],0)
- dollars
- The cumulative cost of each phase
Total Weekly Cost = SUM(Weekly Costs[phase!])
- dollar/week
- The total weekly cost of running the project
-:SUPPLEMENTARY
Overrun Charge = IF THEN ELSE(Project is Done,0,MAX(0,Overrun Charge
Rate*(Time-(10+Initial Schedule Completion Time[ONBOARD]))))
- dollars
- The over run charges for a late project.
Overrun Charge Rate = 350000
- dollars/week
- The penalty assessed on project lateness per week. Kicks in after a 10 day grace
period
Wage Rate =1600
- dollars/person/week
- The cost of maintaining the average worker at the yard in terms of base pay and
benefits.
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Appendix C - Glossary of Terms
3-D Product Model - Captures all of the information needed to describe a ship
ABS - American Bureau of Ships
Anchor Windlass - Used to raise and lower the anchor and chain
Arsenal Ship - Large missile carrying ship with over 500 vertical launch cells
ATC - Affordability Through Commonality Program
BATHMAX 1500 - Teaming effort of Kvearna Masa and Bath Iron Works for fast
container ship - 1500 TEU capacity
BIW - Bath Iron Works
Block - Construction section of the ship - max 250 tons
Burn Tables - Machines in the Fabrication facility where plates are cut into shapes. The
processes used are different for each shipyard.
Crash Astern Test - While going max speed forward, reverse the engines to max reverse
to see how long it takes to stop the ship.
CATEA - Visualization Software used by Bath and Electric Boat. Also used by Boeing
on the 777 program
Computer Vision - 3-D CAD Package
CONUS - Continental United States
COTS - Commercial Off The Shelf
CPM - Critical Path Method
CVX - Next generation aircraft carrier
Davits - Used to launch and recover small boats
DDG-51 Flight IIA - Added helicopter support and lengthened base design
DMRS - Defense Mobility Requirements Study
DWL - Designed Water Line
DYNAMO - System Dynamics modeling software
ECP - Engineering Change Proposal
Erection Site - The place where the ship is put together. This could be a dry-dock, a
shipbuilding ways, or on a land level translator depending on the shipyard.
FASTSHIP Atlantic - Semi Planing Hull proposed by Thornycraft and Giles with 1500
TEU capacity
Frames
FTV - Future Technology Variant of Mid Term Sealift Technology Development
Program
HVAC - Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
IHI - Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries
ISO 9000
JIT - Just In Time
Lagging - pipe insulation
Light Off - Start an engine or boiler
LCC - Life Cycle Cost
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SOCV - Sealift Option, Commercially Viable - A new approach to providing the surge
sealift capacity needed by the government in time of war.
LPD-17 - Latest Amphibious Ship
LBP - Length Between Perpendiculars - usually the length of the ship at the waterline
LM-6000 - Advanced gas turbine engine developed by General Electric
LOA - Length Over All - Total length of the ship
LSI - Lean Ship Initiative
MARITECH - Marine Systems Technology
Margin - Reserve for future growth
MHI - Massachusetts Heavy Industries
MILSPEC DH-36 - High Tensile Strength Steel Plate
MILSPEC - Military Specifications
Molecules - System Dynamics Building Blocks generated by Jim Hines for Vensim and
15.875
MTSSTDP - Mid-Term Sealift Ship Technology Development Program
MW - Mega Watt
NASSCO - National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
NAVSEA - Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVSHPSSO - NAVSEA Shipbuilding Support Office
NDF - National Defense Features
No Touch Labor - Not involved with structural steel of outfitting of ship, e.g. cleaning
people
NSRP - National Shipbuilding Research Program
OPA 90 - Oil Pollution Act of 1990
Opti Nest - Automatic plate marking and cutting CAD/CAM system
Outfitting - The installation of all systems in the structural steel framework of a ship This
includes piping, electrical cables, furniture, machinery, and other items
Panels - Plates of steel which make up the sides, bottom and decks of the ship
PERT - Probabilistic Evaluation and Review Technique
PO2 - The On Block portion of the BIW construction sequence
PWBS - Product Work Breakdown Structure
QA - Quality Assurance
RRF - Ready Reserve Force
RO/RO - Roll On/Roll Off ship - Can carry cars, trucks or tracked vehicles. Loaded and
unloaded without the use of cranes.
SA'AR - Corvette sized combatant built by Ingalls for Israeli Navy.
SC-21 - Next combatant ship program after DDG-51
Shipbuild - New project planning and progress tracking software which will use some
elements of System Dynamics
Ship Production Model - A virtual representation of a particular ship being built at a
shipyard
SHP - Ship Horse Power
SOCV@MIT - 13.414 Year Long Design Project Team
Stealth - Ability to evade radar
SUPSHIP - Supervisor of Shipbuilding
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Strakes
Strategic Sealift - Shipping which provides heavy lift of Department of Defense
Equipment from CONUS to the area required
System Dynamics - Methodology used to examine complex problems with non linear
relationships and feedback
TEU - Twenty foot Equivalent Unit
Title XI - Loan guarantees meant to stimulate shipbuilding in this country
TOC - Total Ownership Costs
Unit - The smallest level of sub assembly in the process. Includes entire system of
machinery like fire pumps. Units can be tested for proper operation at the shop level
USCG - United States Coast Guard
Vensim - System Dynamics modeling software
Waterjet - Method of Propulsion much like ajet engine. Ship is propelled by ajet of
water instead of a propeller.
WBD - Weeks Before Delivery
WIP - Work In Progress
WT, T, W-T -
Zones - Defines what functions are carried out in this portion of the ship e.g. Machinery,
Living, Storage
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